The opinion of the court was delivered by: John G. Koeltl, District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The plaintiff and counter-defendant Mason Tenders District Council ("MTDC") of Greater New York, on behalf of itself and its constituent Asbestos, Lead, and Hazardous Waste Local No. 78 ("Local 78") (collectively, the "Union"), brings this action pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, to enforce the terms of a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") against defendants and counter-plaintiffs WTC Contracting, Inc. ("WTC"), an alleged employer within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) and party to the CBA, and John Perotti, the president of WTC who allegedly executed the CBA in his personal and representative capacities.
In their answer, WTC and Perotti--together with counter-plaintiff Dunia Solis, Perotti's wife--assert five counterclaims under federal and state law against the Union and counter-defendant Edison Severino, an alleged "Business Agent" for the Union. These counterclaims allege (1) that the Union engaged in conduct intended to coerce neutral business entities to sever business relations with WTC in violation of Section 8(b)(4) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) ("First Counterclaim"); (2) a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because counter-defendant Severino allegedly induced the Union to engage in extreme and outrageous conduct to compel counter-plaintiff Solis to acquiesce in Severino's demands for sexual favors ("Second Counterclaim"); (3) a claim for assault and battery against Severino ("Third Counterclaim"); (4) a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations and prospective contractual relations against Severino and the Union ("Fourth Counterclaim"); and (5) a claim to hold the Union vicariously liable for Severino's alleged misconduct ("Fifth Counterclaim").
The counter-defendants dispute the underlying factual allegations in the counterclaims. Moreover, the counter-defendants move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss these counterclaims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Cress v. Wilson, No. 06 Civ. 2717, 2007 WL 1686687, at *3--*4 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2007) (discussing the applicable standards on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)). For the following reasons, the counter-defendants' motion to dismiss the counterclaims is granted in part and denied in part.*fn1
The counter-defendants argue that the First Counterclaim, which alleges a violation of the LMRA, should be dismissed because the counter-plaintiffs failed adequately to specify damages. Section 303 of the LMRA provides for the recovery of damages for "[w]hoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason [of]"*fn2 a violation of, among other provisions, Section 8(b)(4). 29 U.S.C. § 187(b). The counter-defendants argue that the phrase "by reason of" in Section 303 requires a claimant to plead special damages to state a valid cause of action.
The only authority that the counter-defendants offer to support this theory is a single memorandum opinion from a district court in the District of Columbia, which held only that the plaintiffs in that case had adequately pleaded special damages, without resolving or even addressing whether Section 303 requires an LMRA claimant to plead special damages to state a cause of action. See Oncore Construction, LLC v. Laborer's Int'l Union ECF of N. America, AFL-CIO, No. 02-1634 (JDB), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26760, at *13--*14 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2003).
The counter-defendants' sparse motion papers offer no additional cases or arguments to support their theory that the counter-plaintiffs are required to plead special damages with respect to the First Counterclaim. In this case, the First Counterclaim alleges that the Union unlawfully interfered with WTC's relations with two separate businesses and that as a result of these unlawful disruptions, the Union caused damages to WTC in an amount of no less than $10,000 in each case. (Countercl. ¶¶ 31, 36.) Although the phrase "by reason of" in Section 303 does require that there be a causal nexus between the alleged violation of the LMRA and any injury suffered, see Betal Envtl. Corp. v. Local Union No. 78, 162 F. Supp. 2d 246, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), nothing in Section 303 suggests that the particularization of the injuries in this case was insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Therefore, the counter-defendants' motion to dismiss the First Counterclaim on this basis is denied.
The counter-defendants also move to dismiss the state law counterclaims against the Union and counter-defendant Severino, in his official capacity, because the counter-plaintiffs failed to allege that the entire membership of the Union authorized in advance or subsequently ratified the allegedly unlawful conduct, as required by Martin v. Curran, 101 N.E.2d 683, 686 (N.Y. 1951) ("So, for better or worse, wisely or otherwise, the Legislature has limited such suits against association officers, whether for breaches of agreements or for tortious wrongs, to cases where the individual liability of every single member can be alleged and proven."). See, e.g., Salemeh v. Toussaint, 810 N.Y.S.2d 1, 1--2 (App. Div. 2006) ("Intentional tort claims against Local 100 were properly dismissed because plaintiff security guard failed to plead that the entire membership of Local 100 authorized in advance, or subsequently ratified, the alleged assault upon him."); Duane Reade, Inc. v. Local 338 Retail, 794 N.Y.S.2d 25, 25 (App. Div. 2005); see also Hoesten v. Best, 821 N.Y.S.2d 40, 52--53 (App. Div. 2006) ("While the Martin rule has been the subject of considerable criticism, it remains the law of New York." (citations omitted)).
The counter-plaintiffs attempt to avoid the rule of Martin v. Curran by relying on a single memorandum decision from the First Department in Browne v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union 851, which approved a jury instruction that a union could be liable for the acts of its members where violence or threats of violence had become an every day occurrence in a strike, authorized and approved by the union, and the union either openly encouraged the violence and threats or deliberately failed to check it or give orders countermanding it. 609 N.Y.S.2d 237, 238 (App. Div. 1994). However, Browne does not undercut Martin's continuing vitality.
To the extent that plaintiffs are arguing that Browne demonstrates that Martin is no longer good law . . . the court rejects their argument. The Browne court did not discuss Martin. In light of the substantial body of case law . . . that suggests Martin is still good law in New York, the Appellate Division's decision in Browne is not sufficiently definitive to persuade this court that Martin no longer applies.
Bldg. Indus. Fund v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 992 F. Supp. 192, 194--95 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); see also Salemeh v. Toussaint, 799 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Table), 2003 WL 23945600, at *2 (Sup. Ct. June 20, 2003), aff'd as modified, 810 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 2006).
Martin v. Curran applies here. Therefore, because the counter-plaintiffs have failed adequately to allege that each member of the Union authorized or subsequently ratified the alleged torts, the counter-defendants' motion to dismiss the state law counterclaims ...