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In re Parmalat Securities Litigation


July 24, 2007


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Lewis A. Kaplan, District Judge.

This document relates to: 04 MD 1653 (LAK)


This is a purported class action on behalf of purchasers of securities of the Italian company Parmalat Finanziaria, S.p.A. ("Parmalat") for damages allegedly sustained when Parmalat collapsed following discovery of a massive fraud. The Court assumes familiarity with its prior opinions*fn1 and sets forth only those aspects of the Third Amended Complaint (the "TAC") relevant to the instant motion.

The named plaintiffs are several entities and individuals, foreign and domestic, who purchased Parmalat securities during the course of the alleged fraud.*fn2 Plaintiffs seek to sue on behalf of all purchasers of Parmalat securities between January 5, 1999 and December 18, 2003.*fn3 Plaintiffs sue Parmalat's officers, directors, accountants, lawyers, and banks under Sections 10(b)*fn4 and 20(a)*fn5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5*fn6 thereunder.

The matter is before the Court on motions of Grant Thornton International ("GTI") and Grant Thornton LLP ("GT-US") (collectively, the "Grant Thornton Movants"); Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu ("DTT"), Deloitte & Touche LLP ("Deloitte-US") and James E. Copeland ("Copeland") (collectively, the "Deloitte Movants")(the Grant Thornton Movants and the Deloitte Movants collectively will be referred to as the "Auditor Movants"); Bank of America Corp., Bank of America N.A. and Banc of America Securities Ltd. (collectively, the "BoA Movants"); and Citigroup Inc., Citibank, N.A., Vialattea LLC, Buconero LLC and Eureka Securitisation plc (collectively, the "Citigroup Movants") to dismiss the claims of foreign purchasers pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) on the ground that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over such claims, that foreign purchasers fail to state a claim for relief, or both.

I. Legal Standards

In this circuit, as in many others, the extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act long has been characterized as implicating a court's subject matter jurisdiction.*fn7 A recent Supreme Court decision, however, raises the question whether it properly is characterized instead as going to the existence of a claim under the federal securities laws. In Arbaugh v. T & H Corp.,*fn8 the Supreme Court concluded that Title VII's definition of "employer" as having fifteen or more employees was an element of the Title VII claim rather than a limitation on subject matter jurisdiction. The Court, observing that "[o]n the subject-matter-jurisdiction/ingredient-of-claim-for-relief dichotomy, this Court and others have been less than meticulous,"*fn9 enunciated a "readily administrable bright line" rule: "[W]hen Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character."*fn10

The limits on the extraterritorial application of the Securities Exchange Act are not set forth in the text of the Act itself, but instead reflect a recognition by the courts that Congress would not have wished "the precious resources of United States courts and law enforcement agencies" to be spent on predominantly foreign transactions.*fn11 Arbaugh's "bright line" rule thus suggests that this limit is an element of a securities fraud claim rather than a restriction on a court's subject matter jurisdiction.*fn12 The Court need not decide the issue, however. While the appropriate characterization may affect the outcome in other cases, movants here prevail in either event.

On a motion to dismiss, a court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in the alleging party's favor.*fn13 "To survive dismissal, the plaintiff must provide the grounds upon which his claim rests through factual allegations sufficient 'to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'"*fn14

Upon submission by the parties of materials external to the complaint, a court may convert a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings for failure to state a claim into one for summary judgment.*fn15 Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.*fn16 Where, as here, the burden of proof at trial would fall on the nonmoving party, it ordinarily is sufficient for the movant to point to a lack of evidence to go to the trier of fact on an essential element of the nonmovant's claim.*fn17 In that event, the nonmoving party must come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to avoid summary judgment.*fn18

If, where the Court considers extrinsic materials, the motions properly are characterized as motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction instead of summary judgment motions, the standard would change only in that a court may make factual findings where a material fact is disputed.*fn19 As there are no material facts in dispute here, the outcome would be the same under either standard.

