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Nolan v. Primagency

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK


April 15, 2008

JOHN NOLAN, PLAINTIFF,
v.
PRIMAGENCY, INC. ET AL, DEFENDANTS.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Richard J. Sullivan, District Judge

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

On January 31, 2008, this Court issued an Order to Show Cause (the "OSC") sua sponte, directing counsel for plaintiff John Nolan, Mr. Louis A. Piccone, Esq., and counsel for defendants Primagency, Inc., Steven Lebetkin, and Conrad J. Isoldi ("Defendants"), Mr. Neil R. Flaum, Esq., to show cause why this case should not be dismissed and/or why sanctions and a finding of civil contempt on Mr. Piccone and/or Mr. Flaum should not issue given the failure of plaintiff to diligently prosecute this case, and the failure of the parties to follow Court orders. After counsel for plaintiff failed to appear on the return date of the OSC, the Court issued an order on March 3, 2008 imposing sanctions on the parties, but declining to dismiss the case, provided that the parties complied with the directives contained in that order. See Nolan v. Primagency, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 134 (RJS), 2008 WL 650387 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2008) ("Nolan I"). Plaintiff failed to comply with that order in each and every respect. Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), this action is dismissed with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court presumes the parties' familiarity with the facts relevant to this Order, which are recounted in detail in the OSC, as well as prior orders and transcripts in this matter, including Nolan I. However, certain facts post-date those orders and are recounted here.

The Court in Nolan I imposed civil contempt sanctions on Mr. Piccone and Mr. Flaum, in the amounts of $750.00 and $200.00, respectively. See Nolan I at *1-4. Nolan I also included the following directives:

Additionally, Mr. Piccone has until March 17, 2008, to comply with the Court's November 1, 2008 and January 3, 2008 orders. This means that by March 17, 2008, Mr. Piccone must (1) properly file the Amended Complaint via the Court's electronic case system ("ECF"); (2) submit a courtesy copy of the Amended Complaint to chambers in accordance with the Individual Practices of the undersigned; (3) confer with Defendants' counsel, Mr. Flaum, regarding a joint proposed Case Management Plan; (4) submit a proposed Plan to the Court by hand delivery, email, or regular mail, provided that it reaches chambers by March 17, 2008; and (5) submit a joint status letter, along with Mr. Flaum, outlining what, if anything, has transpired in this case since the November 1, 2007 conference. Mr. Piccone is also directed to forward a copy of this order to his client, plaintiff John Nolan and file proof of service electronically with the Court . . . . Failure to comply with this Order in any respect shall result in dismissal of this case pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Nolan I, 2008 WL 650387 at *3 (emphasis added). With regard to Mr. Flaum, Nolan I contained the following directives:

In addition, Mr. Flaum is given a limited amount of time in which to comply with past orders. This means that Mr. Flaum must (1) properly file an answer to the Amended Complaint via the Court's ECF system by April 7, 2008, assuming, of course, that the Amended Complaint has been filed as of March 17, 2008; (2) submit a courtesy copy of the Answer to chambers in accordance with the Individual Practices of the undersigned; (3) confer with Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Piccone, regarding a joint proposed Case Management Plan; (4) submit a proposed Plan to the Court by hand delivery, email, or regular mail, provided that it reaches chambers by March 17, 2008; and (5) submit a joint status letter, along with Mr. Piccone, no later than March 17, 2008, outlining what, if anything, has transpired in this case since the November 1, 2007 conference. If for some reason a joint letter is not possible, Mr. Flaum shall submit a status letter to the Court by March 17, 2008 explaining why the submission of a joint letter was not possible. Additionally, Mr. Flaum shall be present at the conference on Tuesday, April 8, 2008 at 10:30 a.m., and is also directed to forward a copy of this Order to his clients and file proof of service electronically with the Court. Failure to strictly comply with this order shall result in further sanctions.

Id. at *4. The Court in Nolan I stated three separate times that the case would be dismissed if plaintiff failed to comply with any of these directives. Id. at *1-5.

