The opinion of the court was delivered by: Michael A. Telesca United States District Judge
Plaintiff Kiss Trebbles has filed the above three pro se actions. In the first, plaintiff seeks relief for slander, libel and fraud (10-CV-6051T, Docket #1); in the second she seeks relief for libel, personal injury, housing accommodations, fraud and "Rackeeteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations" (10-CV-6053T, Docket #1) and in the third she seeks relief for "Civil Rights" (10-CV-6-62T, Docket # 1). Plaintiff has requested in forma pauperis status in each case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and has met the statutory requirements. Plaintiff's complaints have been reviewed by the Court with respect to the 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) criteria.
Based on the Court's review, and as discussed below, plaintiff's complaints are completely lacking in federal jurisdiction. For that reason, they must be dismissed. However, because plaintiff has filed five actions in less than two months, all of which were either frivolous, lacking in federal jurisdiction, or failing to state a claim, the Court must consider sanctions to prevent plaintiff from abusing her ability to file actions in forma pauperis.
Because plaintiff has met the statutory requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), plaintiff is granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. Section 1915(e)(2)(B) of 28 U.S.C. provides that the Court shall dismiss a case in which in forma pauperis status has been granted if the Court determines that the action (I) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. In addition, "[it] is common ground that in our federal system of limited jurisdiction any party or the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, may raise the question of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction." United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. CenterMark Properties Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, "[w]here jurisdiction is lacking, ... dismissal is mandatory." Id.; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3).
In evaluating the complaint, the Court must accept as true all of the factual allegations and must draw all inferences in plaintiff's favor. See Larkin v. Savage, 318 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam); King v. Simpson, 189 F.3d 284, 287 (2d Cir. 1999). Moreover, "a court is obliged to construe [pro se] pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations." McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004); and see Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 701 (2d Cir. 1998). Nevertheless, even pleadings submitted pro se must meet the notice requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2004). "Specific facts are not necessary," and the plaintiff "need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.' " Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Boykin v. Keycorp, 521 F.3d 202, 213 (2d Cir 2008) (discussing pleading standard in pro se cases after Twombly). "A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, ..., and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erikson, 551 U.S. at 94 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Generally, the Court will afford a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend or to be heard prior to dismissal " 'unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim.'" Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Federal Savings Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam)).
Based on its evaluation of the complaint, the Court finds that plaintiff's claims must be dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction. In addition, plaintiff's claims are frivolous and fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(I) and (ii). Plaintiff's complaint falls into the category wherein amendment would be futile, and, therefore, no amendment will be allowed. Plaintiff's remaining motions are denied.
The same statute that allows a litigant to commence a civil or criminal action in federal court in forma pauperis "authorizes federal courts to dismiss a claim filed in forma pauperis 'if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.'" Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989), citing to what is now 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
Section 1915[e] is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits that paying litigants generally do not initiate because of the costs of bringing suits and because of the threat of sanctions for bringing vexatious suits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. To this end, the statute accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless. Examples of the former class are claims against which it is clear that the defendants are immune from suit ... and claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.... Examples of the latter class are claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district judges are all too familiar.
Id. at 327-28, 1833 (citations omitted).
In plaintiff's first action, she alleges fraud and libel for reason that are not clear. For factual allegations, plaintiff merely repeats, verbatim, sections of apparent collections letters dealing with outstanding school loans incurred for her attendance at the Continental School of Beauty. Plaintiff also attaches various documents from the Continental School of Beauty and their collection agents, that appear to indicate that the balance due the school is because plaintiff either was terminated from, or withdrew from, the school prior to finishing a program. Nothing in the excerpts from letters plaintiff included in the allegations sections of the Complaints, nor the papers attached, indicates either a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim, or any other claim that would give this Court jurisdiction.
In the second action, plaintiff sues the Monroe County Executive and other officials of the County Department of Social Services for libel, personal injury, housing accommodations, fraud and "Rackeeteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations." Her factual allegations, however, contend that her room at her shelter was entered and her wallet was stolen with all of her belongings. She states the federal basis for the claim as "housing, personal injury" and the relief she seeks is money and to be "relieved from the YWCA shelter forever and it's employees." Plaintiff does not explain any basis for federal jurisdiction over this claim, and the Court does not find any. The second claim alleges plaintiff was "put out of emergency housing with force and intimidation". However, plaintiff attached to the complaint the decision of the State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance Fair Hearing. The decision states that plaintiff asked for a fair hearing and ...