II. Successive Motions

As an initial matter, plaintiffs argue that the motions should be denied as improper successive motions under Rule 12(g) or as determined by the law of the case because all movants filed previously motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs' arguments are without merit. Indeed, they are further reflections of the scorched earth, take no prisoners style of litigation that both sides have pursued here to the detriment of the prompt, speedy and efficient resolution that should be the goal of all litigation.*fn20

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g) states, in relevant part, that "[i]f a party makes a motion under this rule but omits therefrom any defense or objection then available to the party which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on the defense or objection so omitted, except a motion as provided in subdivision (h)(2) hereof on any of the grounds there stated." Subdivision (h)(2), in turn, states that "[a] defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . may be made . . . by a motion for judgment on the pleadings." The plain language of the rule thus contemplates that successive motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be filed. Other courts in this district have reached the same conclusion.*fn21

Plaintiffs' argument that the law of the case doctrine bars consideration of the current motions also is unpersuasive. Under the law of the case, "when a court has ruled on an issue, that decision should generally be adhered to by that court in subsequent stages in the same case."*fn22 But as the Court has not yet ruled on whether foreign purchasers state claims against movants, the law of the case doctrine does not apply. Moreover, the doctrine is discretionary, "and the decision whether or not to apply law-of-the-case is, in turn, informed principally by the concern that disregard of an earlier ruling not be allowed to prejudice the party seeking the benefit of the doctrine," where the term prejudice "refers to a lack of sufficiency of notice."*fn23 Plaintiffs have had ample notice that the Court is considering the issue. Hence, even if the doctrine applied, it would not bar the Court's consideration of the motions.*fn24

III. Discussion

A. The Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Laws

As noted above, the federal securities laws are silent with respect to their extraterritorial application. In Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.,*fn25 however, Judge Friendly noted that "[w]hen . . . a court is confronted with transactions that on any view are predominantly foreign, it must seek to determine whether Congress would have wished the precious resources of United States courts and law enforcement agencies to be devoted to them rather than leave the problem to foreign countries."*fn26 The test in this Circuit for whether Congress would so wish is "(1) whether the wrongful conduct occurred in the United States, and (2) whether the wrongful conduct had a substantial effect in the United States or upon United States citizens."*fn27

Conduct in the United States will support application of the securities laws only when "substantial acts in furtherance of the fraud were committed within the United States."*fn28 U.S. acts or culpable failures to act must have been "more than 'merely preparatory'" and must have "'directly caused' the claimed losses."*fn29 In contrast, "where the United States activities are merely preparatory or take the form of culpable nonfeasance and are relatively small in comparison to those abroad," the securities laws do not apply.*fn30 "Inherent in the conduct test is the principle that Congress does not want 'the United States to be used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when these are peddled only to foreigners.'"*fn31 All parties here agree that the conduct of each defendant is analyzed separately.*fn32

Initially, plaintiffs did not contend that the second test -- the effects test -- applies to the claims of foreign purchasers. At oral argument, however, lead plaintiffs' counsel urged the Court to apply a "blended" test weighing both conduct and overall effects, citing Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC.*fn33 Plaintiffs argue, in essence, that since the fraud harmed U.S. purchasers,*fn34 this effect should factor into the Court's consideration of whether the U.S. conduct of the moving defendants is sufficient to support application of the securities laws.

Plaintiffs' argument is unpersuasive. The plaintiff in Itoba was a foreign entity, but the alleged injury flowed to its parent company and its shareholders, half of whom resided in the United States.*fn35 Thus, if neither the effects test nor the conduct test alone had been satisfied, the injury suffered in the U.S. would not have been redressed. This case is very different. Plaintiffs here seek to certify a class of purchasers of Parmalat securities. Some purchasers were domestic; others foreign. Movants seek to dismiss only the claims of the latter. The claimed injuries to American purchasers will be litigated, and the question of whether the securities laws reach the claims of foreign purchasers need not consider the U.S. effect.*fn36 Thus, the effects test has no bearing on the present motions.

B. The Auditor Movants

It is unnecessary to convert the motions of the Auditor Movants to ones for summary judgment, as plaintiffs have not stated a legally sufficient claim. The Court begins by setting forth the allegations of the complaint, drawing every reasonable inference favorable to plaintiffs.

1. Allegations

The TAC alleges that Parmalat's auditors during the relevant period, Grant Thornton S.p.A. ("GT-Italy") and Deloitte & Touche, S.p.A. ("Deloitte-Italy"), participated in and are liable for Parmalat's fraud. GT-Italy and Deloitte-Italy allegedly, for example, certified Parmalat's financial statements despite knowing that such statements contained material misrepresentations.*fn37

The TAC does not allege, however, that any fraudulent acts or omissions by GT-Italy or Deloitte-Italy took place in the United States.

