In an action, inter alia, for specific performance of an option agreement for the purchase of real property, the defendant appeals, as limited by her brief, from stated portions of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Knipel, J.), dated March 1, 2007, and the plaintiff cross-appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of the same judgment as, after a non-jury trial, is in favor of the defendant and against her dismissing the first cause of action.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
STEVEN W. FISHER, J.P., DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO, THOMAS A. DICKERSON and ARIEL E. BELEN, JJ.
ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed insofar as cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
The appeal by the defendant is dismissed because she is not aggrieved by the judgment, which granted her complete relief by dismissing the only two causes of action asserted in the complaint (see CPLR 5511; Parochial Bus Sys. v Board of Educ. Of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d 539, 544-545; Roth v Michelson, 55 NY2d 278, 281; Rorie v Woodmere Academy, 52 NY2d 200, 204; Cherry v Koch, 126 AD2d 346, 348).
Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court properly declined to direct partial specific performance of the subject option agreement (see SJSJ Southold Realty, LLC v Fraser, 33 AD3d 784; cf. Bee Jay Indus. Corp. v Fina, 98 AD2d 738, affd 62 NY2d 851).
FISHER, J.P., ANGIOLILLO, DICKERSON and BELEN, JJ., concur.
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