SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
December 31, 2008
TOWN OF AMHERST, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
BRIAN BURNS MEAD, DEFENDANT,
POWER UP MANUFACTURING, INC., GMAC LEASING CORPORATION, VEHICLE ASSET UNIVERSAL LEASING TRUST, CENTRAL ORIGINATING LEASE TRUST, AND GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. (APPEAL NO. 3.)
Appeals from a second amended order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Joseph R. Glownia, J.), entered December 18, 2007. The second amended order, among other things, denied the motion of defendant Power Up Manufacturing, Inc. and the cross motion of defendants GMAC Leasing Corporation, Vehicle Asset Universal Leasing Trust, Central Originating Lease Trust, and General Motors Acceptance Corporation for summary judgment.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., HURLBUTT, PERADOTTO, GREEN, AND GORSKI, JJ.
It is hereby ORDERED that the second amended order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Plaintiff commenced this action seeking reimbursement pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-c (6) for the wages and medical bills of a police officer employed by plaintiff. The officer was injured when the police vehicle he was driving was struck by a vehicle driven by defendant Brian Burns Mead and owned by defendant Power Up Manufacturing, Inc. (Power Up). Supreme Court properly denied the motion of Power Up and the cross motion of the remaining defendants-appellants for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against them. Contrary to the contention of those defendants, General Municipal Law § 207-c (6) does not apply only to active tortfeasors. Rather, it applies both to active tortfeasors and to those who are vicariously liable. Indeed, the statute expressly provides that "a cause of action shall accrue to the municipality for reimbursement . . . as against any third party against whom the [police officer] shall have a cause of action" (id. [emphasis added]).
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