Incredibly, as of April 8, 2008, as noted in the record on that day's conference, the parties collectively had failed to comply with even one of the directives contained in Nolan I. (See Apr. 8 Tr. at 3.) Mr. Piccone admitted on the record that he had not complied with any of the directives in Nolan I, and that his failure to comply with Nolan I was due to personal issues that the Court does not recount here but are referenced, at least in part, in the transcript of the April 8, 2008 telephone conference.*fn1 (See id. at 3-4.) Mr. Flaum noted that although he had also "missed the boat" (id. at 8), he sent in payment of the $200.00 sanction on April 7, 2008 and filed the status letter that day (see id.), 21 days after the deadline contained in Nolan I.*fn2 It is unclear whether Mr. Flaum ever forwarded a copy of Nolan I to his clients as directed, but it is certainly clear from the docket sheet in this case that Mr. Flaum failed to file the required proof of service. See Nolan I, 2008 WL 650387, at *4.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard for Dismissal Pursuant to Rule 41(b)

Rule 41(b) expressly authorizes involuntarily dismissal "[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also LeSane v. Hall's Sec. Analyst, Inc., 239 F.3d 206, 209 (2d Cir. 2001). The "primary rationale" for dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b) is "the failure of plaintiff in his duty to process his case diligently." Lyell Theatre Corp. v. Loews Corp., 682 F.2d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1982). Dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b) is committed to the discretion of the district court, and may be imposed sua sponte. See Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962); LeSane, 239 F.3d at 209. Rule 41(b) provides that such a dismissal "operates as an adjudication on the merits" unless the dismissal order states otherwise. See Lyell Theatre, 682 F.2d at 42-43.

Dismissal is an extreme and "harsh" remedy only to be imposed in the most "extreme" situations, and the Court must consider the entire record in deciding whether dismissal is appropriate. See Lucas v. Miles, 84 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir. 1996); Minnette v. Time Warner, 997 F.2d 1023, 1027 (2d Cir. 1993). However, in appropriate cases, dismissal must be available, "not merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent." Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976). While dismissal based on the actions of a party's attorney may have serious consequences for the represented party, the Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]here is certainly no merit to the contention that dismissal of petitioner's claim because of his counsel's unexcused conduct imposes an unjust penalty on the client." Link, 370 U.S. at 633.

The Second Circuit has instructed that a district court weighing dismissal of a case pursuant to Rule 41(b) should employ a balancing test, considering the following factors:

(1) the duration of the plaintiff's failure to comply with the court order, (2) whether plaintiff was on notice that failure to comply would result in dismissal, (3) whether the defendants are likely to be prejudiced by further delay in the proceedings, (4) a balancing of the court's interest in managing its docket with the plaintiff's interest in receiving a fair chance to be heard, and (5) whether the judge has adequately considered a sanction less drastic than dismissal.

Lucas, 84 F.3d at 535 (2d Cir. 1996); see also United States ex rel. Drake v. Norden Sys., Inc., 375 F.3d 248, 254 (2d Cir. 2004). Generally, no one factor is dispositive. Shannon v. Gen. Elec. Co., 186 F.3d 186, 194 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Nita v. Conn. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 16 F.3d 482, 485 (2d Cir. 1994)).

B. Analysis

Weighing all of the above factors, the Court dismisses this case with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b).

1. Duration

The first element of the balancing test, the duration of plaintiff's failures, requires that the court consider "(1) whether the failures to prosecute were those of the plaintiff; and (2) whether these failures were of significant duration." Martens v. Thomann, 273 F.3d 159, 180 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Spencer v. Doe, 139 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 1998)); see also United States ex rel. Drake, 375 F.3d at 255. The court must also consider whether any of the delays are attributable to the defendant. See Jackson v. City of New York, 22 F.3d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1994).

Here, while the various failures to follow court orders can be attributed to both parties, plaintiff is primarily to blame for the fact that this case has not advanced in more than six months. See Nolan I, 2008 WL 650387, at *5. This period of delay is particularly significant given that, during that time, the action did not merely lie dormant, but the parties ignored and disobeyed multiple court orders designed to move the case along. The six-month period at issue here thus is of sufficient duration to weigh in favor of dismissal. See Lyell Theatre Corp., 682 F.2d at 42-43 (noting that Rule 41 dismissal may be warranted "after merely a matter of months").

