Plaintiff Dorothy Jones, on behalf of her minor son, S.A., challenges an Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") determination that he is not entitled to supplemental security income ("SSI") under the Social Security Act ("the Act"). Plaintiff alleges S.A. has been disabled since September 27, 2004, because of a learning disability, diabetes, asthma, speech and language delays, and behavior problems. Plaintiff alleges S. A.'s impairments have significantly interfered with his ability to function in an age-appropriate manner both in school and socially, and therefore, he is entitled to payment of SSI under the Act.
Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on September 27, 2004. Her application was denied initially and, under the prototype model of handling claims without requiring a reconsideration step, Plaintiff was permitted to appeal directly to the ALJ. See 65 Fed. Reg. 81553 (Dec. 26, 2000). Pursuant to Plaintiff's request, an administrative hearing was held on June 6, 2006, before ALJ Thomas Zolezzi, at which time Plaintiff, S. A., and their attorney appeared. The ALJ considered the case de novo, and on August 18, 2006, issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on November 24, 2006.
On January 3, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Civil Complaint challenging Defendant's final decision and requesting the Court toreview the decision of the ALJ pursuant to Section 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Act, modify the decision of Defendant, and grant SSI benefits to Plaintiff.*fn1 The Defendant filed an answer to Plaintiff's complaint on March 20, 2007, requesting the Court todismiss Plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff submitted Plaintiff's Brief on May 4, 2007. On May 10, 2007, Defendant filed a Brief In Support Of The Commissioner's Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings*fn2 pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After full briefing, the Court deemed oral argument unnecessary and took the motions under advisement.
For the reasons set forth below, this Court finds no reversible error and finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision. Thus, the Court affirms the decision of the Commissioner.
A. Legal Standard and Scope of Review
A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo whether an individual is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), 1383 (c)(3); Wagner v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the Commissioner's determination will only be reversed if it is not supported by substantial evidence or there has been legal error. See Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983); Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979). "Substantial evidence" is evidence that amounts to "more than a mere scintilla," and it has been defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed. 2d 842 (1971). Where evidence is deemed susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner's conclusion must be upheld. See Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
"To determine on appeal whether the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining evidence from both sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts from its weight." Williams on Behalf of Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988). If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's finding must be sustained "even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff's position and despite that the court's independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner's]." Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In other words, the Court must afford the Commissioner's determination considerable deference, and may not substitute "its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner], even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon a de novo review." Valente v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984).
On August 22, 1996, Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity and Reconciliation Act of 1996 (1996 Act), which amended the statutory standard for children seeking SSI benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c. In relevant part, the 1996 Act provides that an "individual under the age of 18 shall be considered disabled.if [he or she] has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i).
The regulations promulgated by the Social Security Administration (SSA) define "marked and severe functional limitations" in terms of "listing-level severity," i.e., an impairment that meets, medically equals or functionally equals the severity of an impairment in the listings. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a). In accordance with the regulations, a child's functional limitations are evaluated in six broad areas or domains of functioning: (i) acquiring and using information; (ii) attending and completing tasks; (iii) interacting and relating with others; (iv) moving about and manipulating objects; (v) caring for yourself [oneself]; and (vi) health and physical well-being. See 20 C.F.R § 416.926a(b).
The Commissioner has established a three-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether a child is disabled as defined under the Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924. Specifically, the child must demonstrate: (1) that he or she is not working; (2) that he or she has a "severe" impairment or combination or impairments; and (3) that his or her impairment or combination of impairments is of listing level severity in that it meets, medically equals or functionally equals the severity of a listed impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924. A child's medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments "functionally equals" a listed impairment if it results in "marked" limitations in two domains of functioning or an "extreme" limitation in one domain. See 20 C.F.R. 416.926(a). A limitation is "marked" if it seriously interferes with a claimant's ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities. See 20 C.F.R. §416.926a(e)(2). A "marked" limitation is more than moderate but less than extreme. See id.