The opinion of the court was delivered by: Michael A. Telesca United States District Judge
Plaintiff Robert Long, ("Long" or "plaintiff") proceeding pro se, brings this diversity action against the defendants claiming that the defendants breached a contract with him and plaintiff Long Consulting and Management Group, and that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties to the plaintiffs. Specifically, Long claims that the defendants breached a deposit account agreement by allowing a third party to access plaintiffs' account without authorization.
Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs' claims on several grounds including lack of complete diversity, and failure to state a claim. In response to the defendants' motion, plaintiffs seek to amend the Complaint to cure jurisdictional defects.
For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion to dismiss is granted, plaintiffs' motion to amend is denied, and plaintiffs' Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
I. Standard for Motion to Dismiss
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part that upon the close of pleadings, any party may move for judgment upon the pleadings. A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) is evaluated under the same standards that apply to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Patel v. Contemporary Classics of Beverly Hills, 259 F.3d 123, 126 (2nd Cir. 2001). In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court must "accept...all factual allegations in the complaint and draw...all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." See Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). In order to withstand dismissal, the complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007) (disavowing the oft-quoted statement from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief").
"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." See id. at 1965 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, "at a bare minimum, the operative standard requires the 'plaintiff [to] provide the grounds upon which his claim rests through factual allegations sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 56-57 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1974).
II. Claims asserted by Plaintiff Long Consulting and Management Group, Inc.
Long, who is not an attorney and who is proceeding pro se*fn1 purports to represent plaintiff Long Consulting and Management Group, Inc. However, it is well settled in the Second Circuit that a layperson may not represent a corporation pro se, even in cases where the layperson is the President or sole shareholder of the company he or she seeks to represent. Pecarsky v. Galaxiworld.com Ltd., 2001 WL 497775 (2nd Cir., 2001); Powerserve Intern., Inc. v. Lavi, 239 F.3d 508 (2nd Cir., 2001); Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Foundation of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59 (2nd Cir., 1990). Any hardship created by the requirement of legal representation is immaterial, as a person may not benefit from the corporate form while ignoring the accompanying responsibilities. In re Roma Group, Inc., 153 B.R. 18, 20 (S.D.N.Y.,1993) ("one who chooses a legal structure for doing business will normally be barred from seeking to circumvent the legal implications of that choice"). Because a lay person may not represent a corporation pro se, I dismiss all claims raised by plaintiff Long Consulting and Management Group, Inc.
III. Claims against Individual Defendants
Plaintiff has withdrawn his claims against individual defendants Alexandra Wehr, Nicole Colegrove, Catherine Brown Allen, William Troupe, III on grounds that these defendants are residents of New York, and inclusion of these defendants would prevent this court from exercising jurisdiction over the matter. The remaining defendants, Henry L. Meyer, III, Beth E. Mooney, Thomas W. Bunn, and Thomas C. Stevens, are Corporate Executives of Key Bank, N.A. or Key Corp., and plaintiff has failed to allege any personal involvement of these individuals with respect to his claims of breach of contract or breach of fiduciary duty. Because New York law does not provide for personal liability of corporate officers or directors for torts committed by the company those officers direct, plaintiff ...