The opinion of the court was delivered by: Joseph F. Bianco, District Judge
Plaintiff Atronic International, GmbH ("Atronic"), brought this action against defendant SAI Semispecialists of America, Inc. ("SAI"), claiming breach of contract regarding the sale of computer semiconductor chips. On September 15, 2007, this Court denied the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, and granted plaintiff's motion to strike certain evidence offered by defendant. Plaintiff now moves for reconsideration and/or reargument of this Court's denial of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, plaintiff's motion is denied.
The Court presumes the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts of this case, as set forth in this Court's previous decision. Thus, for the purposes of resolving the instant motion, the Court briefly recites the holding that plaintiff asks this Court to reconsider.
By Memorandum and Order dated September 15, 2007, this Court denied the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment (hereinafter, "the Decision"). In the Decision, the Court rejected Atronic's motion for partial summary judgment as to the issue of SAI's breach of a contract that allegedly imposed the following obligations on SAI: (1) to deliver 20,000 TI Graphics Processors ("processors") under the terms of the parties' agreement as set forth in a purchase order that Atronic sent to SAI via e-mail on October 19, 2002 (hereinafter, "the October 19 purchase order"); and (2) to deliver 20,000 additional processors, pursuant to an option clause in the October 19 purchase order that Atronic purportedly exercised in Mid-December 2001.
In the Decision, this Court found that, although there was no writing signed by SAI, the "merchant exception" of New York's Statute of Frauds permitted plaintiff "to proceed with [its] breach of contract claim despite the Statute of Frauds." (Decision, at 5.) Nevertheless, noting that the "only consequence of the merchant exception is to remove the bar of the Statute of Frauds," the Court further found that SAI had demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether "there was mutual assent [by the parties] to the terms in the October 19 revised purchase order, as a matter of law." (Decision at 5.) Specifically, the Court found that SAI had presented testimonial evidence that, notwithstanding the written terms of the October 19 purchase order, the parties' agreement included "the condition that the order was `open' and `subject to prior sale.'" (Decision at 6.) As such, the Court found that:
If SAI's evidence that the agreement between the parties included a provision that the order was subject to prior sale is credited, as this Court must in considering the instant motion for summary judgment, there exists a disputed issue of material fact as to whether SAI breached the terms of the agreement, either as to the initial 20,000 TI Graphics Processors, or as to the additional 20,000 option processors. Accordingly, Atronic's motion for summary judgment is denied.
This case was re-assigned to the undersigned from the Honorable Thomas C. Platt on February 23, 2006. The Decision was issued on September 15, 2006. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration and/or reargument of the Decision pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Civil Rule 6.3 on November 7, 2006.
Motions for reconsideration may be filed pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e). The decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration falls squarely within the discretion of the district court. See Devlin v. Transp. Comm'ns Int'l Union, 175 F.3d 121, 132 (2d Cir. 1999). "The standard for granting such a motion is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked . . . that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted). Similarly, Local Civil Rule 6.3 provides that a party moving for reconsideration must "set forth concisely the matters or controlling decisions which [the party] believes the court has overlooked." In any event, "reconsideration of a previous order is an extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources." In re Health Mgmt. Sys. Inc. Sec. Litig., 113 F. Supp. 2d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see ...