The TAC alleges that the Grant Thornton and Deloitte Movants are vicariously liable for the allegedly fraudulent conduct of, respectively, GT-Italy and Deloitte-Italy.*fn38 The Court previously found that plaintiffs have alleged sufficiently that GT-Italy was the agent or alter ego of GTI and GT-US and that Deloitte-Italy was the agent or alter ego of DTT.*fn39 These movants thus would be vicariously liable for any Section 10(b) violations committed by their respective agents. The Court previously held also that plaintiffs allege legally sufficient claims against all of the Auditor Movants for liability under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, which provides that "[e]very person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of this chapter . . . shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person . . . ."*fn40 Of particular significance for present purposes, the Court held that the culpable participation of the controlling person was not a necessary element of a Section 20(a) claim.*fn41

In sum, the TAC sues the Auditor Movants exclusively for the acts and omissions of others, based on their status as principals and controlling persons.*fn42

2. Analysis

Plaintiffs argue that "all acts or failures to act by [the Auditor Movants] occurred in the United States" and that the conduct test therefore is satisfied.*fn43 The Auditor Movants reply that any U.S. conduct in which they engaged is not alleged to have been directly related to the fraud and thus cannot support extraterritorial application of the securities laws.*fn44

Plaintiffs' argument misses the mark. The conduct test looks not at any conduct, but at culpable conduct in furtherance of the fraud. Plaintiffs seek to hold the Auditor Movants liable solely on the basis of their status as principals or controlling persons -- a status which, in itself, is not alleged to have been part of the fraud. In fact, plaintiffs made this very point in a prior motion in seeking to persuade the Court to apply Rule 8's pleading standard to their allegations of agency. The Court agreed, concluding that plaintiffs' "allegation [of agency relationship] is not so closely intertwined with the claim of securities fraud that it is a circumstance of the fraud itself."*fn45 Thus, the Auditor Movants' U.S.-based actions simply formed the relationships of agency and control. These relationships were not parts of the fraud and did not directly cause plaintiffs' alleged injuries.*fn46

Further, plaintiffs tacitly acknowledge that none of the alleged primary violators' conduct took place in the United States. As the only culpable conduct for which plaintiffs seek to hold the Auditor Movants liable occurred outside of the United States, the securities laws do not apply to claims of foreign purchasers.

C. The BoA and Citigroup Movants

BoA, Citigroup, and plaintiffs all submitted extrinsic materials in connection with the banks' motions. Having provided the requisite notice to the parties,*fn47 the Court converts BoA's and Citigroup's motions to dismiss into motions for summary judgment dismissing the claims of foreign purchasers.

1. The BoA Movants

a. The Parmalat Administração Investment

i. Claim for Relief

The TAC alleges two fraudulent arrangements involving the BoA Movants. The first is an arrangement for equity investment in a Brazilian Parmalat subsidiary, Parmalat Administração.*fn48 BoA was the private placement agent for the investment and also an investor. Under the terms of the transaction, designed by BoA employees based in Italy, investors purchased four-year notes from two Cayman Islands special purpose entities, which used the proceeds to invest in Parmalat Administração. A return on the Parmalat Administração investment was assured by a put agreement guaranteed ultimately by Parmalat.

In a prior opinion, the Court held that, while plaintiffs allege no actionable misrepresentations by BoA with respect to this transaction, plaintiffs sufficiently allege a violation of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) on the theory that the structure of the transaction itself was deceptive:

"The [structure of the arrangement] created the appearance that BoA believed that [Parmalat Administração] was worth . . . $1.6 billion and was willing to invest its own money based on that valuation, when in fact BoA knew that [Parmalat Administração] was worth far less and was willing to invest only because the put guaranteed that BoA would be repaid at a premium."*fn49

ii. Evidence of United States Conduct

It is undisputed that BoA actively and successfully solicited U.S. investors and participated in several U.S. "road shows" to that end. Much of plaintiffs' evidence of U.S. conduct, however, demonstrates only the involvement of U.S.-based BoA officials in the private placements, either in soliciting such investments or in obtaining a favorable rating for the investment from an independent rating organization.*fn50

Plaintiffs submit evidence of additional U.S.-based actions that they argue supports extraterritorial application of the securities laws:

* U.S.-based BoA personnel performed a 1998 analysis of Parmalat's Brazilian operations.*fn51 Although plaintiffs assert also that this analysis was ignored, there is no evidence as to what BoA actually did with it.

