Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entertainment

January 13, 2010

KEVIN STARR, MATT PUTMAN, CINDY SELEY, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, DAVID PASCHKETT, ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, CHRISTOPHER MICHAUD, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, LISA OWENS, RICHARD BENHAM, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, KEATON LANDRY, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, SHERI CLARK, RACHAEL HALL AND MITCHELL HORTON, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,
v.
SONY BMG MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT, SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA, BERTELSMANN, INC., UNIVERSAL MUSIC GROUP, TIME WARNER INC., FORMERLY KNOWN AS AOL TIME WARNER CABLE, INC., WARNER MUSIC GROUP CORP., EMI MUSIC NORTH AMERICA, CAPITOL RECORDS INC., DOING BUSINESS AS EMI MUSIC NORTH AMERICA, JOHN DOES 1-100, BERTELSMANN MUSIC GROUP, INC., BMG MUSIC, BMG MUSIC PUBLISHING, DOING BUSINESS AS THE RCA RECORD LABEL, CAPITOL-EMI MUSIC, INC. AND VIRGIN RECORDS AMERICA, INC., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.*FN1



SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Loretta Preska, Judge), entered October 21, 2008, dismissing Plaintiffs-Appellants' Second Consolidated Amended Complaint ("SCAC") for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We hold that the SCAC contains "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made," Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and therefore states a claim for violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. We therefore vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Katzmann, Circuit Judge

Argued: September 21, 2009

Errata Filed: February 19, 2010

Before NEWMAN, WALKER, and KATZMANN, Circuit Judges.

This case calls upon us to determine whether an antitrust complaint alleging a conspiracy by major record labels to fix the prices and terms under which their music would be sold over the Internet states a claim for violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). We hold that Plaintiffs-Appellants' Second Consolidated Amended Complaint ("SCAC") contains "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made," id. at 555, and therefore states a claim. We vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

The SCAC contains the following non-conclusory factual allegations, which we must accept as true.*fn2

Defendants produce, license and distribute music sold as digital files ("Digital Music") online via the Internet ("Internet Music") and on compact discs ("CDs"). Together, defendants EMI, Sony BMG Music Entertainment ("Sony BMG"), Universal Music Group Recordings, Inc. ("UMG"), and Warner Music Group Corp. ("WMG"), control over 80% of Digital Music sold to end purchasers in the United States.

Initially, defendants Bertelsmann, Inc. ("Bertelsmann"), WMG, and EMI agreed to launch a service called MusicNet. Defendants UMG and Sony Corporation ("Sony") agreed to launch a service called Duet, later renamed pressplay. All defendants signed distribution agreements with MusicNet or pressplay and sold music directly to consumers over the Internet through these ventures (the "joint ventures"). Both the joint ventures and the Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") provided a forum and means through which defendants could communicate about pricing, terms, and use restrictions.

To obtain Internet Music from all major record labels, a consumer initially would have had to subscribe to both MusicNet and pressplay, at a cost of approximately $240 per year. Both services required consumers to agree to unpopular Digital Rights Management terms ("DRMs").

For example, pressplay prohibited consumers from copying more than two songs from any particular artist onto a CD each month. Music purchased from MusicNet and pressplay would often "expire" unless repurchased: A MusicNet consumer would need to repurchase music each year and a pressplay consumer who unsubscribed would immediately lose access to all of the music he or she had purchased. MusicNet and pressplay also did not allow consumers to transfer songs from their computers to portable digital music players like the iPod. One industry commentator observed that MusicNet and pressplay did not offer reasonable prices, and one prominent computer industry magazine concluded that "nobody in their right mind will want to use" these services. SCAC ¶ 77.

Moreover, the pricing of CDs accounted for costs such as copying the compact discs; producing the CD case, labels and anti-shoplifting packaging; shipping, both to the distributor and then to record stores; labor, such as shelving CDs and staffing cash registers; and damaged and unsold inventory. All of these costs were eliminated with Internet Music. SCAC ¶ 71. However, these dramatic cost reductions were not accompanied by dramatic price reductions for Internet Music, as would be expected in a competitive market.

Eventually, defendants and the joint ventures began to sell Internet Music to consumers through entities they did not own or control. However, the entities could only sell defendants' music if they contracted with MusicNet to provide Internet Music for the same prices and with the same restrictions as MusicNet itself or other MusicNet licensees. If the licensee attempted to license music from another company, defendants forced them to pay penalties or terminated their licenses. In addition, each defendant was paid shares of the total revenue generated by a joint venture licensee, rather than on a per song basis, linking each defendant's financial interest in the joint venture to the total sales of all labels rather than to its own market share.

Defendants also used Most Favored Nation clauses ("MFNs") in their licenses that had the effect of guaranteeing that the licensor who signed the clause received terms no less favorable than the terms offered to other licensors. Defendants attempted to hide the MFNs because they knew they would attract antitrust scrutiny. For example, EMI and MusicNet had a "side letter" agreement which assured that EMI's core terms would be no less favorable than Bertelsmann's and WMG's. "EMI CEO Rob Glaser decided to put the MFN in a secret side letter because 'there are legal/antitrust reasons why it would be bad idea to have MFN clauses in any, or certainly all, of these agreements.'" SCAC ΒΆ 95. UMG also used MFN clauses in its license agreements. A January 12, 2006 article in the Wall Street Journal confirmed ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.