The opinion of the court was delivered by: William M. Skretny United States District Judge
Plaintiff, the United States of America ("the Government"), commenced this action on June 12, 2006, pursuant to the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act ("CAFRA"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 et seq. The Government seized the defendant vehicles and currency, which allegedly belong to Luis Pabon ("Pabon" or "Claimant") as being derived from narcotics trafficking.
Presently before the Court is the Government's Motion for Default Judgment and Order of Forfeiture (Docket No. 12) and Pabon's Cross-Motion to set Aside the Clerk's Entry of Default and to deny default judgment.*fn1 (Docket No. 14). This Court grants the Government's Motion for Default Judgment and denies Pabon's Cross-Motion to Set Aside for the reasons stated in the discussion that follows.
Pabon was arrested along with numerous other individuals for alleged involvement in a heroin and cocaine distribution ring. Following the arrests, special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigations Criminal Enterprise Task Force executed a search warrant and seized various items of property, including the subject property--to wit, two extensively customized automobiles, an all terrain vehicle (ATV), and currency. The government argues that this property was purchased by drug proceeds and is subject to forfeiture under CAFRA.
The Government served copies of the Verified Complaint for Forfeiture and a Warrant and Summons for Arrest of Articles in Rem by mail on Pabon's criminal defense attorney Michael J. Stachowski on June 20, 2006. Pabon was personally served on July 6, 2006. The Warrant and Summons directed that a person who asserts an interest in the property "must file a verified statement of interest/ claim with the Clerk of this Court" within thirty (30) days after being served with the Government's Complaint, pursuant to Rule C(6) of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. Additionally, the warrant and summons required that an answer to the complaint be served within twenty days after the filing of the statement of interest/ claim. No statement of interest/ claim was filed. On August, 15, 2006, a Clerk's entry of default (Docket No. 11) was entered against the property pursuant to FED. R. CIV. PRO. 55(b). The Government filed its Motion for Default Judgment on September 14, 2006. (Docket No. 12). On October 11, 2006, Pabon filed a Motion to set Aside the Clerk's Entry of Default to which he appended a Proposed Answer. (Docket No. 14).
A. Pabon Failed to Timely File a Claim
The procedural requirements of a federal civil forfeiture action are governed by CAFRA and the Supplemental Rules. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)(A); see also United States v. $1,437.00, 242 F. Supp. 2d 193, 195 (W.D.N.Y. 2002). The United States initiates a judicial forfeiture by filing a complaint in the district where the seizure occurred. Supp. Rule C(2). Upon the filing of the complaint, the district court clerk issues a warrant for the arrest of the property at issue. See Supp. Rule C(3). The United States must then publish notice of the action and arrest in a newspaper of general circulation within the district. The notice must specify the time within which the party filing the claim must file an answer. Supp. Rule C(4). Claimants to the seized property must file a claim of interest in the property within thirty days of service of the government's complaint and an answer within twenty days after the filing of the claim of interest. Supp. Rule C(6).
The time limit for filing claims to seized property was enacted "to force claimants to come forward as soon as possible after forfeiture proceedings have been initiated so that all interested parties can be heard and the dispute resolved without delay." United States v. 1982 Yukon Delta Houseboat, 774 F.2d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir. 1985). The time limit 3 should be strictly enforced. Id. See also United States v. Amiel, 995 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1993) (strict compliance with rule requiring filing of an answer together with the claim). Measuring from the date on which Pabon, rather than his attorney was served, his statement of interest/ claim was due no later than August 7, 2006. No claim was filed and Pabon's Cross-Motion and Proposed Answer was not filed until 97 days after he was personally served.
B. Pabon Has Not Demonstrated Good Cause to Vacate the Entry of Default
Under FED. R. CIV. PRO. 55(c), an entry of default may be set aside for "good cause shown." The "good cause" standard under Rule 55(c) is evaluated under identical criteria to that of the "excusable neglect" standard under Rule 60(b). See Richardson v. Nassau County, 184 F.R.D. 497, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); TCI Group Line Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 2001). Under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(b), an entry of default may be set aside for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, . . . excusable neglect [or] any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." The Second Circuit has further elaborated as to the proper criteria to be considered under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(b). These criteria include "(1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) the level of prejudice that may occur to the non-defaulting party if relief is granted." United States v. $393,967, 775 F. Supp. 43, 46 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Wagstaff-El v. Carlton Press Co., 913 F.2d 56, 57 (2d Cir. 1990)). The party seeking to vacate the default judgment bears the burden of demonstrating the presence of good cause or excusable neglect. TCI Group, 244 F.3d at 696.
Pabon argues that the entry of default should be vacated because he was confused as to whether his appointed criminal defense attorney was representing him in the civil forfeiture action. This Court concludes that Pabon's confusion as to the scope of existing legal representation does not constitute excusable neglect in this case. Pabon's "confusion" is highly questionable given Stachowski's affirmation that he had explained to Pabon that he could not represent him in the civil forfeiture action without a separate retainer. This Court is also persuaded by existing caselaw concluding that confusion as to the scope of legal representation is not excusable neglect. For example, in United States v. $32,000, 2006 WL 1883274 (N.D. Cal. 2006), the claimant had hired two lawyers and each lawyer thought the other was representing the claimant in his forfeiture action. However, the court concluded that the claimant could not establish excusable neglect because the ...