The opinion of the court was delivered by: Scullin, Senior Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, one of the world's leading creators and distributors of motion pictures, retained MediaSentry to combat infringement of its copyrighted motion pictures on peer-to-peer ("P2P") networks. See Declaration of Karen R. Thorland dated October 19, 2007 ("Thorland Decl."), at ¶ 3. MediaSentry is a company that provides online antipiracy and copyright protection services to identify direct infringers of Plaintiff's copyrights on P2P networks. See id.
MediaSentry searched several P2P networks for infringing copies of Plaintiff's copyrighted motion pictures. See Declaration of Elizabeth Hardwick dated October 25, 2007, at ¶ 4. When MediaSentry located a user offering Plaintiff's copyrighted works for download, it sought to download those files while obtaining information to confirm the infringement and to identify the infringer. See id. at ¶ 5.
Defendant used a fictitious network name or pseudonym to copy and distribute Plaintiff's copyrighted works. See Thorland Decl. at ¶ 5. Therefore, Plaintiff initially could only identify Defendant by the unique Internet Protocol ("IP") address that his internet service provider ("ISP"), Time Warner Cable, had assigned to him on the date and at the time of the infringement. See id. Based upon this information, Plaintiff filed a "John Doe" lawsuit against Defendant and others in the Southern District of New York, where Time Warner Cable is located. See id.
ISPs keep track of the IP addresses that they assign to their subscribers in "user logs." See id. at ¶ 6. These user logs provide the most accurate means to connect an infringer's identity to its infringing activity. See id. In its "John Doe" lawsuit, Plaintiff moved for leave to serve a subpoena on Time Warner Cable seeking Defendant's true identity. See id. The court granted the motion and, on December 27, 2005, Plaintiff served the subpoena. See id. In response, Time Warner Cable identified Defendant as the individual using the IP address that MediaSentry had obtained at the time of the infringement. See id. at ¶ 7.
According to the information that Time Warner Cable provided, Defendant did not reside in the Southern District of New York. See id. at ¶ 8. Therefore, Plaintiff dismissed that suit against Defendant without prejudice and sought to negotiate an out-of-court settlement with him. See id. Defendant refused to settle the dispute. See id.
On June 6, 2007, Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action to prevent Defendant from copying and distributing to others over the Internet unauthorized copies of one of Plaintiff's copyrighted motion pictures and for damages in connection with Defendant's past infringements of this motion picture. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 1. Plaintiff served Defendant with a copy of the summons and complaint on July 24, 2007. See id.; Thorland Decl. at ¶ 10. Defendant did not answer or otherwise appear within the statutory period, see Thorland Decl. at ¶ 11; and, therefore, on August 16, 2007, Plaintiff sent him a letter advising him that he was in default and that, if he failed to answer, Plaintiff would seek a default judgment against him, see id. Defendant did not respond to Plaintiff's letter. See id. Defendant did, however, send a letter to the Court dated August 21, 2007. See Dkt. No. 9. The Court responded to that letter by informing him that the "letter was not in proper form to be considered an 'answer'" and directing him to "review the complaint [and] forward [any further responses] to the court no later than September 7, 2007." See Dkt. No. 10. Defendant did not file any additional documents.
On October 4, 2007, Plaintiff requested and the Clerk of the Court entered a Notice of Default against Defendant. See Dkt. Nos. 11-12. Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for entry of a default judgment against Defendant pursuant to Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Dkt. No. 15.
A. Default Judgment Standard
Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a two-step procedure for entry of a default judgment. First, "[u]nder Rule 55(a), a clerk must . . . enter the default against a party who fails to plead or otherwise defend." Time Warner Entm't/Advance Newhouse P'ship v. Stockton, No. 5:00-CV-1989, 2004 WL 1739520, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2004) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)). Second, the plaintiff must "move the court for default judgment." Id. (citation omitted). "In considering a motion for default judgment, the court will treat the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true, and the court will then analyze those facts for their sufficiency to state a claim." Id. (citation omitted). Since, at Plaintiff's request, the Clerk of the Court entered default against Defendant, Plaintiff's motion for entry of a default judgment is appropriately before the Court.
In support of its motion, Plaintiff asserts that its complaint sets forth the following facts that establish Defendant's liability for willful copyright infringement: (1) Plaintiff owns the applicable exclusive distribution rights to the copyrighted motion picture, Four Brothers; (2) this motion picture is the subject of a valid Certificate of Copyright Registration that the Register of Copyrights issued; (3) Defendant infringed Plaintiff's exclusive rights by distributing to others, without authorization, copies of this copyrighted motion picture by using a P2P network on the Internet; and (4) Defendant's infringement was willful because he either was aware or had reason to be aware that his actions constituted an infringement of Plaintiff's rights. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 2 (citing Complaint). Based upon these facts, Plaintiff requests statutory damages in ...