The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sifton, Senior Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On May 2, 2008, plaintiff Louis Guadagni commenced this action against defendants the New York City Transit Authority ("Transit Authority")*fn1 and Police Officers "John Doe" and "Jane Doe," alleging (1) false arrest; (2) false imprisonment; (3) defamation (including slander, libel, slander per se and libel per se); (4) malicious prosecution; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6) abuse of process; (7) invasion of privacy; (8) wrongful suspension from employment; (9) violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988, based on, inter alia, unspecified violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and (10) negligent hiring and training of police officers. On January 27, 2009, I granted defendant Transit Authority's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims. Guadagni v. New York City Transit Auth., No. 08-CV-3163, 2009 WL 205050 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2009). Presently before this Court is plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of that decision pursuant to Rule 6.3 of the Local Rules for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York. For the reasons that follow, the motion is denied.
Familiarity with the factual background of this matter is presumed based on the record of proceedings before the undersigned. For a description of the facts of this case, see Guadagni, 2009 WL 205050, at *1-3.
I. Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration
A. Standard for Reconsideration
A motion for reconsideration pursuant to Local Rule 6.3 will be granted if the moving party presents factual matters or controlling decisions the court overlooked that might materially have influenced its decision.*fn2 Pereira v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. (In re Payroll Express Corp.), 921 F. Supp. 1121, 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Violette v. Armonk Assocs., L.P., 823 F. Supp. 224, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Reconsideration is also appropriate if there is an intervening change of controlling law, new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 789 (2d Cir. 1983); Casino, LLC v. M/V Royal Empress, No. 98-CV-2333, 1998 WL 566772, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1998). Local Rule 6.3 is to be narrowly construed and strictly applied so as to avoid repetitive arguments on issues that have been fully considered. See Caleb & Co. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 624 F.Supp. 747, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Accordingly, a party in its motion for reconsideration "may not advance new facts, issues or arguments not previously presented to the court." Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., No. 86-CV-6447, 1989 WL 162315, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1989).
Local Rule 6.3 states that "[a] notice of motion for reconsideration or reargument of a court order determining a motion shall be served within ten (10) days after the entry of the court's determination of the original motion, or in the case of a court order resulting in a judgment, within ten (10) days after the entry of the judgment." E.D.N.Y. Local Civ. R. 6.3. Courts will enforce this time limit "absent adequate justification for ignoring it." Algie v. RCA Global Communications, Inc., 891 F.Supp. 875, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd, 60 F.3d 956 (2d Cir. 1995). This is true even where motions for reconsideration are filed one day late. Dama v. Seirup, No. 96-CV-2557, 2008 WL 1957772, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2008); Tejada v. Suffolk County, No. CV-05-2961, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20043, at *2-3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2007).
B. Timeliness of Plaintiff's Motion
Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of my January 27, 2009 memorandum opinion and order granting defendant Transit Authority's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims. The judgment resulting from that order was entered on January 28, 2009. Under Local Rule 6.3, plaintiff had until February 11, 2009 to serve his motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff's motion was not served until February 26, 2009,*fn3 and plaintiff has offered no for the motion's untimeliness. Indeed, in his reply, he is "compelled to acknowledge the ten-day rule set forth in Local Civil Rule 6.3[.]" Pl.'s Reply at 5. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion is denied as untimely pursuant to Local Rule 6.3.
C. Merits of Plaintiff's Motion
Even if it were timely, plaintiff's motion would still be denied on its merits. Plaintiff has not established that I overlooked any factual matter or committed clear error in my prior order, nor has he presented any new evidence or pointed to an intervening change in the law. Instead, plaintiff seeks "modification" of my January 27, 2009 order and the resulting judgment so as to allow him to "revive and replead" his state law claims, most of which were dismissed without prejudice due to his failure to appear at a requisite statutory hearing, see Guadagni, 2009 WL 205050 at *5-6, should plaintiff in fact appear at the requisite hearing on a future date.*fn4 Plaintiff's argument is not a proper ground for reconsideration of my previous order, which in any case did not dismiss plaintiff's state law claims with prejudice. Nor is it, as plaintiff suggests, a ground for relief from a final judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pursuant to which a movant must show "exceptional circumstances" or "extreme hardship" to ...