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Banco Central Del Paraguay v. Paraguay Humanitarian Foundation

September 5, 2007


The opinion of the court was delivered by: John F. Keenan, United States District Judge



Before the Court is (i) Principal Defendants' motion for a "new trial", pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and (ii) Plaintiff's motion to impose sanctions on Principal Defendants' counsel for attorneys' fees and expenses incurred by Plaintiff in connection with its opposition to the Rule 59 motion. For the reasons that follow, Principal Defendants' motion pursuant to Rule 59 is denied. Plaintiff's motion for the imposition of fees and expenses is also denied.

The underlying facts of this case are set forth in considerable detail in prior decisions of this Court, see, e.g., Banco Central de Paraguay v. Paraguay Humanitarian Foundation, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 9649 (JFK), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87093 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2006), Banco Central de Paraguay v. Paraguay Humanitarian Foundation, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 9649 (JFK), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 293 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2005), and familiarity is assumed.

In brief, by Order dated January 6, 2005, the Court granted Plaintiff Banco Central de Paraguay's ("Banco Central") motion for summary judgment on its claim of conversion (Count I of the amended complaint) and denied Principal Defendants' motion for summary judgment. On March 3, 2005, Principal Defendants moved for reconsideration of the Court's January 6, 2005 Order.

By Order dated June 30, 2005, the Court denied Principal Defendants' motion for reconsideration, observing that it had already considered and rejected the arguments advanced by the Principal Defendants. On January 3, 2006, the Court entered judgment in favor of Banco Central in the amount of $16 million plus interest. On January 17, 2006, Principal Defendants filed another motion for reconsideration of the Court's January 6, 2005 grant of summary judgment, which the Principal Defendants characterized as a motion for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule 59. On May 4, 2006, the Court denied Principal Defendants' Rule 59 motion.

By Order dated November 29, 2006, the Court granted Banco Central's motion to dismiss without prejudice its remaining claims for constructive trust and civil conspiracy (respectively, Counts II and III of the amended complaint). By the same Order, the Court also granted Banco Central's motion to compel Principal Defendants to produce discovery in aid of judgment and its motion to impose sanctions against Principal Defendants for their abuse of the discovery process. Principal Defendants' instant Rule 59 motion followed.*fn1


(i) Principal Defendants' Rule 59 Motion

Principal Defendants move for a "new trial" under Federal Rule 59. The Court construes this motion as one "to alter or amend the judgment" under Rule 59(e), because it follows the Court's Order of November 29, 2006, not a trial. Principal Defendants contend that "[r]ecently additional evidence has been obtained which was never provided by Plaintiff and was never available to Defendants which shed [sic] a new light on the case." (Principal Defendants' Brief In Support of Motion for New Trial Under FRCP Rule 59 ("Def. Mot.") 2.) The "new" evidence that Principal Defendants have submitted consists of a translation into English of an order, dated August 22, 2005, issued by a Paraguayan bankruptcy court (the "Paraguayan order"), in which Banco Orientale, one of the two insolvent Paraguayan banks for which Plaintiff has acted as representative in this case, was declared bankrupt and a bankruptcy trustee was appointed to administer Banco Orientale's assets. (Def. Mot., Ex. A.) Principal Defendants contend that the Paraguayan order constitutes proof that Banco Centrale is not authorized to act in a representative capacity for Banco Orientale. The new evidence, Principal Defendants argue, warrants the setting aside not only of the Court's November 29, 2006 Order, but also previous Orders of the Court, including the Court's grant of summary judgment in Banco Central's favor on January 6, 2005, and the Order of October 31, 2005, in which the Court dismissed Principal Defendants' counterclaim.

