UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
April 29, 2009
ANTHONY J. MILANO, PLAINTIFF,
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, DEFENDANT.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Kimba M. Wood, U.S.D.J.
OPINION and ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Anthony Milano ("Plaintiff") brought a employment discrimination action against Michael J. Astrue, the Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant"). Plaintiff claimed: (1) that the Social Security Administration ("SSA") in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, discriminated against him on the basis of his age and retaliated against him for seeking redress with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; (2) that the SSA violated the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, when Plaintiff's supervisor told Plaintiff's co-worker that Plaintiff was being reassigned before Plaintiff was told of the reassignment; and (3) that the SSA violated the Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301(b), 2302(b), by allegedly disregarding the "merit principles" in the promotion selection process.
Defendant moved for summary judgment seeking to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. The motions were referred to Magistrate Judge Freeman, who issued a Report and Recommendation dated August 18, 2008 (the "Report"), familiarity with which is assumed.
The Report recommended that the Court grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment in its entirety and deny Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment in its entirety. Plaintiff submitted timely objections to the Report. Defendant submitted a timely response to Plaintiff's objections.
After reviewing the record, the Report, Plaintiff's objections, and Defendant's response, the Court in an Opinion and Order dated September 26, 2008 (hereinafter "the Order") (1) adopted the Report in its entirety, (2) granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment in its entirety, and (3) denied Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment in its entirety. The Court assumes familiarity with the Order.
On October 14, 2008, the Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration.*fn1 For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.
I. Legal Standard
Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) ("Rule 59(e)").*fn2 The standard for a motion for reconsideration is strict, and reconsideration "will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked - matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995).
Courts should not grant a motion for reconsideration when the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided. Shamis v. Ambassador Factors Corp., 187 F.R.D. 148, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Likewise, courts should not grant a motion for reconsideration in order to allow a party "[to] advance new facts, issues or arguments not previously presented to the Court." Id.
The decision to grant or deny the motion is within the sound discretion of the district court. See Devlin v. Transp. Commc'n Int'l Union, 175 F.3d 121, 132 (2d Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff does not identify controlling law or data that the Court overlooked and that would affect, if considered, the outcome of the case. See Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257.
In his motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff argues: (1) Richard Dooley and Jane Zanca were not eligible for the Best Qualified Lists for the Disability Program Administrator position; (2) Bonnie Muir's statements regarding her qualifications are not credible; (3) Robert Sayre's voluntary service beyond the 120-day detail was expressly forbidden by the Management Officials Promotion Plan; (4) Plaintiff is entitled to inferences in his favor because SSA destroyed documents it was required to save; (5) Julio Infiesta's references to Plaintiff's job performance were unsubstantiated; and (6) Plaintiff established a prima facie case of retaliation.
In making these six arguments, Plaintiff mostly reiterates arguments that already have been considered and rejected by the Court.*fn3 To the extent that Plaintiff goes behind reiterating arguments, he presents new evidence*fn4 and new arguments*fn5 that cannot be introduced at the motion for reconsideration stage. See Shamis, 187 F.R.D. at 151.
Plaintiff provides no reason for the Court to reconsider the Order; therefore, the Court will not do so.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration (D.E. 69) is DENIED.