Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Myers v. Phillips

August 7, 2007


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Levy, United States Magistrate Judge


Respondent William Phillips ("respondent") moves pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(iii) to quash a subpoena directing the Kings County District Attorney (the "District Attorney") to disclose to petitioner Kenneth Myers ("petitioner") the complete grand jury minutes (the "Minutes") taken in People v. Kenneth Myers, Kings County Indictment Number 4231/96. For the reasons stated below, the subpoena is modified as described infra.


Petitioner pro se*fn1 filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus on October 8, 2004. Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, deprivation of due process by erroneous jury instructions, and deprivation of his Constitutional right to present a defense. (See Petitioner's Memorandum of Law, dated May 18, 2007 ("Pet.'s Mem."), at 1-3.) At a telephone conference on January 27, 2006, petitioner was instructed to submit a subpoena for the grand jury "testimony of the police officers who testified at trial." (See Transcript of Telephone Conference, dated Jan. 27, 2007 ("Tr."), at 12.) At the January 27, 2006 conference, petitioner maintained that the grand jury testimony of certain police officers and a medical examiner were formerly in his possession, or in the possession of his now-relieved counsel.*fn2 (Id. at 17-18.) By subpoena issued January 30, 2007 and served on the District Attorney March 14, 2007, petitioner sought disclosure of the "Grand Jury Minutes (in full)." (See Affidavit of Sholom J. Twersky, Esq., dated Mar. 22, 2007 ("Twersky Aff."), ¶ 9.)

Respondent moves to quash or modify the subpoena, or in the alternative, requests that the court conduct an in camera inspection of the Minutes to determine whether they should be released. (Id. at 4.) Respondent argues that the doctrine of comity compels this court to refrain from ordering disclosure of the Minutes and that petitioner has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating a compelling and particularized need for the Minutes which outweighs the public policy considerations supporting grand jury secrecy. (See Respondent's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Disclosure of Grand Jury Minutes, dated Mar. 22, 2007 ("Resp.'s Mem."), at 1, 8.)

Petitioner opposes the motion to quash, or in the alternative, requests that the court conduct an in camera inspection of the Minutes or that the court instruct him to return to state court to exhaust his remedies there. (See Petitioner's Declaration, dated May 2, 2007 ("Pet.'s Decl."), at 2.) Petitioner argues that the doctrine of comity does not preclude a federal court from ordering the disclosure of state grand jury minutes and that he has satisfied his burden to demonstrate a compelling and particularized need. (Id. at 1-2.)


Privileged matter is immune from discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Because this action is premised upon federal law claims, federal common law is the source of any privilege. See, e.g., Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 1987); King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 189 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Burke v. New York City Police Dep't, 115 F.R.D. 220, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Thus, although New York preserves the secrecy of its grand jury by statute, see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.25(4) (2007), that statute does not control in this action.*fn3 See Lora v. Board of Ed. of City of New York, 74 F.R.D. 565, 576 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (federal courts are not bound by state law protecting the secrecy of state grand jury proceedings, but "a strong policy of comity between state and federal sovereignties impels federal courts to recognize state privileges where this can be accomplished at no substantial cost to substantive and procedural policy.").

Under federal law, a party seeking disclosure of federal grand jury material must demonstrate a particularized need. See Douglas Oil v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 217 (1979). Thus, in evaluating applications to unseal state grand jury minutes, federal courts have required the same demonstrations of "particularized need" required for the unsealing of federal grand jury minutes. See, e.g., Palmer v. Estate of Stuart, No. 02 Civ. 4076, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21788, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2004); Waterman v. City of New York, No. 96 Civ. 1471, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 1998); Scheiner v. Wallace, No. 93 Civ. 0062, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18873, at *13-14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 1995). To demonstrate particularized need the movant must show "that (a) the material sought is needed to avoid a possible injustice, (b) the need for disclosure is greater than the need for secrecy, and (c) the request is structured to cover only material so needed." Scheiner v. Wallace, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18873, at *13-14 (quoting Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 715 (2d Cir. 1987) (citations omitted)).

A. Possible Injustice

Under New York state law, a prosecutor is required to make available to the defendant any grand jury testimony made by a person whom the prosecutor intends to call as a witness at trial and which relates to the subject matter of the witness's testimony. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.45(1)(a) (2007); People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286 (N.Y. 1961). Respondent concedes that petitioner's trial attorney would have had access to the so-called "[R]osario material."*fn4 (See Tr. at 18.)

It is clear that petitioner's trial attorney had access to the grand jury testimony of any government witness who testified at trial. It is unclear, however, how this testimony was lost or otherwise went out of petitioner's possession over the course of his efforts to exhaust all available remedies, first with new counsel and now pro se. The court need not speculate on this matter. Ultimately, petitioner's habeas claims hinge on the testimony of the government's witnesses. To wit, petitioner alleges that the police officers' testimony was conflicting and inadmissible as a matter of law and that the medical examiner's testimony was insufficient to support a conviction. (See Pet.'s Decl. at 2.) Without the Minutes, petitioner is hampered in his ability to make specific arguments to support his claims.

This is not a case where the ultimate facts testified to before the grand jury can also be obtained by petitioner from the same original sources. That is the sort of situation in cases where disclosure of grand jury minutes is typically denied. In such cases, there is usually no "particularized need"*fn5 because the information sought may be obtained by other means which do not intrude upon the secrecy of the grand jury.

In this case . . . the grand jury testimony is the res itself, the subject matter of this part of the lawsuit. What is relevant here is not the underlying facts testified to, but the content of the testimony itself. The grand jury ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.