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In re Sala

July 29, 2009


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Harold Baer, Jr., District Judge


John Sala, Jr., a minor and high school senior when this complaint was filed, was dismissed from the Warwick High School football team in the middle of the 2006 season after two run-ins with law enforcement and school authorities. As a consequence of his son's dismissal, Plaintiff John Sala ("Plaintiff") asserts constitutional and breach of contract claims against the Warwick Valley Central School District ("District"), Superintendant Frank Greenhall ("Greenhall") and football coach James Sciara ("Sciara"). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated John Sala, Jr.'s procedural and substantive due process rights, violated the First Amendment by retaliating against Plaintiff for his use of the legal system in an attempt to vindicate John Sala, Jr.'s rights, and breached a signed agreement that was meant to address the appropriate sanction for the first of the two incidents. Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.


In early September 2006, John Sala, Jr., then a senior at Warwick High School and one of four co-captains of the football team, invited three of his teammates to his parent's home to watch a video of an earlier game. Sala, Jr. Dep. 35. One of John Sala, Jr.'s teammates had been driving recklessly in the neighborhood and was parked directly in front of the Sala home when town police responded to complaints from the neighbors. Id. When no one answered the doorbell, the officers walked around the house and saw the friends drinking beer. Id. They also found a small quantity of marijuana. Id.; Am. Compl. ¶ 10. When none of the teammates admitted to possessing the marijuana, John Sala, Jr. was arrested. Sala, Jr. Dep. at 35. According to the Amended Complaint, the team quarterback and son of an assistant coach and District president escaped the premises undetected. Am. Compl. ¶11.

Following the incident at the Sala home, John Sala, Jr. was suspended from the football team for the balance of the 2006 season. Am. Compl. ¶13. Through counsel, Plaintiff appealed to the District Superintendant, Greenhall, and pursuant to a signed settlement agreement the suspension was reduced to four weeks, conditioned on, inter alia, John Sala, Jr. adhering to the school's code of conduct. Affidavit of Frank Greenhall, dated Mar. 14, 2008 ("Greenhall Aff."), Ex. A ("Settlement Agreement").

A few weeks later, during the period of his suspension, the District's Athletic Director, John Russo, observed John Sala, Jr. driving too fast in a school parking lot after a football game and asked him to slow down. Am Compl. ¶19. Russo maintains that John Sala, Jr. responded by directing profanity at him, though John Sala, Jr. denies this. Am. Compl. ¶19; Affidavit of Patrick J. Fitzgerald, dated Mar. 14, 2008 ("Fitzgerald Aff."), Ex. C. John Sala, Jr. was then ticketed by a police officer in the parking lot for driving after 9:00 p.m. in violation of the terms of his "junior license." Am. Compl. ¶ 21; Affidavit of Kathy Ann Wolverton, dated Mar. 14, 2008 ("Wolverton Aff."), Ex. A. The following Monday, the Salas met with Coach Sciarra and several of the assistant coaches to discuss the incident, and Sciarra dismissed John Sala, Jr. from the football team. Id. at ¶26. Thereafter, again represented by counsel, the Salas appealed the dismissal to Superintendant Greenhall. At a meeting with Greenhall on October 2, 2006, Plaintiff and his attorney argued that Russo had a "longstanding antipathy toward the Sala family" and that "John Sala, Jr. had done nothing to warrant his dismissal from the football team." Id. at ¶35. Not a scintilla of evidence was provided to support this allegation. The next day, in a detailed letter explaining the basis for his decision, Greenhall sustained Sciarra's decision to dismiss John Sala, Jr. from the team, and advised Plaintiff that he could appeal the decision to the School Board which was to next meet on October 16, 2006. Greenhall Aff., Ex. B. Instead, Plaintiff filed this action on October 4, 2006.

Plaintiff initially sought, among other relief, a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants from disallowing John Sala, Jr.'s participation on the football team. Two days later, the District consented to a temporary restraining order that reinstated John Sala, Jr. to the football team pending further order of the Court. Following a hearing, on October 18, 2006 Judge Robinson granted an injunction that hadterminated John Sala, Jr.'s suspension from the football team.*fn1 Slip Op., dated Oct. 18, 2006. Pursuant to the Court's Order, John Sala, Jr. rejoined the football team. But Coach Sciarra played him only infrequently and only on defense, even though he had previously acknowledged to Plaintiff that John Sala, Jr. was "one of the stars" of the team. Am. Compl. ¶51-53. John Sala, Jr. graduated from Warwick High School in the spring of 2007 and, in 2008 was attending East Carolina University, without a football scholarship.*fn2 Sala, Jr. Dep. 7.


A court may grant summary judgment "only if it can be established that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Opals on Ice Lingerie v. Bodylines Inc., 320 F.3d 362, 367-68 (2d Cir. 2003). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A dispute concerning a material fact is genuine if the "'evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

"In determining whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all justifiable factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 309 (2d Cir. 2008). However, "[i]n order to defeat a properly supported summary judgment motion, the opposing party must proffer admissible evidence that 'set[s] forth specific facts' showing a genuinely disputed factual issue that is material under the applicable legal principles." Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).


A. Procedural Due Process

"The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted). Such opportunity must be granted within a meaningful time and manner, Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965), and be "appropriate to the nature of the case." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). However, "[t]he requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property." Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Such constitutionally protected interests are created and defined by "existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source, such as state law." Id. at 577.

Defendants cite numerous cases that generally stand for the proposition that "there is no constitutional right to participate in extracurricular sporting activities." Hadley v. Rush Henrietta Cent. School Dist., No. 05 Civ. 6331 (MAT), 2007 WL 1231753, 3 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2007); see also, Gardner v. Wansart, No. 05 Civ. 3351 (SHS) 2006 WL 2742043, 5 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 26, 2006) ("[D]ue process need not accompany a public school's decision to remove a student from involvement in extracurricular activities.") However, I need not decide whether on these facts John Sala, Jr. had a protectable liberty interest in his reputation or a property interest in his participation on the football team or in the expectancy of a college scholarship because Defendants afforded him all the process that was due. See, e.g., Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d 207, 211 (2d Cir. 2006) (availability of adequate process defeats a so-called stigma-plus claim alleging injury to reputation); Mazevski v. Horseheads Cent. School ...

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