The opinion of the court was delivered by: Warren W. Eginton Senior United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Anthony Angelillo brings this action against Harte Nissan, Inc. ("Harte") and Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp. ("NMAC") asserting that Harte sold plaintiff a "new" car despite the car having previously been in a significant accident requiring substantial repairs. Plaintiff brings claims under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"), 15 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq., for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and for violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act ("CUTPA"), Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 42-110 et seq. Now pending before the Court are defendants' motions to dismiss (Docs. #6, 23).
For purposes of ruling on the motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all allegations of the complaint as true. In addition, because the contract at issue was incorporated into the complaint by reference, the Court will also review it. See Leonard v. Israel Discount Bank of New York, 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff is a consumer living in Manchester, Connecticut. Defendant Harte is an authorized dealer of Nissan automobiles located in Hartford, Connecticut. NMAC is licensed with the Connecticut Department of Banking as a sales finance company. It accepts the assignment of installment contracts for motor vehicles from dealerships including Harte.
Plaintiff purchased a 2007 Nissan 350Z from Harte on August 12, 2008 for a total cash price of $34,932.52. He paid $4,000 as a down payment and financed the balance of $30,932.52 pursuant to a retail installment sales contract that was assigned to NMAC. The finance charge under the contract was $6,494.52, for a total sale price of $41,427.04. The contract provided that NMAC may, in the event of a default by the buyer, recover costs of repossession, late fees and attorney's fees.
The purchase order described the automobile as a "New 2007 Nissan 350Z." The purchase order form used by Harte contained three boxes to describe the motor vehicle that was being sold: "Demonstrator," "Used" and "New." Harte checked the box marked "New" on the purchase order.
Prior to the sale, the automobile was in a significant accident. As a result of the accident, the automobile needed significant repairs. Harte did not disclose the accident or repairs to plaintiff prior to the time of purchase. Plaintiff experienced multiple and repeated problems with the automobile and brought it to Harte. Harte was unable to make repairs to plaintiff's satisfaction. In July 2009, plaintiff learned that the vehicle had been in an accident prior to his purchase.
On July 24, 2009, plaintiff, through his attorney, notified Harte and NMAC that he had revoked his acceptance of the automobile pursuant to section 42a-2-608 of the Connecticut General Statutes and that he was retaining possession of the vehicle as security for his claim pursuant to section 42a-711 of the Connecticut General Statutes.
To date, defendants have failed and refused to refund to plaintiff the money that he paid under the contract.
The first count of plaintiff's complaint is for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42a-2-314. Plaintiff alleges that Harte's conduct was intentional, wanton and in bad faith. Plaintiff seeks punitive damages for this conduct. The second count is for a violation of CUTPA.
Both defendants have moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) contending that plaintiff's claimed damages do not reach the $50,000 threshold for establishing federal jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1)(B). In addition, NMAC moves to dismiss pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) because the MMWA does not create a right of action against a financier of a consumer's purchase, only against a "warrantor."
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) "challenges the court's statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case before it." 2A James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 12.07, at 12-49 (2d ed. 1994). "[F]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and lack the power to disregard such limits as have been imposed by the Constitution or Congress." Durant, Nichols, Houston, Hodgson, & Cortese-Costa, P.C. v. Dupont, 565 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 2009). Once the question of jurisdiction is raised, the ...