The opinion of the court was delivered by: John Gleeson, District Judge
Mohammed Karimzada petitions for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking to overturn his conviction in New York State Supreme Court, Queens County, of rape and related crimes stemming from his assault of a woman in 1994. Karimzada claims that the trial judge's inquiry into the validity of his waiver of his right to trial by jury was inadequate. He also claims that the trial judge sentenced him harshly as punishment for exercising his constitutional right to trial instead of pleading guilty. For the reasons discussed below, the petition is denied.
The government's evidence at trial established that Karimzada raped a woman in Queens in the early hours of August 12, 1994, after meeting her in a Manhattan dance club and luring her into his car with the promise of a ride to her home in Staten Island. Although the police investigated the case, they were unable to identify the woman's assailant and sent the rape kit to cold storage in September 1994. In 2002, as part of an effort to solve old sexual assault cases, the police compared the DNA evidence in the rape kit to other samples contained in a recently created DNA databank. The DNA evidence matched a sample of Karimzada's blood that he had provided after being convicted in 1998 of a different rape. At the time of the match, Karimzada was serving an eight to sixteen year prison term for rape charges unrelated to the 1994 rape.
On May 22, 2003, a grand jury in the New York Supreme Court, Queens County, charged Karimzada with rape in the first degree, assault in the second degree, two counts of sexual abuse in the first degree, and unlawful imprisonment. On April 4, 2005, Karimzada waived his right to a jury trial in writing while standing next to his lawyer in open court. At his bench trial, Karimzada conceded that he had committed the rape; he argued in his defense only that the five-year statute of limitations for the rape charge had expired and that, since the police had not exercised "reasonable diligence" in trying to identify the perpetrator of the rape, the prosecution had not proven that the statute should be extended for another five years as permitted by New York law. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 30.10(4)(a)(ii).
The judge found Karimzada guilty of all counts on June 6, 2005. On July 27, 2005, the judge sentenced him to concurrent terms of eight and one-third to twenty-five years on the rape count, two and one-third to seven years on each of the sexual assault and sexual abuse counts, and one and one-third to four years on the unlawful imprisonment count. The concurrent terms were imposed consecutively to the prison term that Karimzada was serving at the time of sentencing.
Karimzada appealed, arguing that his conviction should be overturned because, among other reasons, the trial judge's on the record inquiry into the validity of his jury trial waiver was inadequate and because the trial judge had unconstitutionally lengthened his sentence as punishment for proceeding to trial instead of pleading guilty. The Appellate Division rejected both of these claims as unpreserved and affirmed his conviction. People v. Karimzada, 851 N.Y.S.2d 624 (2nd Dep't 2008).The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. 12 N.Y.3d 818 (2009).
Karimzada filed this petition on July 31, 2009. He asserts the same claims that the New York state courts rejected on direct appeal.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") limits the scope of federal habeas review of claims challenging a state conviction that state courts have adjudicated on the merits. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A federal court may overturn a state court's ruling on the merits of a claim only if the ruling "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Id.
Federal habeas courts do not generally examine claims challenging a state court conviction, even under this deferential standard, unless the petitioner "has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). A claim is unexhausted if a petitioner has failed to fairly present that claim to the highest state court with jurisdiction to hear the claim. See Jones v. Keane, 329 F.3d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 2003). Moreover, a federal habeas court generally may not review a claim on the merits, even if it is exhausted, if the state court decision rejecting that claim "rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). "This rule applies whether the state law ground is substantive or procedural." Id.
A federal court may not, however, accept an assertion that a claim is procedurally barred on state law grounds without examining the adequacy of the alleged procedural default. See Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 239 (2003). "Ordinarily, violation of firmly established and regularly followed state rules . . . will be adequate to foreclose review of a federal claim," but "[t]here are . . . exceptional cases in which exorbitant application of a generally sound rule renders the state ground inadequate to stop consideration of a federal question." Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 885 (2002). In determining whether a case fits within that limited category, the Second Circuit has identified three "guideposts": "(1) whether the alleged procedural violation was actually relied on in the trial court, and whether perfect compliance with the state rule would have changed the trial court's decision; (2) whether state case law indicated that compliance with the rule was demanded in the specific circumstances presented; and (3) whether petitioner had substantially complied with the rule given the realities of trial, and therefore, whether demanding perfect compliance with the rule would serve a legitimate governmental interest." Cotto, 331 F.3d at 240 (internal quotation marks omitted).
If the court finds that the alleged procedural default is adequate, it may not review the defaulted claim on the merits unless the petitioner can establish "cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law," Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, that is, the ...