The opinion of the court was delivered by: William M. Skretny United States District Judge
On June 18, 2008, petitioner fled a petition seeking habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.*fn2 (Docket No. 1). Respondent filed an answer to the petition and a memorandum of law on September 11, 2008. (Docket Nos. 10 and 11). Petitioner thereafter filed, on September 23, 2008,*fn3 letters which the Court has construed as motions requesting an extension of time to "properly prepare" or to "renew" his petition (Docket No. 14) and to stay the petition pending the filing of an application for a writ of error coram nobis in state court. (Docket No. 13). By Text Order entered March 27, 2009, the Court denied petitioner's motion for an extension of time to prepare or renew his petition, but construed it as a supplement to petitioner's request to stay. (Docket No. 15).*fn4 As explained below, the letters can also be construed, in the alternative or in addition to a request for a stay, as a request for leave to amend the petition to assert a new claim. For the reasons set forth herein, petitioner's motion to stay and/or amend the petition is denied.
On March 11, 2004, a judgment of conviction was entered against petitioner in Monroe County Supreme Court on several counts, including criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees, and he was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction to the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, which affirmed his conviction on March 16, 2007. People v. Cotton, 38 A.D.3d 1189 (4th Dept. 2007). The New York Court of Appeals denied petitioner's application for leave to appeal on May 4, 2007. People v. Cotton, 8 N.Y. 2d 983 (2007). Petitioner did not petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, and his judgment of conviction thus became final 90 days later, on August 2, 2007, the date on which his time for submitting a petition for certiorari expired. McKinney v. Artuz, 326 F.3d 87, 2003; Williams v. Artuz, 237 F.3d 147, 150-51 (2d Cir. 2001).*fn5
Subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, a petitioner has one year from the date his conviction becomes final to file a habeas corpus petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Thus, any claim asserted by petitioner after August 2, 2008, would be time-barred.*fn6
As noted, petitioner's petition for habeas corpus was filed on June 18, 2008. The petition asserted the following grounds in the petition: (1) the jury pool violated the "fair cross-section" of the community requirement of the Sixth Amendment; (2) the trial court erred in applying a state statutory presumption concerning intent to use a weapon unlawfully applied against him; (3) the evidence was legally insufficient to establish guilt; (4) failure to supress the handgun discovered during an inventory search; (5) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences for weapons convictions that occurred on different dates; (6) the sentence petitioner received was harsh and excessive. Petition at ¶ 22.
In response to item 24 on the form habeas petition, directing petitioner to indicate any collateral proceedings with respect to the judgment of conviction in state court, he stated that he had filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in the Appellate Division, Fourth Department on June 18, 2008, asserting denial of his right to the effective assistance of counsel on appeal. Petition at ¶ 24. Petitioner did not, however, include an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim among the grounds asserted in the petition, as enumerated above.
In the answer to the petition, the respondent denied that petitioner had a pending coram nobis application pending in state court. Answer at ¶ 14 ("Neither the Monroe County District Attorney's Office nor the Fourth Department have a record of any such application.").
In the instant motion, petitioner admits that the coram nobis application described in the petition was not in fact filed, apparently due to problems petitioner experienced obtaining paralegal-type assistance in prison. (Docket No. 13). Attached to petitioner's letter motion is a letter dated April 5, 2007, from his appellate counsel advising petitioner that if he believed counsel had been ineffective in representing him on appeal, he could bring a motion for a writ of error coram nobis with the Appellate Division, Fourth Department. Counsel's letter, written before the Court of Appeals' denial of petitioner's application for leave to appeal, further advised him that if leave to appeal were denied, petitioner should consider filing a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he could allege, inter alia, that his trial attorney and appellate attorney were ineffective. (Docket No. 14 at 2).
The claim on which petitioner seeks to base his application for a stay was not among the six claims raised in his original petition. Therefore, to determine whether petitioner may seek to obtain a stay to exhaust a claim not raised in his original petition, the Court must first determine whether he may amend the petition to include an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim.
The standard for determining a motion to amend a habeas corpus petition that has not yet been decided on the merits is governed by Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Littlejohn v. Artuz, 271 F.3d 360, 363 (2d Cir. 2001); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (providing that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "may be amended * * * as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions"); Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (Habeas Corpus Rules), Rule 11 (permitting application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in habeas cases to the extent they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or the Habeas Corpus Rules). Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part, that "[a] party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course: (A) before being served with a responsive pleading; * * *. In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires." However, notwithstanding the liberal amendment requirement of Rule 15(a), ...