Although Principal Defendants ask the Court to "review all of its Opinions issued since January of 2005," (Def. Mot. 7), the Court notes at the outset that Principal Defendants' motion is timely only as to the Court's November 29, 2006 Order. See Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 513, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("To be timely under Civil Rule 59(e), a motion must be filed within 10 days after entry of the judgment . . . This time limitation is uncompromisable, for Civil Rule 6(b) provides, in pertinent part, that the district court may not extend the time for taking any action under Rules 50(b) and (c)(2), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e).") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Further, even if the Court were to consider Principal Defendants' motion as arising under Rule 60(b)(2), which permits a movant to seek relief from a judgment or order on the ground of newly discovered evidence within one year of the judgment or order, the motion would be untimely as to all orders except for the Order of November 29, 2006. This is because the prior Orders of this Court, including the January 6, 2005 Order granting summary judgment to Banco Central and the January 3, 2006 Order entering judgment against the Principal Defendants, were entered more than one year prior to the filing of the instant motion, which Principal Defendants filed on March 6, 2007. Therefore, the Court will consider Principal Defendants' motion only to the extent that it addresses the Court's Order of November 29, 2006.

A motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Rule 59 is evaluated under the same standard as a motion for reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 6.3. See Williams v. New York City Dep't of Corrections, 219 F.R.D. 78, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). To receive reconsideration, "the moving party must demonstrate controlling law or factual matters put before the court on the underlying motion that the movant believes the court overlooked and that might reasonably be expected to alter the court's decision." Parrish v. Sollecito, 253 F. Supp. 2d 713, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Williams, 219 F.R.D. at 83. Rule 59(e) should be "narrowly construed and strictly applied so as to avoid repetitive arguments on issues that have been considered fully by the Court," Williams, 219 F.R.D. at 83, and "to prevent the rule from being used as a substitute for appealing a final judgment." USA Certified Merchants, LLC v. Koebel, 273 F. Supp. 2d 501, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Furthermore, "[r]econsideration of a court's previous order is an 'extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources.'" Montanile v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 216 F. Supp. 2d 341, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting In re Health Mgmt. Sys. Inc. Sec. Litig., 113 F. Supp. 2d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).

In order to establish entitlement to reconsideration of a decision in light of the availability of new evidence, Principal Defendants must show that: "(1) newly discovered evidence is of facts existing at the time of [the prior decision]; (2) the moving party is excusably ignorant of the facts despite using due diligence to learn about them; (3) newly discovered evidence is admissible and probably effective to change the result of the former ruling; and (4) the newly discovered evidence is not merely cumulative . . . of evidence already offered." Fidelity Partners, Inc. v. First Trust Co. of New York, 58 F. Supp. 2d 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citation omitted).*fn2 A party seeking to alter or amend a judgment on the basis of newly discovered evidence bears an "onerous" burden. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 247 F.3d 370, 392 (2d Cir. 2001).

Principal Defendants have failed to meet their heavy burden of establishing that the new evidence is "probably effective to change the result of the former ruling," because the Paraguayan order simply has no bearing on the Court's former ruling of November 29, 2006. By that Order, the Court granted Banco Central's motion to dismiss its remaining claims without prejudice, pursuant to Federal Rule 41(a)(2); granted Banco Central's motion to compel discovery in aid of judgment, pursuant to Rule 37(a); and imposed sanctions on Principal Defendants for discovery abuses, also pursuant to Rule 37(a). In rendering its decision to dismiss the remaining claims, the Court found that Principal Defendants made no attempt to show, and indeed could not show, that dismissal of Banco Central's remaining claims would result in legal prejudice to Principal Defendants. The Court noted that Principal Defendants largely failed to address the five factors, set forth by the Second Circuit in Zagano v. Fordham Univ., 900 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1990), that a court must consider in determining whether a defendant will suffer legal prejudice.*fn3 The Court observed that the Principal Defendants, instead of addressing the Zagano factors, argued fruitlessly and irrelevantly that various events unfolding in Paraguay would allow the Court to "'discover that [Banco Central] is the real party in interest without authority and its allegations to a considerable extent are false, misrepresent the real facts and that this case was brought ...

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