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Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bayer Corp.

September 4, 2008

EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY AND MARTIN M. COYNE, PLAINTIFFS,
v.
BAYER CORP., FORMERLY MILES INC; THE STERLING DRUG INC. SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFIT PLAN; AND THE SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFIT PLAN COMMITTEE OF STERLING DRUG INC., DEFENDANTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Cedarbaum, J.

OPINION

Plaintiff Martin Coyne moves for summary judgment on this claim for pension benefits pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") § 502(a)(1)(B). An additional plaintiff, Eastman Kodak Co. ("Kodak"), sues for indemnification, but does not move for summary judgment at this time. Bayer Corp., the Sterling Drug Inc. Supplemental Benefit Plan, and the Supplemental Benefit Plan Committee of Sterling Drug Inc. ("Defendants") move for summary judgment against both plaintiffs, seeking a determination that Coyne is not entitled to the benefits he seeks. Defendants' motion is opposed by both Coyne and Kodak. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion is granted and the complaint is dismissed.

BACKGROUND

Familiarity with the procedural history is assumed. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bayer Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Kodak I") (dismissing without prejudice to exhaust administrative remedies), vacated and remanded, 452 F.3d 215, 216-19 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Kodak II") (holding that an ERISA benefits claimant is not required to exhaust a claims procedure whose adoption post-dates the suit to recover benefits). The parties stipulated to all of the facts material to the current summary judgment motions.

Coyne began working for Sterling Drug Inc. ("Sterling") in 1981. During his employment, he accrued pension benefits under the Sterling Drug Inc. Retirement Plan for Salaried Employees (the "Sterling Plan").

In 1988, Sterling was acquired by Kodak. Kodak added Appendix I to its pension plan, the Kodak Retirement Income Plan (the "KRIP"). Appendix I of the KRIP incorporated the terms of the Sterling Plan. Coyne, like the other employees of Sterling, continued to accrue benefits under the Sterling Plan, now Appendix I of the KRIP.

In February of 1994, Sterling's board approved what is known as a "top hat" plan, the Sterling Drug Inc. Supplemental Benefit Plan (the "Sterling Supplemental Plan"). Top hat plans provide employees with supplemental benefits beyond the limitations that the Internal Revenue Code places on ordinary ("qualified") benefit plans. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 401(a)(17) & 415; Kodak I, 369 F. Supp. 2d at 476; Kodak II, 452 F.3d at 217; Kemmerer v. ICI Americas Inc., 70 F.3d 281, 286-87 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing top hat plans). A top hat plan pays what an employee would have received under the qualified plan if the Internal Revenue Code did not limit the benefits available under qualified plans. Top hat plans are unfunded. As benefits become due they are paid from the general assets of the employer company and not from a pension trust. The Sterling Supplemental Plan, although created in 1994, had an effective date of January 1, 1991. Coyne did not accrue benefits under the Sterling Supplemental Plan in February of 1994, because top hat benefits accrued only to employees whose salaries were high enough to trigger a § 401(a)(17) benefits limitation.

In autumn of 1994, through a series of transactions involving multiple corporations (the "1994 Transaction"), Sterling was acquired by Bayer Corp. ("Bayer"). Some Sterling business lines, not relevant here, were sold to Sanofi Aventis and SmithKline Beecham. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. STWB Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), later opinion, 2002 WL 31465798 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2002). Bayer assumed the obligation to pay the qualified pension benefits that had accrued under the KRIP for some Sterling employees. Supplement A, Article II was added to the Bayer Corporation Pension Plan, stating that Bayer's obligation to pay Sterling benefits only extends to "employees of Sterling who participated, or who were eligible to participate, in the KRIP ... and were employed by Sterling on November 1, 1994." (Bayer Corporation Pension Plan, Supplement A, art. II, ¶ S2.20(b).) Coyne was not employed by Sterling on November 1, 1994. On October 13, 1994, he became an employee of Kodak. At that time, he ceased to accrue benefits under Appendix I of the KRIP and began to accrue benefits under the regular provisions of the KRIP.

Coyne was an employee of Kodak until his retirement in 2003, and in his years at Kodak his salary exceeded the § 401(a)(17) limit on pension benefits. Kodak has its own top hat plan, the Kodak Unfunded Retirement Income Plan. Under that plan Coyne is entitled to $4,273.79 per month, which he is receiving.

On May 15, 2003, prior to Coyne's actual retirement, Kodak provided Bayer with an estimate of Coyne's benefits under the Sterling Supplemental Plan. Neither Bayer nor Sterling made those payments, so on July 9, 2003, Kodak entered into an agreement with Coyne to advance payments to him equal to the Sterling Supplemental Plan benefits until the matter was resolved.*fn1 On June 29, 2004, Coyne and Kodak filed this lawsuit. Coyne seeks benefits under the Sterling Supplemental Plan and a determination that the Sterling Supplemental Plan was obligated to pay him $11,305.18 per month for life in addition to his Kodak top hat pension. Kodak seeks indemnification for the payments it has made to Coyne based on its calculation of what he was owed under the Sterling Supplemental Plan.

DISCUSSION

ERISA plans are construed according to federal common law. Dobson v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 389 F.3d 386, 399 (2d Cir. 2004). Plans are interpreted "as a whole, giving terms their plain meanings." Fay v. Oxford Health Plan, 287 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir. 2002). Where contract language is ambiguous, summary judgment is not appropriate.*fn2 Perreca v. Gluck, 295 F.3d 215, 224 (2d Cir. 2002). Whether language is ambiguous is a question of law to be resolved by reference to the contract alone. Fay, 287 F.3d at 104. The court must examine the context of the entire agreement and determine whether a reasonably intelligent person would find the language to be capable of multiple meanings. Id. If summary judgment is denied, relevant extrinsic evidence may be introduced at trial. Following such an inquiry, "absent evidence indicating the intention of the parties, any ambiguity in the language used in an ERISA plan should be construed against the interests of the party that drafted the language." Perreca, 295 F.3d at 223.

The Sterling Supplemental Plan "is intended to provide benefits in excess of the limitations imposed by Sections 401(a)(17) and 415 of the Internal Revenue Code ... to those employees of the Employer participating in the Kodak Retirement Income Plan." (Sterling Supplemental Plan, Introduction.) "Employer" is defined as Sterling. (Id.) As discussed above, Sterling ...


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