The opinion of the court was delivered by: Seybert, District Judge
Plaintiffs, John Kogut ("Kogut"), John Restivo ("Restivo"), Dennis Halstead ("Halstead"), Melissa Lullo ("Lullo"), Jason Halstead ("J. Halstead"), Heather Halstead ("H. Halstead"), and Taylor Halstead ("T. Halstead")*fn1 (collectively "Plaintiffs") commenced these actions 07-CV-6695 and 07-CV-6720 on December 19, 2006, and December 21, 2006, respectively. Subsequently, the Court consolidated both cases into the earlier-filed action.*fn2 Kogut, Restivo, and Halstead base the majority of their claims against Nassau County ("County") and various Nassau County Police Department ("NCPD") officers and supervisors (collectively "Defendants") on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, inter alia, malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment.*fn3 Additionally, Kogut, Restivo, and Halstead assert 14th Amendment due process violations, and a variety of state claims*fn4 stemming from their prior interrogations, arrests, and subsequent state prosecutions. Finally, Halstead's Children asserted their own cause of action, unconstitutional denial of familial association, which they claim stems from their father's wrongful conviction and imprisonment.
On August 27 and 28, 2008, Defendants moved to dismiss both actions. In an Order dated August 3, 2009 ("August 2009 Order"), the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motions. Plaintiffs now move for reconsideration of the Court's August 2009 Order pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 6.3. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiffs' motions.
I. Murder of Theresa Fusco
On November 10, 1984, Theresa Fusco ("Fusco"), a sixteen- year-old girl, left Hot Skates--a local roller skating rink. Approximately three weeks later, on December 5, 1984, Fusco's body was discovered naked and brutalized by the railroad tracks near Park Place and Rocklyn Avenue in Lynbrook. Defendant Joseph Volpe ("Volpe") of the Nassau County Police Department was assigned as lead detective for the investigation. The medical examiner estimated that the time of death occurred between seven to fourteen days prior to the date of discovery of the body. The autopsy also revealed that Fusco had suffered severe blows to the face, and death, ultimately, resulted from ligature strangulation. There was no trauma around the vaginal area; however, a vaginal swab produced seminal fluids. After interviews with Fusco's mother and best friend it was concluded, by Vople, that Fusco was not sexually active. (Restivo & Halstead Am. Compl. ¶ 49). The investigating officers knew of these findings; however, not all of this information was made public.
In early March 1985, Defendants Frank Sirianni ("Sirianni"), Daniel Perrino ("Perrino") and others questioned Harold Smyle ("Smlye") as a suspect in the Fusco rape and murder. Smyle, who had a history of psychological illness, informed the Defendants that Plaintiff Restivo told Symle he knew who killed Fusco. (Id. ¶ 50.) On March 5, 1985, Volpe had Restivo brought to NCPD headquarters. (Id. ¶ 51.) The Defendants then proceeded to interrogate Restivo.
Restivo claims that his interrogation lasted twenty-four hours, during which Defendants refused to let him leave the interrogation room, denied his request to contact a lawyer or his girlfriend, and employed coercive and abusive interrogation tactics in order to produce false accusations against Halstead. (See id. ¶¶ 52-64.) After suffering through hours of "physical and emotional abuse," Restivo claims that he signed a written statement, created by Defendants, which falsely indicated that Halstead had told him that he raped a girl by a cemetery and then strangled and killed her. (Id. ¶ 60.) Morever, Restivo maintains that he had no knowledge of the Fusco murder and that the Defendants provided him with all of the facts related to the rape and murder. (Id. ¶ 61.) Subsequently, based on Restivo's statements, the Defendants acquired a warrant to wiretap Halstead's phone. On March 11 and again on March 13, 1985, Defendants Volpe, Allen, and others stopped Halstead as he was walking in the street, placed him in one of their police vehicles, and drove him to the parking lot of the Lynbrook Police Department. Halstead claims that during these two informal interrogations, members of the NCPD placed listening devices in his apartment. During the time that he was in police custody on both dates, Halstead was questioned about the Fusco rape and murder, and he repeatedly denied any involvement in or knowledge of the crime. (Id. ¶ 69.)
On March 21, 1985, Volpe had Kogut brought to NCPD headquarters for questioning. Kogut was a part-time employee of Restivo's moving business. At this first interrogation, Kogut repeatedly denied any knowledge of the murder. (Id. ¶ 70.) On March 25, 1985, Kogut was again brought to the NCPD headquarters for questioning. Plaintiffs allege that during this twelve-hour interrogation, Defendants utilized abusive and coercive tactics. Finally, Kogut signed a confession that included the following information: (1) Halstead and Restivo raped Fusco in the cemetery; (2) Kogut strangled her to death with a cord as she lay face down on the ground because she threatened to tell the authorities who raped her; and (3) all three of them transported Fusco's dead body in Restivo's van to "the Fort" area where they hid her body under leaves and wooden pallets. (See id. ¶ 76.) Kogut was never informed of his Miranda rights, and only signed a Miranda waiver after fifteen hours of interrogation. (Id. ¶ 79.) After Kogut signed his confession, Volpe and Robert Dempsey ("Dempsey") directed Sirianni and Harry Waltman ("Waltman"), "with the active participation and approval of [D]efendant Camp[b]ell," to take Kogut to the area of the cemetery where Fusco's body was discovered. (Id. ¶ 80.) Plaintiffs further allege that, during this time, Sirianni and Waltman were under Volpe's and Dempsey's orders to coach Kogut about the particular circumstances of the crime. (Id.) Finally, Volpe, Dempsey, and their fellow officers compelled Kogut to repeat his confession on videotape in front of Assistant District Attorneys Peck and McCarty.*fn6 (Id. ¶ 81.) Kogut's interrogation and confession culminated in his arrest and arraignment on March 26, 1985, approximately nineteen hours after he was picked up for his second interrogation.
