The opinion of the court was delivered by: David G. Larimer United States District Judge
Karen Taylor ("Taylor"), pro se, commenced this action against her former employer, the Naples Central School District ("School District"), Superintendent Brenda Keith ("Keith"), and Secondary School Principal Ken Foster ("Foster") pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. Plaintiff alleges loss of employment in retaliation for her complaints about defendants' failure to comply with their obligations to provide for her disabled son's education under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Currently before the Court are two motions brought by defendants: a motion to dismiss the claims against the individual defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), and a motion for summary judgment by all the defendants. Defendants' motions are granted and the complaint is dismissed.
In response to defendants' motions, plaintiff has submitted material that raised certain matters relating mostly to what she views as poor treatment of her son Kaleigh, who apparently suffers from certain medical conditions which required the School District to implement a special plan for his education. These matters, though, have little to do with plaintiff's separate claim concerning discrimination against her.
This Court's order of March 9, 2006 (Dkt. #4), made it quite clear that the action was limited to plaintiff's own claims of retaliation and not any claims relating to plaintiff's son. That order clearly advised plaintiff that she could not raise claims on behalf of another since she was not an attorney.
Subsequent to that decision and order, no formal claim was ever filed on behalf of plaintiff's son. Therefore, as defendants note, many of the points raised by plaintiff have little relevance to her allegations that she was retaliated against for advocating on behalf of her son before the School District. Unfortunately, plaintiff continues to be focused on her son and advised her opponents and the Court that the principal issue in this case involves her son. It clearly does not.
I. Motion to Dismiss Individual Defendants
The motion to dismiss the claims against the individual defendants is granted. It is well settled that individual employees cannot be held personally liable for violations of the ADA. See Falso v. Sutherland Global Services, 494 F.Supp.2d 207, 209 (W.D.N.Y. 2007); Murphy v. Board of Educ. of the Rochester City Sch. Dist., 273 F.Supp.2d 292, 326 (W.D.N.Y. 2003), aff'd, 106 Fed.Appx. 746 (2d Cir. 2004). Both defendant Brenda Keith and defendant Ken Foster must therefore be dismissed from the action.
II. Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment
Defendant School District's motion for summary judgment is granted. Plaintiff has failed to raise a material issue of fact and, therefore, as a matter of law, defendant is entitled to judgment.
The adverse action suggested by plaintiff is modest. The essence of her claim is that she was not called as a substitute teacher for several weeks in 2003. Plaintiff's employment with the School District ended shortly thereafter when she accepted a long-term assignment in another school district, the Wayland-Cohocton School District, in 2004.
Plaintiff had worked as a substitute teacher for the defendant School District for several years from 1999 to 2004. During her employment, commencing about 2001, she made various complaints to the School District. One was that she believed her children were entitled to door-to-door transportation which eventually was denied by the School District simply because it deemed the road unsafe. There had been several accidents on this rural road. Although a special plan was adopted for plaintiff's son, plaintiff continued to protest that the School District was not fully complying with the plan. Plaintiff filed a complaint with the United States Department of Education Office of Civil Rights and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission about those matters but both agencies dismissed her claims.
Even now, in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff again raises issues about the School District's failure to provide door-to-door transportation and other matters that ...