NEW YORK SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT
December 29, 2009
IN RE MARVIN M., A PERSON ALLEGED TO BE A JUVENILE DELINQUENT, APPELLANT.
Order of disposition, Family Court, New York County (Susan R. Larabee, J.), entered on or about February 23, 2009, which adjudicated appellant a juvenile delinquent, upon a finding that he committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of criminal trespass in the third degree and resisting arrest, and placed him with the Office of Children and Family Services for 12 months, unanimously modified, on the law, to the extent of vacating the finding as to criminal trespass in the third degree, dismissing that count of the petition and remanding for a new dispositional hearing, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
Mazzarelli, J.P., Catterson, Moskowitz, Richter, Manzanet-Daniels, JJ.
The court's finding as to resisting arrest was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence. The evidence established that appellant entered the lobby of a school where he was not a student and, after being told to leave, unlawfully remained and then resisted arrest by struggling. The arrest was lawful, because it was based on probable cause to believe defendant was "in violation of a personally communicated request to leave the premises from a principal, custodian or other person in charge thereof" (Penal Law § 140.10[c]). There is no record support for appellant's assertion that the lobby was open to the public.
However, the criminal trespass finding was based on insufficient evidence because the petition limited the presentment agency's theory to trespass on school property "in violation of conspicuously posted rules or regulations governing entry and use thereof," pursuant to Penal Law § 140.10(b), and there was no evidence regarding posted rules or regulations. The supporting deposition did not cure this defect so as to afford appellant sufficient notice of this charge, and the presentment agency never sought to amend the petition.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.
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