The opinion of the court was delivered by: Honorable Richard J. Arcara Chief Judge United States District Court
Plaintiff Corrie Dayton filed a complaint in this case on June 12, 2009, accusing defendant Northeast Financial Solutions of multiple violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692--1692p. Plaintiff served defendant with a summons and complaint, but defendant failed to answer or appear. On October 22, 2009, plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment seeking statutory damages along with costs and fees. Given the allegations that defendant is deemed to have admitted by default, and given the itemization of costs and fees that plaintiff has submitted, the Court awards damages along with costs and fees as described below.
This case concerns defendant's conduct in attempting to collect on an alleged consumer debt. Because defendant did not appear in the case, and because the complaint does not contain a lot of background information, details concerning this debt are not available to the Court. For example, the Court cannot determine from the information available what kind of debt defendant attempted to collect and whether it communicated that information to plaintiff; whether plaintiff acknowledges owing any kind of debt, and if so, whether she agrees with defendant's characterization of it; and whether the parties dispute the amount of the debt in question. Nonetheless, the complaint does allege that defendant continually called plaintiff demanding payment for this debt. During these telephone calls, according to the complaint, defendant did not reveal its telephone number through plaintiff's Caller ID system; threatened to obtain a civil judgment against plaintiff; threatened to have plaintiff arrested and charged with a Class B felony; represented to plaintiff that it was a law firm; and failed to identify itself in any meaningful way, let alone as a debt collector. In the course of communicating with plaintiff, defendant allegedly committed numerous violations of the FDCPA, including the following: harassing and abusive conduct toward plaintiff; failure to disclose identity; misrepresentations about plaintiff's legal situation, including false threats of Class B felony charges; and threats to commence civil litigation without any intent actually to do so.
Defendant never answered the allegations in the complaint within the time required by Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, plaintiff requested an entry of default on September 28, 2009. The Clerk of the Court filed an entry of default on September 29, 2009. On October 22, 2009, plaintiff filed her motion for default judgment. In the motion, plaintiff did not request an evidentiary hearing and did not seek actual damages. Plaintiff instead sought statutory damages, actual costs, attorney fees, plus "anticipated collection costs."
"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 is the basic procedure to be followed when there is a default in the course of litigation. And it tracks the ancient common law axiom that a default is an admission of all well-pleaded allegations against the defaulting party." Vermont Teddy Bear Co., Inc. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Because defendant never answered or otherwise challenged the complaint, all allegations in the complaint are now deemed admitted. Nonetheless, "[w]hile a party's default is deemed to constitute a concession of all well pleaded allegations of liability, it is not considered an admission of damages." Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). The Court thus must assess what an appropriate award might be, keeping in mind that plaintiff has not requested an evidentiary hearing or actual damages. Pursuant to FRCP 55(b)(2), the Court will exercise its discretion not to schedule an evidentiary hearing on its own initiative because of the straightforward nature of plaintiff's request for damages, costs, and fees.
Section 1692k(a)(1) of the FDCPA provides for statutory damages of up to $1,000 per plaintiff. See also Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1998) ("All that is required for an award of statutory damages is proof that the statute was violated, although a court must then exercise its discretion to determine how much to award, up to the $1,000.00 ceiling.") (citations omitted). Here, plaintiff seeks the maximum amount of statutory damages given the frequency and nature of defendant's harassing conduct. "In determining the amount of liability in any action under subsection (a) of this section, the court shall consider, among other relevant factors... the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional." 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1). In this case, defendant is deemed to have admitted to misrepresenting itself as a law firm and to making frequent telephone calls threatening both civil litigation and Class B felony criminal charges. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that an award of statutory damages in the amount of $750 will suffice to address all of the allegations now deemed admitted.
The FDCPA authorizes successful litigants to receive "in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court." 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). The prevailing plaintiff in an FDCPA action is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses regardless of whether any statutory or actual damages are awarded. See Savino, 164 F.3d at 87; Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, Inc., 886 F.2d 22, 28 (2d Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). As to how district courts should calculate attorney fees when such an award is appropriate, this Court noted in a prior FDCPA case that
A reasonable hourly rate is the "prevailing market rate," i.e., the rate "prevailing in the [relevant] community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed. 2d 891 (1984); see also Cohen v. W. Haven Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 638 F.2d 496, 506 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[F]ees that would be charged for similar work by attorneys of like skill in the area" are the "starting point for determination of a reasonable award."). The relevant ...