The opinion of the court was delivered by: Kimba M. Wood, U.S.D.J.
Plaintiff Crystal Spruill ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff initially alleged several claims arising from the removal of her children by the Administration for Children's Services ("ACS"), the subsequent placement of her children in foster care, and her related arrest. However, only Plaintiff's false arrest claim remains. (See Mar. 27, 2007 Order 4-5; D.E. 33.) The remaining defendants, New York City Police Department Officers Sidney Wise and Mark McDonald (the "Arresting Officers"), now move for summary judgment on the false arrest claim. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the Arresting Officers' motion for summary judgment.
The Court sets forth the following undisputed facts related to Plaintiff's false arrest claim: On November 5, 2001, Plaintiff's sister, then the custodian of Plaintiff's children, brought the children to Plaintiff's home. (Am. Compl. 3; D.E. 6.) At that time, an order of protection permitted Plaintiff to have contact with her children only in the context of highly supervised agency visits.*fn2 (Schaerf Decl. Ex. C; D.E. 43.)
In the early hours of the morning on November 6, 2001, Child Protective Service workers arrived at Plaintiff's home and attempted to remove her children. (Am. Compl. 3.) When Plaintiff resisted, the workers sought assistance from the police. (Id.) The Arresting Officers, two New York City Police Department officers, were called to Plaintiff's home. (See Wise Aff. ¶¶ 3-5, D.E. 48; McDonald Aff. ¶¶ 3-5, D.E. 49.)
Prior to the Arresting Officers' arrival at Plaintiff's home, Hani Malek of ACS informed the Arresting Officers that Plaintiff was in violation of an order of protection. (See Wise Aff. ¶ 6; McDonald Aff. ¶ 6.) When the Arresting Officers arrived at Plaintiff's home, two ACS workers again informed the Arresting Officers of the order of protection. (See Wise Aff. ¶ 7; McDonald Aff. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff was informed that she was in violation of the order of protection, but she continued to resist the removal efforts. (See Wise Aff. ¶¶ 8-9; McDonald Aff. ¶¶ 8-9.) The Arresting Officers then arrested Plaintiff. (See Wise Aff. ¶ 10; McDonald Aff. ¶ 10.)
Plaintiff brings a false arrest claim against the Arresting Officers. The Arresting Officers move for summary judgment on this claim. (See D.E. 43.) By Report and Recommendation dated June 12, 2008 (the "Report"), familiarity with which is assumed, Magistrate Judge Francis recommended the Court grant the Arresting Officers' motion for summary judgment. (Report 9-10.) Plaintiff submitted objections to the Report.*fn3 After de novo review of the Report and Plaintiff's objections, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of the Arresting Officers.
A. Standard of Review of a Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation
The Court must review de novo those portions of the magistrate judge's report and recommendation to which timely written objections have been filed. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, her objections "are generally accorded leniency." Dixon v. Ragland, No. 03 Civ. 826, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85159, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2007) (citation omitted). Furthermore, the Court construes Plaintiff's objections to "raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
B. Standard of Review of a Summary Judgment Motion
Summary judgment is properly granted where "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Guilbert v. Gardner, 480 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2007). The substantive law governing a case will determine which facts are material. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.; see also Mitchell v. Shane, 350 F.3d 39, 47 (2d Cir. 2003).
The burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact rests with the moving party. See Koch v. Town of Brattleboro, 287 F.3d 162, 165 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323). Once a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, "the non-moving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. ...