The opinion of the court was delivered by: Nicholas G. Garaufis United States District Judge
NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, United States District Judge
Plaintiffs bring this action to challenge the rule of Defendant Board of Elections in the City of New York ("Defendant" or "Board of Election") that a candidate collecting signatures on a designating petition must utilize only subscribing witnesses who are registered members of that candidate's party, codified at New York Election Law § 6-132(2) ("Party-Witness Rule"). Plaintiffs and Defendant have filed cross motions for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied and Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must draw all permissible inferences in that party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The court will accept as fact only those facts included in the parties' Local Civil Rule 56.1 statements of material fact and supported by citations to the record. Local Civil Rule 56.1. Any numbered paragraph in the parties' statement of material facts will be deemed to be admitted for purposes of their motions unless specifically controverted by a correspondingly numbered paragraph in the opposing side's statement. Id.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law," Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), i.e., "where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party," Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir. 2001). "A fact is 'material' for these purposes if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. An issue of fact is 'genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 256. If the moving party meets its burden, the non-moving party must then "set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
Plaintiffs initially filed this suit seeking injunctive relief directing Defendant Board of Elections to place the names of Plaintiffs Phillip J. Smallman ("Smallman") and John G. Serpico ("Serpico") (collectively, "Candidate Plaintiffs") and former Plaintiff Zachary Lareche ("Lareche") on the ballot for Judge of the Civil Court of the City of New York in Kings County in the September 12, 2006 Democratic Party primary election. (Complaint ("Compl.") (Docket Entry # 1).) The other four remaining plaintiffs in the case, Lori S. Maslow ("Maslow"), Carol Faison ("Faison"), Jemel Johnson ("Johnson"), and Kenneth Bartholomew ("Bartholomew") (collectively, "Subscribing Witness Plaintiffs"), each sought to serve as subscribing witnesses for the Candidate Plaintiffs in that election, even though they were not enrolled in the Democratic Party at the time. (Id.)
At the same time Plaintiffs filed their Complaint, they also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction (Docket Entry #3), on which no action was taken initially because Defendant had not yet ruled on the objections filed against Smallman's, Serpico's, and Lareche's petitions (Docket Entry # 6). The motion for a preliminary injunction was later rendered moot and never ruled upon by Judge Edward R. Korman because the Board of Elections never removed Smallman and Serpico from the ballot due to a lack of valid signatures: even without the contested signatures, both Smallman and Serpico had a sufficient number of signatures to appear on the ballot, which, in fact, they did. With regard to then-Plaintiff Lareche's petition, even if the signatures procured by the subscribing witnesses who were not enrolled in the Democratic Party had been counted in favor of Lereche's petition, he still would have lacked a sufficient number of signatures to earn a position on the ballot. (Docket Entry # 9.)
Specifically, to attain a position on the Democratic primary election ballot in 2006, Smallman and Serpico needed to file a designating petition containing a minimum of 4,000 valid signatures of enrolled Democrats. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 80 (citing Declaration of Aaron Maslow ("Maslow Decl.") ¶ 23); Def. 56.1 ¶ 80.) Defendant prepared a report ("Clerk's Report") detailing objections to Serpico and Smallman's petitions. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 93, 96; Def 56.1 ¶¶ 93, 96.) For Serpico's petition, Defendant's Clerk's Report states that 109 signatures were invalid because the subscribing witnesses were not registered to vote and 211 were invalid because the subscribing witnesses were not enrolled in the correct party; overall, the Clerk's Report states that of the 11,971 signatures filed on Serpico's petition, 7,117 were invalid and 4,854 were valid, still more than the 4,000 required to attain a position on the ballot. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 94-95; Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 94-95.) For Smallman's petition, Defendant's Clerk's Report states that 119 signatures were invalid because the subscribing witnesses were not registered to vote and 211 were invalid because the subscribing witnesses were not enrolled in the correct party; overall, the Clerk's Report stated that of the 13,397 signatures filed on Smallman's petition, 7,712 were invalid and 5,685 were valid, also more than the 4,000 required to attain a position on the ballot. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 97-98; Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 97-98.)
The parties do not contest that, despite the invalidation of signatures witnessed by non-party enrollees, the Candidate Plaintiffs had a sufficient number of signatures remaining on their 2006 designating petitions to attain positions on the ballot. (Pl. Mem. at 1.) The parties also do not contest that the Candidate Plaintiffs lost the primary election. (Id.) The remaining Plaintiffs have filed an Amended Complaint seeking to conform this action to one for a declaratory judgment.*fn2 (Id.) Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint for declaratory judgment also states that the Subscribing Witness Plaintiffs wish to support candidates of another party at some point in the future by collecting petition signatures for the Candidate Plaintiffs or other named and unnamed candidates.
A. Standing to Contest an "Injury-in-Fact"
In order to have standing under Article III, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he or she has suffered an "injury in fact" that is "concrete and particularized" as well as "actual or imminent," rather than "conjectural or hypothetical"; (2) the injury is "fairly traceable" to the challenged conduct; and (3) it is likely, rather than "merely speculative," that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff must at least allege that he suffered an injury at the hands of a defendant for his claim against that defendant to survive summary judgment. Wachtler v. County of Herkimer, 35 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. At the summary judgment stage, Plaintiffs must set forth specific facts ...