Subsequently, on March 26, 1985, NCPD seized Restivo's van and transported it to police headquarters. Defendant Charlie Frass ("Frass") compared samples taken from Plaintiff Restivo's van with the hair and blood samples taken from Fusco. Plaintiffs claim that between March 1, 1985 and June 20, 1985 the Defendants, through coercion, intimidation, and physical force, began collecting evidence against the Plaintiffs. (Id. ¶ 90.) In addition, Plaintiffs state that Defendants failed to disclose or document exculpatory evidence or statements that were allegedly made by witnesses. (Id. ¶ 92.)
II. Plaintiffs' Convictions and Subsequent Appeals
On June 20, 1985, Restivo and Halstead were arrested for Fusco's rape and murder. On December 3, 1986, they were both convicted of rape and second-degree murder; they were sentenced to thirty-three and one-third years to life in prison. On May 28, 1986, Kogut was convicted on all counts in the Indictment, and on June 27, 1986 was sentenced to an aggregate indeterminate term of imprisonment of 31.5 years to life.*fn7 (Kogut Compl., Ex. A., unnumbered page 2.) Kogut appealed his conviction, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court erred in ruling that his confession was voluntary. The Appellate Division affirmed Plaintiff's conviction on October 17, 1991. (Kogut Compl. ¶ 79.) On November 21, 1991, the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. (Id. ¶ 80.) Subsequently, Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus alleging numerous constitutional challenges to his conviction. On April 15, 2002, the U.S. District Court dismissed the writ.
III. DNA Exoneration; Proceedings After Discovery
From 1993 to 2003, various samples of semen obtained from Fusco's body were subjected to DNA testing; on five separate occasions, Plaintiffs claim, the tests proved that the DNA found inside the victim did not belong to Restivo, Halstead, or Kogut. On June 11, 2003, the convictions of Restivo, Halstead and Kogut were vacated; however, the charges were not dropped. (Kogut Compl. ¶ 81.) In 2005, the Nassau County District Attorney, armed with newly discovered evidence, retried Kogut. At Kogut's second trial, Judge Victor Ort, held that "the question hairs were [not] left in the van on or about November 10th of 1984, and absent those hairs, there is no corroboration, whatsoever, for the [Kogut's] confession concerning the count of rape." (Id. ¶ 73.) Kogut was acquitted of all charges on December 21, 2005. (Id. ¶ 85.) Shortly thereafter, on December 29, 2005, upon the motion of the Nassau County District Attorney's Office, Judge William C. Donnino of the Nassau County Supreme Court dismissed the charges against Restivo and Halstead for lack of evidence. (Restivo & Halstead Am. Compl. ¶ 113.) On December 19, 2006 and December 21, 2006, respectively, Plaintiffs commenced these actions.
In its August 2009 Order, the Court dismissed the following claims: (1) Plaintiffs' claims for malicious prosecution, based on Section 1983 and New York law, relating to Plaintiffs' First Trials; (2) Plaintiffs' claims for false arrest and false imprisonment, based on Section 1983 and New York law; (3) Plaintiffs' claims of due process violations based on Defendants' alleged offering of false evidence; (4) Kogut's conspiracy claim; (5) Plaintiffs' Monell claims; (6) Halstead's Children's claims for loss of familial association; (7) Kogut's battery claim; (8) Restivo's and Halstead's claims for failure to intercede; (9) Restivo's and Halstead's claims for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress; (10) Plaintiffs' claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress; (11) Restivo's and Halstead's claims based on negligent supervision; and (12) Restivo's and Halstead's claims based on respondeat superior.
On August 18 and 31, 2009, Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the Court's August 2009 Order. Specifically, Plaintiffs ask the Court to reconsider its decision regarding their
(1) malicious prosecutions claims, under state and federal law; (2) false arrest and false imprisonment claims; (3) Monell claims, and (4) due process claims. Additionally, Kogut asks the Court to reconsider its findings with regard to his (5) Battery claim, and (6) negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.*fn8
I. Rule 59(e) Standard of Review on Motion for Reconsideration
Motions for reconsideration may be brought pursuant to Rules 59(e) and 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 6.3. See Wilson v. Pessah, No. 05-CV-3143, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17820, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. March 14, 2007). Rule 59(e) permits a moving party to file a motion for reconsideration when it believes the Court overlooked important "matters or controlling decisions" that would have influenced the prior decision. Shamis v. Ambassador Factors Corp., 187 F.R.D. 148, 151, (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Reconsideration is not a proper tool to repackage and relitigate arguments and issues already considered by the Court in deciding the original motion. See United States v. Gross, No. 98-CR-0159, 2002 WL 32096592, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2002) ("A party may not use a motion to reconsider as an opportunity to reargue the same points raised previously."). Nor is it proper to raise new arguments and issues. See Lehmuller v. Inc. Vill. of Sag Harbor, 982 F. Supp. 132, 135 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). Reconsideration may only be granted when the Court did not evaluate decisions or data that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the Court. Wechsler v. Hunt Health Sys., 186 F. Supp. 2d 402, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
II. Rule Against Undermining Underlying Convictions in Parallel Civil Proceedings
Courts' concerns about the potential for civil proceedings undermining criminal convictions reach back over a century:
[I]f [an] action for malicious prosecution were allowed to be maintained before the termination of the criminal proceeding [in plaintiff's favor,] the plaintiff might be found guilty in that proceeding, and yet maintain [his] action for malicious prosecution on the ground that he was not guilty, and that the defendant had no probable cause to believe ...