The opinion of the court was delivered by: A. Kathleen Tomlinson, Magistrate Judge
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion [DE 100-1] for reconsideration (the "Motion for Reconsideration") of the portion of this Court's September 29, 2008 Order (the "September 29 Order") [DE 86] imposing monetary sanctions in the amount of $250 upon Plaintiff's counsel for failing to certify their compliance with Local Rule 37.3's meet-and-confer obligation, in connection with Plaintiff's Cross-Motion to compel Defendant to produce supplemental documents (the underlying "Motion to Compel").*fn1 Defendant opposes [DE 100-2] Plaintiff's Reconsideration Motion and cross-moves for an award of attorneys' fees and costs incurred in opposing the Reconsideration Motion (Defendant's "Cross-Motion"). Plaintiff does not oppose Defendant's Cross-Motion.
Based upon my review of the parties' submissions and the applicable law, I find that Plaintiff has not shown that this Court overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters raised in the underlying motion which would warrant reconsideration of the September 29 Order.
Further, Defendant has not made the requisite showing entitling it to an award of costs and attorneys' fees incurred in opposing the instant Motion for Reconsideration.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. Defendant's Cross-Motion for attorneys' fees and costs is also DENIED.
II. THE PARTIES'CONTENTIONS
Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of the portion of this Court's order imposing sanctions upon Plaintiff's counsel for failure to comply with Rule 37.3 on the grounds that the description of the correspondence and telephone conversations between Plaintiff's and Defendant's counsel in connection with Plaintiff's requests for supplemental document production, as set forth in the underlying Motion to Compel, "had the required 'level of factual specificity required by Rule 37' to make it clear to this Court that a good faith attempt had been made in solving the dispute that was ultimately presented to the Court for its consideration." See Pltf.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Recons. ("Pltf.'s Mem.") [100-1] at 3. Plaintiff further contends that "in analyzing the facts which were set forth in support [of] the original cross motion... this Court employed a to[o] narrow reading of the certification requirements...." Id. at 3; see also Decl. of James. J. Daw, Jr. in Supp. of Mot. for Recons. ("Daw Decl.") [100-1], ¶ 10.
In opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration should be denied because Plaintiff does not "point to any controlling decisions or facts that were overlooked by the Court" in the September 29 Order. See Def.'s Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Pltf.'s Mot for Recons. [DE 100-2] ("Def.'s Mem.") at 1. Moreover, contrary to Plaintiff's assertion that counsel made sufficient efforts to meet-and-confer, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's counsel "never sought to meet-and-confer" in connection with the request for supplemental document production. See id. at 3; see also Decl. of Matthew Solum in Opp'n to Pltf.'s Mot for Recons. [DE 100-2] ("Solum Decl."), ¶ 20.
Motions for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) are governed by Local Rule 6.3,*fn2 which requires the moving party to "set forth concisely the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked." E.D.N.Y. Local R. Civ. P. 6.3; Myers v. Okada, No. 08-CV-1635, 2008 WL 4724579, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2008). The Second Circuit's standard "is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked-matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the lower court's reconsideration of a summary judgment motion was not an abuse of discretion because the moving party presented "data the court had not previously considered," such as extensive legislative history on the relevant statute and new case law) (citations omitted).
Motions for reconsideration "should not be granted where the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided." Id. This heightened burden intends "to dissuade repetitive arguments on issues that have already been considered fully by the Court." Ruiz v. Comm'r of the Dep't of Transp., 687 F. Supp. 888, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), modified on other grounds, 934 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Fed. Express Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 192, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that a motion for reconsideration "is to be narrowly construed and strictly applied so as to avoid repetitive arguments on issues that have been considered fully by the court"). The scope of a motion for reconsideration, therefore, is extremely narrow and is an "extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly in the interest of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources." In re Health Mgmt Sys. Inc. Sec. Litig., 113 F. Supp. 2d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Whether to grant such a motion "is within the sound discretion of the district court." Myers, 2008 WL 4724579, at *1 (quoting Federal Express Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d at 195).
Having considered the parties' arguments, as discussed below, I find that Plaintiff has not met its burden to show that the Court overlooked relevant facts or law or that the Court misapplied relevant law which ...