Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Official citation and/or docket number and footnotes (if any) for this case available with purchase.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Rivera v. Super Star Leasing

NEW YORK SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT


December 11, 2008

EDGARDO L. RIVERA, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v.
SUPER STAR LEASING, INC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Mark Friedlander, J.), entered February 20, 2008, which denied defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Andrias, J.P., Saxe, Sweeny, Catterson, Moskowitz, JJ.

24540/05

Defendants, through the affirmed reports of a radiologist, orthopedic surgeon and neurologist, made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment regarding plaintiff's claim of serious injury on the theory of "permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member" (Insurance Law § 5102[d]).

However, plaintiff's expert raised a triable issue of fact on this theory of serious injury. Plaintiff's expert, who reviewed the relevant medical records and examined plaintiff as recently as September 2007, provided both quantitative and qualitative range of motion limitations in his report. He opined that plaintiff's symptoms were caused by the accident, and concluded that plaintiff had sustained permanent consequential limitation of use of his cervical and lumbar spine and right shoulder (see Garner v Tong, 27 AD3d 401 [2006]; Gonzalez v Vasquez, 301 AD2d 438 [2003]). To the extent the expert incorporated into his affirmation several unsworn reports of other doctors who examined plaintiff, these unsworn reports were not the only evidence submitted by plaintiff in opposition to the motion, and may be considered to deny a motion for summary judgment (see e.g. Largotta v Recife Realty Co., 254 AD2d 225 [1998]).

Furthermore, the motion court properly concluded that defendants failed to demonstrate a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on plaintiff's 90/180-day claim. Defendants' experts did not examine plaintiff until approximately two years after the accident and could offer no conclusions regarding plaintiff's condition in the 180 days following the accident (see Loesburg v Jovanovic, 264 AD2d 301 [1999]).

We have considered defendants' remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

20081211

© 1992-2008 VersusLaw Inc.



Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Official citation and/or docket number and footnotes (if any) for this case available with purchase.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.