The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Glenn T. Suddaby, United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER
Currently before the Court in this labor and disability discrimination action filed by Christine Duttweiller ("Plaintiff") is a motion for summary judgment filed by Eagle Janitorial, Inc. and Eagle Building Services, Inc. ("the Eagle Defendants"). (Dkt. No. 107.) For the reasons set forth below, the Eagle Defendants' motion is granted.
A. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint
In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts, inter alia, the following claims against the Eagle Defendants and Local 200 United Service Employees International Union ("the Union Defendant") arising out of incidents leading up to and including Plaintiff's termination from her employment with the Eagle Defendants: (1) two claims under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. ("LMRA") for breach of the duty of fair representation and breach of the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA"); (2) a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. ("ADA") for disability discrimination; and (3) a claim under the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL") for disability discrimination. (Dkt. No. 60.)
B. Court's Decision and Order of June 4, 2009
On June 4, 2009, the Court issued a Decision and Order in this action, dismissing Plaintiff's claims against the Union Defendant. Duttweiller v. Eagle Janitorial, Inc., 05-CV-0886, 2009 WL 1606351 (N.D.N.Y. June 4, 2009) (Suddaby, J.). In that Decision and Order, the Court declined to address Plaintiff's claims with regard to the Eagle Defendants because the Eagle Defendants had failed to file separate motion papers after their request to join the Union Defendant's motion papers was denied; instead, the Court granted the Eagle Defendants leave to file a motion for summary judgment.Duttweiller, 2009 WL 1606351, at *1, 22. Because this Decision and Order is issued primarily for review by the parties in this action, and because the factual issues raised by the pending motion are identical to the factual issues addressed by the Court in its Decision and Order of June 4, 2009, the Court will not recite the action's relevant factual history or undisputed material facts, but will simply refer the reader to the Court's Decision and Order of June 4, 2009. Id. at *1-11.
C. Eagle Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
Generally, in support of their motion for summary judgment, the Eagle Defendants argue as follows: (1) Plaintiff's claim under the LMRA must be dismissed because she has failed to establish that the Union breached its duty of fair representation; (2) her claim under the ADA must be dismissed because she has failed to establish that (a) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, and (b) she suffered an adverse employment action as a result of her disability; and (3) her claim under the NYSHRL must be dismissed for the same reasons that her ADA claim must be dismissed. (See Dkt. No. 107, Part 7 [Defs.' Memo. of Law].)
In response to the Eagle Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff argues, inter alia, as follows: (1) the Eagle Defendants were required, under the Union contract and the ADA, to wait for a diagnosis before discharging Plaintiff; and (2) Plaintiff has introduced evidence sufficient to make out a prima facie case under the ADA, and the Eagle Defendants have failed to establish a non-discriminatory reason for terminating her. (See Dkt. No. 110, Part 6 [Plf.'s Response Memo. of Law].)
II. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Legal Standard Governing Motions for Summary Judgment
Because the parties have demonstrated, in their memoranda of law, an accurate understanding of the legal standard governing motions for summary judgment, the Court will not recite that well-known legal standard in this Decision and Order, but will refer the reader to the Court's recent decision in Pitts v. Onondaga County Sheriff's Dep't, 04-CV-0828, 2009 WL ...