2. Notice

The second element to be considered is whether the plaintiff was on notice that further delay would result in dismissal of the case. See Lucas, 84 F.3d at 535 (2d Cir. 1996).The Second Circuit has held that where a court puts a plaintiff on notice that the court is considering dismissal, and a plaintiff fails to file a document explaining the failures and outlining why the action should not be dismissed, this element has been met. See Shannon, 186 F.3d at 194-95.

The notice element strongly weighs in favor of dismissal of this case. Plaintiff was given notice of the Court's intent to dismiss the action in Nolan I, which stated three times that the action would be dismissed in the event of the plaintiff's failure to comply with its directives. See Nolan I, 2008 WL 650387, at *1-5. In addition, the OSC gave both parties an opportunity to submit papers and to appear in Court to contest dismissal. Plaintiff failed to submit papers in response to the OSC, or to appear on the return date, and failed to follow even one of the directives in Nolan I. Furthermore, the parties had previously been warned that the Court would consider sanctioning the parties for failure to comply with Court orders. (See Jan. 2, 2008 Order.) Finally, plaintiff himself appeared at the January 30, 2008 conference before the Court, and was informed of the Court's intention to issue the OSC and consider dismissing the case absent further action. (See Jan. 30, 2008 Tr. at 3-5.) Thus, because it is abundantly clear that the Court gave plaintiff notice of the impending dismissal of the case, the second element weighs in favor of dismissal.

3. Prejudice

The third element requires that the Court consider the prejudice of further delay to the defendant. See Lucas, 84 F.3d at 535 (2d Cir. 1996). Where the delay is unreasonable, prejudice may be presumed as a matter of law. Shannon, 186 F.3d at 195 (citing Lyell Theatre, 682 F.2d at 43). This is generally because "delay by one party increases the likelihood that evidence in support of the other party's position will be lost and that discovery and trial will be made more difficult." Id. However, "in cases where delay is more moderate or excusable, the need to show actual prejudice is proportionally greater." Lyell Theatre, 682 F.2d at 43. "Although a court cannot deny a plaintiff the right to be heard in the interest of avoiding docket congestion, where a plaintiff could have avoided dismissal 'there can be no claim by plaintiff that [its] due process rights have been denied.'" Jacobs v. County of Westchester, No. 99 Civ. 4976 (WCC), 2008 WL 199469, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2008) (quoting Europacific Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Tradescape Corp., 233 F.R.D. 344, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (alteration in original)).

Defendants' counsel is to blame for at least some of the delay in this matter. Because of this, and because only six months have passed, the Court will not presume prejudice. While it is demonstrably unreasonable to fail to comply with court orders for six months, the unreasonable delay present in other cases in which courts presumed prejudice is absent here. See Shannon, 186 F.3d at 195 (finding presumption of prejudice because events at issue in lawsuit had taken place over a decade earlier); Peart v. City of New York, 992 F.2d 458, 462 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing potential for witness recollection to diminish or witness unavailability as the reason for a presumption of prejudice due to unreasonable delay); Dodson, 957 F. Supp. at 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that dismissal was appropriate after a five-year delay because the court can presume that witnesses' "memories have faded" when eleven years have passed since the events giving rise to plaintiff's cause of action). Thus, the Court finds that the prejudice factor does not weigh in favor of dismissal.

4. Balancing the Court's and Plaintiff's Interests

With respect to the fourth element, the balancing of the court's interests and the plaintiff's right to a fair adjudication on the merits, the Second Circuit has instructed that "[t]here must be compelling evidence of an extreme effect on court congestion before a litigant's right to be heard is subrogated to the convenience of the court." Lucas, 84 F.3d at 535-36. As such, the plaintiff's failure to prosecute must be "vexatious and burdensome" on the Court's ability to manage its docket, as opposed to being merely "silent and unobtrusive." LeSane, 239 F.3d at 210.

