The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Glenn T. Suddaby, United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER
On August 8, 2005, Ellis Douglas ("Plaintiff") filed this pro se prisoner civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against nine employees of the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("Defendants"), alleging that they violated his constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Dkt. No. 1.) On February 14, 2008, Senior U.S. District Judge Lawrence E. Kahn granted in part, and denied in part, Defendants' first motion for summary judgment. In so doing, he dismissed certain of Plaintiff's claims, including all claims against three of the nine Defendants--namely, Correctional Officer R. Davies, Superintendent Joseph T. Smith and Nurse Skies. (Dkt. No. 54, at 2, adopting Dkt. No. 53, at 21-23, 29-31.)*fn1 Remaining in the action after Judge Kahn's Decision and Order were only Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against six Defendants, including J. Rae.
Currently before the Court are (1) Defendant Rae's second motion for summary judgment (Dkt No. 68), and (2) United States Magistrate Judge David R. Homer's Report-Recommendation that Defendant Rae's motion be granted (Dkt. No. 81). Plaintiff has filed, through counsel, timely Objections to the Report-Recommendation. (Dkt. Nos. 82-85.) For the reasons set forth below, the Report-Recommendation is adopted and accepted in its entirety, Defendant Rae's second motion for summary judgment is granted, and Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Rae are dismissed.
When specific objections are made to a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the Court makes a "de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).*fn2
When only general objections are made a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the Court reviews the report-recommendation for clear error or manifest injustice. See Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.) [collecting cases], aff'd without opinion, 175 F.3d 1007 (2d Cir. 1999).*fn3 Similarly, when a party makes no objection to a portion of a report-recommendation, the Court reviews that portion for clear error or manifest injustice. See Batista v. Walker, 94-CV-2826, 1995 WL 453299, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1995) (Sotomayor, J.); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes: 1983 Edition. After conducing the appropriate review, the Court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
II. LEGAL STANDARD ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, summary judgment is warranted if "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In addition, "[the moving party] bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the . . . [record] which it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of any genuine issue of material fact." Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). This burden has appropriately been characterized as "modest."*fn4 When the moving party has met this initial responsibility, the nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing a genuine issue [of material fact] for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
A dispute of fact is "genuine" if "the [record] evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. As a result, "[c]onclusory allegations, conjecture and speculation . . . are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact." Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 400 (2d Cir. 1998) [citation omitted]; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). As the Supreme Court has famously explained, "[The nonmoving party] must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts" [citations omitted]. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986).
As for the materiality requirement, a dispute of fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. "Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. [citation omitted].
Implied in the above-stated burden-shifting standard is the fact that, where a nonmoving party fails to adequately respond to a motion for summary judgment, a district court has no duty to perform an independent review of the record to find proof of a factual dispute--even if that nonmoving party is proceeding pro se.*fn5 (This is because the Court extends special solicitude to the pro se litigant largely by ensuring that he or she has received notice of the consequences of failing to properly respond to the motion for summary judgment.)*fn6 As has often been recognized by both the Supreme Court and Second Circuit, even pro se litigants must obey a district court's procedural rules.*fn7 For this reason, this Court has often enforced Local Rule 7.1(a)(3) by deeming facts set forth in a moving party's statement to have been admitted where the nonmoving party has failed to properly respond to that statement*fn8 --even where the nonmoving party was proceeding pro se in a civil rights case.*fn9
On July 3, 2008, Defendant Rae filed his second motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 68.) In his motion papers, Defendant Rae gave Plaintiff sufficient notice of the consequences of failing to properly oppose his motion. (Dkt. No. 68, Part 1.) Moreover, in Defendant Rae's first motion for summary judgment, he gave Plaintiff a similar notice, and attached the Northern District's form "Notification of the Consequences of Failing to Respond to a Summary Judgment Motion." (Dkt. No. 41, Part 1.) Plaintiff's response to Defendant Rae's second motion for summary judgment was due on July 29, 2008. (See Docket Entry for 7/3/08.)
On July 10, 2008, Attorney Gregory J. Teresi (who had been appointed Plaintiff's trial counsel on March 12, 2008), sent Plaintiff a letter, advising him that he was Plaintiff's counsel only for purposes of trial. (Dkt. No. 69; see also Dkt. No. 56, at 1 & n.1.) In the letter, Attorney Teresi specifically advised Plaintiff, "[I]t is still your responsibility to respond to [Defendant Rae's second motion for summary judgment] if you so choose unless Judge Kahn issues an Order . . . [expanding the scope of] my assistance [to you]." (Dkt. No. 69.) Later that month, on July 28, 2008, Attorney Teresi sent Judge Kahn a letter regarding a pre-trial motion, at the end of ...