* In January 1998, Luca Sala, a Milan-based BoA employee, met with other BoA personnel in San Francisco to discuss the then-potential transaction.*fn52

The documents provided by plaintiffs, a letter explaining the meeting and an attached meeting memo, however, make clear that the meeting was quite preliminary. Indeed, Mr. Sala states that "we cannot estimate [the value of Parmalat's Brazilian subsidiary] as we are still waiting for the relevant information."*fn53

* Also in January 1998 and before the deal was consummated, Mr. Sala advised a U.S.-based BoA official to call Parmalat's CEO to express BoA's interest in the transaction.*fn54 There is no evidence, however, that the call ever took place.

* BoA's New York office provided short-term financing to a Cayman Islands-based Parmalat subsidiary for its purchase of notes.*fn55

* Plaintiffs submit evidence that legal work on the transaction was performed in the U.S. and that legal opinions were issued by U.S.-based lawyers.*fn56

There is no evidence, however, that any BoA employees participated in this work.*fn57

iii. Analysis

Plaintiffs' primary argument is that BoA's marketing of this investment in the U.S. provides the requisite U.S. conduct to support application of the securities laws. Although they concede that the marketing itself was not fraudulent or deceptive, they urge that the allegedly deceptive transaction could not have been executed absent this U.S. marketing. The Bank argues that non-deceptive conduct constituting a "but for" cause of the deceptive transaction is not sufficient under Bersch.

At oral argument, plaintiffs relied primarily on Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co.*fn58

Psimenos, a Greek citizen and resident, opened an investment account with Hutton's Athens office, relying on representations made by an Athens-based Hutton employee. He gave Hutton discretionary authority to trade in his account and directed the employee to seek conservative investments. Despite this direction, Hutton agents invested Psimenos' account speculatively and he incurred heavy losses. Similar results ensued after Psimenos, unhappy with the losses, transferred his account first to Hutton's Paris office and then back to the Athens office under a new manager. Psimenos claimed, inter alia, that Hutton "churned" his account solely to generate commissions. The primary U.S. conduct was that the trades often were executed in the U.S.*fn59

The Second Circuit, despite the fact that the trades themselves were not fraudulent, held that they were sufficient to support application of the Commodities Exchange Act because

"[t]he trades Hutton executed on American markets constituted the final act in Hutton's alleged fraud on Psimenos, without which Hutton's employees could not have generated commissions for themselves. Coming as they did as the culminating acts of the fraudulent scheme, such trading could hardly be called 'preparatory activity' not subject to review under the anti-fraud provisions of the CEA."*fn60

Psimenos, however, does not get plaintiffs where they want to go. The fraud alleged in Psimenos was the mismanagement of Psimenos' account, and the losses occurred when bad investments were made. Thus, while the trades themselves were not fraudulent, they were, as the Circuit noted, the "final act" in the fraud -- absent the consummated trades, the fraudulent management of the account was incomplete.

Here, the theory is that BoA "created the appearance that BoA believed that [Parmalat Administração] was worth . . . $1.6 billion and was willing to invest its own money based on that valuation, when in fact BoA knew that [Parmalat Administração] was worth far less and was willing to invest only because the put guaranteed that BoA would be repaid at a premium."*fn61 Thus, the alleged fraud was complete when BoA designed and invested in the transaction. The marketing to U.S. investors, unlike the trades in Psimenos, neither completed the fraud nor directly caused plaintiffs' alleged losses. Hence, solicitation of U.S. investors does not support application of the securities laws.

The other evidence of U.S. conduct submitted by plaintiffs plainly is insufficient.