Plaintiff's right to an opportunity to be heard is not taken lightly by this Court. However, this action has been pending for over a year, and there has been no significant progress of any kind for six months. During that time, this Court has issued six separate orders relating to the parties' various failures, and held three conferences relating to the parties' inability to advance the case. While the Court has less knowledge of what transpired prior to this action being reassigned to the undersigned on September 4, 2007, the parties' ongoing failure to comply with orders of this Court has taken up a grossly disproportionate amount of the Court's time since October, 2007. Plaintiff's duty to prosecute the case diligently "is designed to achieve 'fairness to other litigants, whether in the same case or merely in the same court as competitors for scarce judicial resources. . . .'" Dodson, 957 F. Supp. at 470 (quoting Chira v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 634 F.2d 664, 668 (2d Cir. 1980)). As such, the Court finds that plaintiff's failures have been "vexatious and burdensome" and accordingly, the fourth element weighs in favor of dismissal.

5. Efficacy of Lesser Sanctions

Finally, the fifth element looks to whether the Court has adequately considered remedies other than dismissal. "It is clear that a district judge should employ the remedy of dismissal 'only when he is sure of the impotence of lesser sanctions.'" Dodson, 86 F.3d at 39 (citing Chira, 634 F.2d at 665). "In deciding on the suitability of lesser sanctions, and whether the sanctions should be aimed primarily against the party or the attorney, it can be important for the district court to assess the relative roles of attorney and client in causing the delay. . . ." Id. at 40. "[T]he more the delay was occasioned by the lawyer's disregard of his obligation toward his client, the more this factor argues in favor of a less drastic sanction imposed directly on the lawyer." Id. However, this Court must be guided by the Supreme Court's pronouncement that "[t]here is certainly no merit to the contention that dismissal of petitioner's claim because of his counsel's unexcused conduct imposes an unjust penalty on the client. Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent." Link, 370 U.S. at 633-34.

Although it is without question that plaintiff's failures in this case are solely attributable to his counsel, Mr. Piccone, plaintiff himself was on notice of Mr. Piccone's shortcomings up to and including his failure to appear on January 30, 2008. Nevertheless, as of the April 8, 2008 telephone conference, Mr. Piccone was still the counsel of record in this matter. Plaintiff voluntarily chose Mr. Piccone to represent him in this action. Thus, while dismissal is an unfortunate result for plaintiff, it is not an unjust result. See Link, 370 U.S. at 633-34.

As to the consideration of lesser sanctions, this factor clearly weighs in favor of dismissal. As reflected in the record of this case, the Court has given plaintiff numerous opportunities to be heard in relation to his failure to follow court orders. Prior admonishments and warnings have been wholly ineffective. Indeed, the Court previously issued a civil contempt sanction against Mr. Piccone in the amount of $750.00 in order to induce his compliance with future orders. See Nolan I, 2008 WL 650387 at *3. As of the date of this Order, that sanction has not been paid. Moreover, as noted above, counsel has not complied with any of the directives contained in Nolan I. As such, and based on the record in this case, the Court is convinced that lesser sanctions will have no impact on plaintiff's, or his counsel's, conduct or compliance with this court's orders.

As four of the five elements favor dismissal under Rule 41(b), the Court finds that dismissal is appropriate, and this case is accordingly dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). While the Court is sympathetic to the personal issues encountered by plaintiff's counsel over the past few months, as alluded to by Mr. Piccone during the April 8, 2008 telephone conference, that fact does not alleviate Mr. Piccone's duties to the Court and his client. A simple letter to the Court explaining his plight could have resulted in the extension of deadlines, a short stay of the action, or other relief, including obtaining new counsel for plaintiff. Mr. Piccone has made no showing that he was unable to contact the Court during the time that he was preoccupied with personal matters. The Court recognizes that dismissal of this case with prejudice may have the result of denying plaintiff any relief that he might have obtained on his claims. However, plaintiff is responsible for his choice of counsel, and did not choose at any point, even after being advised of Mr. Piccone's failures, to replace him as counsel. See Lastra v. Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, No. 03 Civ. 8756 (RJH) (RLE), 2005 WL 551996, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2005) ("Claims by a litigant that he should be excused from his attorney's actions because of alleged fraudulent conduct and disobeyance of the litigant's orders may give rise to a claim for malpractice, but does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance or excusable neglect.")

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this action is DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to close this case.

SO ORDERED.


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