Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Sheila Abdus-Salaam, J.), entered August 8, 2007, insofar as it granted so much of defendant's cross motion as sought to amend a prior judgment to limit prejudgment interest to the period from March 20, 1991 to October 2, 2001, unanimously affirmed, and the appeal from that part of the order denying plaintiff's motion to "clarify" a prior order, unanimously dismissed, without costs.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
Lippman, P.J., Gonzalez, Nardelli, Buckley, Acosta, JJ.
Plaintiff's motion to "clarify" is properly deemed one to reargue, the denial of which is not appealable. Were we to consider the merits, we would affirm on the same grounds as we affirm the balance of the order on appeal.
In a prior order (278 AD2d 40), we affirmed the striking of an award of treble damages, but also agreed not to vacate the award of interest to plaintiff. In the present appeal, we consider whether the court improvidently limited the amount of prejudgment interest plaintiff could recover due to delay in entering the corrected judgment, namely, to the period between the date of the DHCR rent overcharge award and the entry date of the order awarding that interest. It was incumbent upon plaintiff, and in her interest as prevailing party in the action to enforce the DHCR award, to enter a corrected judgment as soon as possible in order to enforce and collect upon it. The court was thus warranted in limiting the amount of prejudgment interest plaintiff could recover because of her inordinate delay in entering the corrected judgment (see Peerless Ins. Co. v Casey, 194 AD2d 411 ; see also Jackson v Brook, 227 AD2d 381 ).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.
© 1992-2009 VersusLaw ...