The opinion of the court was delivered by: David G. Larimer United States District Judge
Plaintiff, Andrew Whalen ("Whalen"), a former employee of defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank ("Chase"), alleges that Chase failed to pay him, and a class of similarly-situated underwriters, overtime compensation in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §201 et seq., and New York Labor Law §190 et seq. and §650 et seq.*fn1 Chases claims that Whalen was not entitled to overtime because he was an exempt, administrative employee under the regulations adopted by the Department of Labor, 29 C.F.R. §541.500 et seq.
Whalen has moved for summary judgment on the grounds that he is a bona fide administrative employee entitled to overtime (Dkt. #72), and Chase has cross-moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Whalen is not an administrative employee (Dkt. #90). For the reasons that follow, plaintiff's motion is denied, Chase's motion is granted, and the Complaint is dismissed.
A. Standard of Review on a Motion for Summary Judgment
It is well settled that a motion for summary judgment should be granted only where there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant. U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). A party who bears the burden of proof on a particular claim must factually support each element of his or her claim. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element...necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Thus, on those issues on which the nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility to confront the motion for summary judgment with evidence in admissible form. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
Chase is a global financial services firm that offers a number of financial products and services, including home equity lines of credit, home equity loans and various kinds of mortgages. Whalen was employed by Chase as an underwriter (also called a credit analyst) in Chase's Home Equity group in Rochester, New York from November 1998 until May 2002.
As an underwriter, Whalen's primary job duty was to evaluate the creditworthiness of Chase's customers applying for loans and lines of credit, and decide whether to approve such requests. In making credit decisions, Whalen analyzed documents concerning applicants' finances and credit histories, and made determinations, pursuant to certain written Chase policies and guidelines (the "Credit Policy"), as to whether the collateral was sufficient to offset the financial risk to Chase. In some instances, Whalen was authorized to approve loan requests and/or make counteroffers on loan requests with one or more variances or exceptions to Chase's policies and guidelines.
The FLSA requires compensation at one and a half time the regular rate when an employer requires the employee to work more than forty hours per week. See 29 U.S.C. §207(a)(2). To establish an FLSA claim, plaintiff must prove that: (1) he was an employee who was eligible for overtime (i.e., that he was not exempt from the Act's overtime pay requirements); and (2) that he actually worked overtime hours for which he was not compensated. See id.; Barry v. Town of Elma, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5548 at *5-*6 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).*fn2 Because the FLSA is a remedial act, its exemptions are narrowly construed. See Martin v. Malcolm Pirnie, Inc., 949 F.2d 611, 14 (2d Cir. 1991); Burke v. County of Monroe, 225 F. Supp. 2d 306, 317 (W.D.N.Y. 2002). The employer bears the burden of proving that an employee is exempt, by demonstrating that the employee serves in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity. Id.; 29 U.S.C. §214(a)(1).
Here, defendant claims that plaintiff is exempt as an administrative employee. Whether an employee's duties are "administrative" within the meaning of the FLSA is a question of law. See Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 714 (1986).
The Department of Labor's ("DOL") regulations set forth a "short test" to determine an employee's exempt status. In addition to other exemptions, the regulations exempt from the FLSA any employee who is "employed in a bona fide administrative capacity": that is, whose weekly wage exceeds the applicable statutory threshold, whose primary duty is office or non-manual work directly related to management policies or general business operations of the employer, and which involves the exercise of discretion and independent judgment. 29 U.S.C.S. §201 et seq.; 29 C.F.R. §541.200(a).*fn3
It is undisputed that plaintiff's wages satisfy the statutory threshold. Accordingly, whether he was "employed in a bona fide administrative capacity" turns upon whether he performed administrative ...