The opinion of the court was delivered by: Randolph F. Treece United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Hector Matos, Jr., filed this civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that on April 18, 2004, the Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by beating him and failing to prevent that alleged beating. Dkt. No. 1, Compl. Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for failure to prosecute, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).*fn1 Dkt. No. 34, Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss. Despite being given an extension of time, Plaintiff has not opposed this Motion. See generally Dkt. For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that the Motion be granted.
Defendants assert that on September 17, 2007, through their counsel, they served Plaintiff with their First Set of Interrogatories at the address provided on the docket. Dkt. No. 34, Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, Mem. of Law, at p. 3. A copy of that discovery request has been attached to the Defendants' Motion. Dkt. No. 34, Steven H. Schwartz, Affirm., dated Dec. 20, 2007, Ex. A, First Set of Interrogs., dated Sept. 17, 2007. Both the interrogatories and the cover letter attached to them specifically state: "a response is required within 30 days of the service of the request." Id. (emphasis in original). Plaintiff did not respond within thirty (30) days, prompting Defendants, through their Counsel, to write Plaintiff on October 29, 2007, informing him that forty-five (45) days had passed since service of the interrogatories, and reminding Plaintiff of his obligation to respond.
Schwartz Affirm., Ex. B, Defs.' Lt. to Pl., dated Oct. 29, 2007. In that letter, Defendants also warned Plaintiff that "failure to respond may result in dismissal of your action due to a failure to prosecute." Id.
Defendants assert that Plaintiff again failed to respond. Through counsel, Defendants wrote Plaintiff another letter reminding him of his original duty to respond within thirty (30) days of service, asking if he needed additional time to respond, and warning him that "failure to respond may result in my filing a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute, and the dismissal of your action due to a failure to prosecute." Schwartz Affirm., Ex. C, Defs.' Lt. to Pl., dated Nov. 27, 2007. Plaintiff failed to respond to that letter as well. Defs.' Mem. of Law at p. 3.
Thereafter, Defendants filed this Motion to Dismiss on December 20, 2007, and the Court directed Plaintiff to file a Response to the Motion by January 22, 2008. Dkt. No. 34. After receiving no response from Plaintiff, the Court, sua sponte, extended Plaintiff's time to file a response until May 19, 2008. Dkt. No. 35, Order. In that Order, we warned Plaintiff that failure to respond may, if appropriate, result in the granting of Defendants' Motion, in which [case] there will be no trial. See N.D.N.Y.L.R. 7.1(b)(3) ("Where a properly filed motion is unopposed and the Court determines that the moving party has met its burden to demonstrate entitlement to the relief requested therein, the non-moving party's failure to serve any papers as required by this Rule shall be deemed as consent to the granting or denial of the motion, as the case may be, unless good cause is shown.")
Id. (emphasis in original).
To date, Plaintiff has not responded to the Defendants' Motion. See generally Dkt.
FED.R.CIV. P. 41(b) permits a court to dismiss an action "[f]or failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] or any order of the court[.]"
However, dismissal under FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b) is considered a "harsh remedy" and should be utilized only in "extreme circumstances." Spencer v. Doe, 139 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Lucas v. Miles, 84 F.3d 532, 535 (2d. Cir. 1996)). In addition, when, as here, there is a pro se litigant, "[d]istrict courts should be especially hesitant to dismiss for procedural deficiencies[.]" Id. Dismissals pursuant to Rules 37 and 41 are within the discretion of the courts pursuant to their authoritative and discretionary control over case management and calendar congestion. See Dodson v. Runyon, 957 F. Supp. 465, 469 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd without opinion, 152 F.3d 917 (2d Cir. 1998), (citing Nita v. Conn. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 16 F.3d 148, 485 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Determining whether a Rule 41(b) dismissal is warranted requires a court to examine the record as a whole, and specifically to consider the following factors: (1) the duration of the plaintiff's failure to comply with the court order; (2) whether the plaintiff was on notice that failure to comply would result in dismissal; (3) whether the defendants are likely to be prejudiced by further delay in the proceedings; (4) a balancing of the court's interest in managing its docket with the plaintiff's interest in receiving a fair chance to be heard; and (5) whether the judge has adequately considered a sanction less drastic than dismissal. Id. at 112-13 (citing Lucas v. Miles, 84 F.3d at 535 & Jackson v. City of New York, 22 F.3d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 1994) (other citations omitted)). Generally, no factor is dispositive. Nita v. Conn. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 16 F.3d at 485.
Applying the factors recited above to the present case, we find that dismissal is warranted. The docket and the submissions presented to the Court show that Plaintiff has failed to respond to Defendants' discovery requests for nearly eleven (11) months, and likewise to the Court's Order to file a response to Defendants' Motion for nearly eight (8) months. Plaintiff was warned both in Defendants' correspondences and in the Court's April 14, 2008 Order that failure to respond could result in the dismissal of his claims. See Defs.' Lts. to Pl., dated Oct. 29 & Nov. 27, 2007; Dkt. No. 35, Order. Furthermore, "[p]rejudice to defendants resulting from an unreasonable delay may be presumed[.]" Lyell Theater Corp. v. Loews Corp., 682 F.2d 37, 43 (2d Cir. ...