The opinion of the court was delivered by: Gabriel W. Gorenstein, United States Magistrate Judge
This is an action for damages stemming from a hit and run accident with a vehicle allegedly driven by defendant Alberto Garcia and owned by defendant Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company/ELRAC, Inc. ("Enterprise"). Pacho now moves to remand this action to state court. For the following reasons, this motion is denied.*fn1
Following the filing of Pacho's complaint in New York Supreme Court, Enterprise removed the suit to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. See Notice to Federal Court of Removal of Civil Action From State Court, filed Dec. 22, 2005 (Docket #1) ("Removal Notice"). It is undisputed that Pacho is a New York domiciliary. See id. ¶ 5; Affirmation in Support of Motion to Remand to State Court, filed May 21, 2007 (Docket #32) ("Pl. Aff."), ¶ 5. Pacho contends that because Garcia is also a New York domiciliary, subject matter jurisdiction does not exist and the case should be remanded to state court. See Notice of Motion to Remand Case to State Court, filed May 21, 2007 (Docket #31); Pl. Aff.; Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Remand Action to State Court, filed May 21, 2007 (Docket #33) ("Pl. Mem."). Enterprise filed papers in opposition to the remand motion, see Memorandum of Law in Opposition of Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, filed June 12, 2007 (Docket #37) ("Def. Mem."), and Pacho submitted a reply, see Reply Affirmation in Support of Motion to Remand to State Court, filed June 21, 2007 (Docket #39) ("Pl. Reply.").
II. LAW ON DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
Diversity jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) for civil suits where the amount in controversy is greater than $75,000 and the parties are "citizens of different States" or "citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state." Citizenship is determined by a party's "domicile." Palazzo ex rel. Delmage v. Corio, 232 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 2000). Satisfaction of the diversity requirement is "determined as of the date that suit is filed." Wolde-Meskel v. Vocational Instruction Project Cmty. Servs., Inc., 166 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1999). 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) states that if "it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded" to the state court.
"Domicile is 'the place where a person has his true fixed home and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.'" Palazzo ex rel. Delmage, 232 F.3d at 42 (quoting Linardos v. Fortuna, 157 F.3d 945, 948 (2d Cir. 1998)). "Domicile is established initially at birth and is presumed to continue in the same place, absent sufficient evidence of a change." Id. To effect a change of domicile, "two things are indispensable: First, residence in a new domicil[e]; and, second, the intention to remain there."
Id. (quoting Sun Printing & Publ'g Ass'n v. Edwards, 194 U.S. 377, 383 (1904)). To determine domicile, "[a] court must consider the entire course of a person's conduct in order to determine the relevant intent." Korb v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 2006 WL 300477, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2006).
Factors that courts often consider include: voting registration and voting practices, location of real and personal property, location where taxes are paid, location of brokerage and bank accounts, driver's and other licenses, membership in churches, clubs, and associations, whether the person owns or rents his place of residence, and locations of the person's physician, lawyer, accountant, dentist, or stockbroker. A 'totality of the evidence' approach is called for, and no single factor is conclusive, although the residence of a married person's spouse and children (if the couple has not separated) is given considerable weight.
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); accord Chevalier v. USA Express Moving & Storage Inc., 2004 WL 1207874, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2004) ("Courts have looked at many factors including voting registration, driver's license registration, location of property, location of bank accounts, place of employment, and payment of taxes to determine whether a party has established a physical presence and intent to stay in a domicile.") (citing Weber v. Paduano, 2003 WL 22801777 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2003)).
The determination of domicile is a matter of federal common law, not state law. See, e.g., Horton v. Bank One, N.A., 387 F.3d 426, 435-36 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1149 (2004); Rishell v. Jane Phillips Episcopal Mem'l Med. Ctr., 12 F.3d 171, 172 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1166 (1997); Rodriguez-Diaz v. Sierra-Martinez, 853 F.2d 1027, 1030 (1st Cir. 1988); 15 James Wm. Moore, et. al., Moore's Federal Practice, § 102.34[a] (3d ed. 2007).
III. FACTS REGARDING GARCIA'S DOMICILE
While the parties questioned Garcia at a deposition, the testimony they elicited from him on the issue of domicile was sketchy and reflects large gaps in Garcia's personal history.
Garcia was born in the Dominican Republic on March 4, 1969. See Deposition of Alberto Garcia, dated Dec. 8, 2006 (attached as Ex. A to Def. Mem.) ("Pl. Dep."), at 4-5. He testified that "[w]hen I came to the United States I was small." Id. at 71. When asked when he moved to the United States, he responded "Back and forth. I never moved here." Id. at 5. In response to the question "So you were both living in [the] Dominican Republic and the United States?" Garcia ...