BoA's U.S. conduct, at most, was ancillary or preparatory to the fraud. It did not rise to the level of "substantial acts in furtherance of the fraud." The alleged fraudulent scheme -- involving Parmalat's Brazilian operations, various Cayman Islands entities, and BoA employees based in Italy -- was overwhelmingly a foreign transaction.

b. The Parmalat Venezuela Loan Restructuring

i. Claim for Relief

The second arrangement by which the TAC alleges that BoA participated in Parmalat's fraud involved a loan BoA made to a Venezuelan Parmalat subsidiary, Parmalat Venezuela. As part of the original loan, which the Court determined was not deceptive,*fn62 Parmalat took out an insurance policy to protect against the risk of political upheaval in South America. In 2001, plaintiffs allege, BoA restructured the loan to provide that these insurance payments be paid to a third party entity, Graubndner Kantonalbank ("GBK"), instead of the original insurer. Plaintiffs allege that GBK had no obligation to provide any coverage and that the funds it received ultimately were funneled back to Parmalat's corrupt insiders. In a prior opinion, the Court concluded that:

"If, indeed, the insurance policy was changed in 2001 to provide for payments to GBK despite the fact that GBK performed no services, that transaction arguably was deceptive because it was capable of misleading investors into believing that the payments were legitimate when, in fact, they were not. To that extent, then, this transaction may have been a deceptive or manipulative device within the meaning of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c)."*fn63

ii. Evidence of United States Conduct

The only U.S. conduct alleged with respect to this transaction is that the insurance premiums paid to GBK were transferred via U.S. bank accounts.*fn64

iii. Analysis

The use of a U.S. bank to transfer funds to GBK was insufficient to support extraterritorial application of the securities laws. Like the Parmalat Administração transaction, the alleged fraud here was the structure of the transaction itself. That payments were made via a U.S. bank is entirely peripheral to the alleged fraud. If such U.S. conduct were sufficient to support extraterritorial application of the securities laws, it would nearly eliminate the conduct test altogether. The cases cited by plaintiffs do not indicate otherwise.*fn65

2. The Citigroup Movants

a. Claim for Relief

Plaintiffs sue the Citigroup Movants for their participation in the securitization of worthless or duplicate receivables. The mechanics were as follows. Parmalat sold food products to distributors, who in turn sold them to supermarkets. Parmalat then issued duplicate invoices -- one to the distributor and the other to the supermarket -- for the same goods and booked both invoices as receivables. Pursuant to an agreement between Parmalat and Citigroup, Archimede Securitization S.r.l. ("Archimede"), an Italian Citigroup subsidiary, purchased receivables, including the duplicate receivables, from Parmalat's Italian operations.

In a previous opinion, the Court concluded that "the arrangements involving the regular factoring and securitization of worthless invoices were deceptive devices or contrivances for purposes of Section 10(b). . . . [Another bank] knew when it paid Parmalat for the invoices that they were worth nothing and were in fact a trick to disguise its loan to Parmalat. The same is true of Citigroup's purchase of certain invoices. If the allegations of the complaint are accepted, the banks used these devices" in violation of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c).*fn66 Thus, Citigroup's alleged participation in the fraud involved its purchase of allegedly worthless receivables.*fn67

b. Evidence of United States Conduct

While it is undisputed that the alleged duplication of receivables and Archimede's purchase of those receivables took place solely in Italy, plaintiffs submit evidence that certain Citigroup conduct relating to this program took place in the U.S. This U.S. conduct falls into three general categories.

First, it is uncontested that the Italian receivables were purchased by Citigroup primarily with funds that originated in the U.S. Archimede, the Italian subsidiary, purchased the receivables from Parmalat.*fn68 A United Kingdom Citigroup subsidiary, Eureka Securitisation plc. ("Eureka U.K."), purchased the receivables from Archimede.*fn69 Eureka U.K.'s portfolio, of which Parmalat receivables constituted about ten percent,*fn70 was financed in large part by funds raised in the U.S. through the issuance of commercial paper by a U.S. subsidiary, Eureka Securitization, Inc. ("Eureka U.S.").*fn71 The transfer of funds from Eureka U.S. to Eureka U.K. was managed in part by Citigroup's New York office.*fn72 There is no evidence, however, of any fraudulent activity with respect to the money raised by Eureka U.S., and no investors in Eureka U.S. or Eureka U.K. ever lost money due to the Parmalat program.*fn73

The second area of U.S. conduct is that in 2000, Citigroup, having purchased Parmalat's Italian receivables since 1995,*fn74 began purchasing receivables from Parmalat's U.S. and Canadian facilities as well.*fn75 The parties dispute whether the purchase of Italian, U.S., and Canadian receivables constituted a single securitization program or three separate programs. Assuming arguendo that they were part of one program, there is no evidence that there was any fraud in the U.S. component. Nor is there evidence that the U.S. component was necessary for the allegedly fraudulent Italian program to exist -- indeed, the Italian program functioned for five years before the U.S. program began.

