In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Spinola, J.), dated January 30, 2008, which granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that he did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d).
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., FRED T. SANTUCCI, DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO, THOMAS A. DICKERSON. CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, JJ.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied.
The Supreme Court erred in concluding that the defendant met her prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). In support of her motion, the defendant relied upon, inter alia, the affirmed medical report of her examining orthopedic surgeon. In his report he noted, upon his examination of the plaintiff, the existence of significant limitations in the range of motion of the plaintiff's lumbar spine (see Hurtte v Budget Roadside Care, 54 AD3d 362; Jenkins v Miled Hacking Corp., 43 AD3d 393; Bentivegna v Stein, 42 AD3d 555; Zamaniyan v Vrabeck, 41 AD3d 472).
Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to consider the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposition papers (see Hurtte v Budget Roadside Care, 54 AD3d 362; Coscia v 938 Trading Corp., 283 AD2d 538).
SKELOS, J.P., SANTUCCI, ANGIOLILLO, DICKERSON and CHAMBERS, JJ., concur.
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