The final category of U.S. conduct alleged is that Citigroup's New York office played some role in the administration and review of the Italian securitization program. Citigroup concedes that a New York employee conducted one audit of Parmalat's Italian facilities and that New York employees twice signed credit approval documents for the program, but notes that there is no evidence that any acted with knowledge of the fraud.*fn76 It contends also, and the Court agrees, that the clear majority of management, administration, and review of the Italian Parmalat program was handled by Citigroup's European offices.

The evidence shows that Citigroup's New York office performed some administrative duties with respect to the Italian program.*fn77 A 2002 email delegated the role of overseeing a "contingency plan" for certain clients, including Parmalat, to an employee who may have been U.S.-based at the time.*fn78 A New York-based attorney at Sherman & Sterling participated on BoA's behalf in 1995 conversations with Zini, Parmalat's counsel, regarding the securitization program, but the details of the securitization program pursuant to those conversations did not include any fraud or duplication.*fn79 Certain policies relating or applicable to Eureka U.K. were or may have been drafted in the U.S.,*fn80 but there is no evidence that they played any role in the fraud. Citigroup employees worked with U.S. credit agencies to get a certain credit rating for the Parmalat program.*fn81 Finally, offer letters for the Parmalat program were collected by the New York office. Although plaintiffs submit evidence that certain customers did not submit the offer letters,*fn82 there is no evidence of Parmalat's role or of any connection to the fraud. Nor do plaintiffs submit any evidence that U.S.- based Citigroup employees knew of the fraud.*fn83

The undisputed evidence shows that Citigroup's Italian and London offices were primarily responsible for the management and administration of the Italian receivables program. Citigroup submits three emails from 1994 discussing in detail the negotiations for the Italian securitization program. Only London- and Milan-based Citigroup employees participated in these emails.*fn84 In 1994, 1996, and 1998, Citigroup conducted reviews of Parmalat S.p.A. based on visits by London- and Milan-based Citigroup employees.*fn85 Citigroup submits also uncontested deposition testimony by various European-based Citigroup employees testifying to their substantial roles in managing the Italian securitization program.*fn86

c. Analysis

As an initial matter, plaintiffs submit no evidence that Citigroup's U.S. personnel had any knowledge of the allegedly fraudulent scheme. Their argument, in essence, is that the fraudulent scheme depended on U.S. conduct. Citigroup argues that any fraud was complete at the moment Archimede purchased the receivables and that the U.S. conduct referred to by plaintiffs therefore is immaterial. In the alternative, it argues that the U.S. conduct was too peripheral to support extraterritorial application of the securities laws.

Unlike the transactions involving the other movants discussed above, plaintiffs here submit evidence of regular U.S. conduct in a variety of areas related to the allegedly fraudulent securities program. But none of the U.S. conduct was essential to the completion of the fraud. For example, although the U.S. commercial paper market was an overwhelming source of Eureka U.K.'s funds, it was not, as plaintiffs urge, "absolutely necessary to maintain the securitization program."*fn87

As noted above, the Italian securitization program existed for five years before Citigroup began to purchase American receivables also, so the latter cannot have been necessary for the former to function. Finally, Citigroup's New York offices handled certain administrative functions and the occasional review or approval of the Italian program. In light of the evidence that the European offices conducted the lion's share of these duties, however, it is unlikely that the conduct of the New York office was necessary for the fraud to occur.

Indeed, all of the U.S. conduct was clearly peripheral to the fraud itself -- the purchase of duplicate receivables, which occurred in Italy. Assuming arguendo that the fraud extended to Eureka U.K.'s purchase of the receivables, this action took place in England. Extraterritorial application of the securities laws cannot apply where, as here, "the essential core of the alleged fraud took place [abroad]. Any activities in the United States were clearly secondary and ancillary."*fn88

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the motions of the Deloitte, Grant Thornton, Bank of America and Citigroup Movants to dismiss the claims of foreign purchasers [04 MD 1653, docket items 764, 768, 788, 792; 04 Civ. 0030, docket items 601, 604, 625, 766] are granted.*fn89


Lewis A. Kaplan, United States District Judge

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