The opinion of the court was delivered by: Randolph F. Treece United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER
On April 30, 2008, pro se Plaintiff Gary Smith filed a civil rights Complaint alleging the Defendants violated his rights established by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq. Dkt. Nos. 1, Compl.;*fn2 22, Am. Compl. He further alleges violations of Articles 1, 3, and 11 of the New York State Constitution as well as New York Corrections Law § 610. The basis for Plaintiff's lawsuit is his contention that the Defendants infringed upon and interfered with his right to freely exercise his religion when he was denied the opportunity to attend Protestant religious services on three separate occasions during his incarceration at Greene Correctional Facility in 2006.
Currently pending before the Court is Defendants Graziano's and Heath's Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Dkt. No. 47. Despite being granted multiple extensions of time, Dkt. Nos. 48, 52, 56, & 59, Plaintiff has failed to respond to the Motion. For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that Defendants' Motion be granted, and Plaintiff's Amended Complaint be dismissed in its entirety.
At the outset, we are compelled to note that, not only has Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, but he has also failed to communicate with this Court in over six months, causing this Court to wonder whether Plaintiff has abandoned his case.
Throughout this litigation, Plaintiff has stumbled over his responsibility to timely ensure that the Court (and his adversaries) has a current address for him. Plaintiff's shirking of his duty has resulted in the return of multiple documents sent to him. See Mail Returned to the Court, Dkt. Nos. 34, 42-44, & 61-62. Time and again, Plaintiff belatedly provided current addresses to the Court, resulting in the Clerk of the Court having to re-serve documents that had been returned as undeliverable. See Notification of Updated Address, Dkt. Nos. 7, 8, 24, 28, 36, 37, 39, 53, 60. Plaintiff's belated notices of changes in his address have stymied the effective administration of this case, and, yet, this is not the only negative effect caused by Plaintiff sidestepping his responsibility. For example, earlier in the litigation, Plaintiff's failure to timely update his address directly impacted the Defendants' ability to serve responses to Plaintiff's discovery demands. See Dkt. No. 41, Order, dated Apr. 6, 2009, at p. 2 (detailing the Defendants' effort to serve Plaintiff with their discovery responses, only to have such responses returned on multiple occasions). Thus, Defendants too have incurred extra-expenses by having to re-serve discovery responses. We conclude that Plaintiff's failure to ensure that his address is current not only burdened the Court and Defendants with extra expenses, but also caused confusion and delay.
Plaintiff's apathetic approach to this litigation is not only reflected by his failure to update his address. He has also, inexplicably, failed to respond to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, which was filed approximately nine months ago, on June 9, 2009, and which we believe Plaintiff received. Dkt. No. 47. The Motion was served on Plaintiff at his then-current address, the Anna M. Kross Center (AMKC). Id. Though Plaintiff twice updated his address thereafter, there has been no indication from Defendants that their Motion was returned to them as undeliverable. Furthermore, on numerous occasions, Plaintiff sought, and was granted, extensions of time to respond to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. See Dkt. Nos. 51, 52, 56, & 59. We note that in one of his extension requests, Plaintiff sought to distinguish his claim for relief from one of the cases Defendants relied upon in seeking summary judgment.*fn3 Dkt. No. 51. In view of these facts, we can safely presume that Plaintiff indeed received a copy of that Motion, as well as the notice that, in accordance with this District's Local Rules 7.1(a)(3) and 56.2, accompanied the Motion and warned Plaintiff of the consequences that could occur should he fail to respond to the Defendants' Motion. Dkt. No. 47 at pp. 1-2. Similarly, Court Orders/Notices that were resent in September 2009 to Plaintiff's last known address have not been returned as undeliverable, thus we can presume that Plaintiff received these mailings as well, and that he is aware of the gravity of a motion for summary judgment. See Young v. City of Syracuse Dep't of Public Works, 307 Fed. Appx. 502, 2009 WL 136920, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 21, 2009) (unpublished opinion) ("[T]he failure of a district court to apprise pro se litigants of the consequences of failing to respond . . . to a motion for summary judgment is ordinarily grounds for reversal." (quoting Vital v. Interfaith Med. Ctr., 168 F.3d 615, 620 (2d Cir. 1999))).
Despite all the above precautions and warnings provided to Plaintiff, he has failed to oppose Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. And, it further appears that Plaintiff has again failed to notify the Court of a change in his address. The last communication this Court received from Plaintiff is a letter, dated August 26, 2009, wherein he provides an updated civilian address. Dkt. No. 60. Though documents mailed to this address have not been returned to the Court, in light of Plaintiff's apparent abandonment of this case, a Chambers staff member conducted a review of the New York State Department of Corrections (DOCS) Inmate Locator Website. According to the information available on that website, as of December 7, 2009, Plaintiff was returned to prison from parole and is currently housed at Fishkill Correctional Facility. See Attach. 1, http://nysdocslookup.docs.state.ny.us. Yet, he has not notified the Court of his change in address, nor has he responded to Defendants' Motion.
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court may, in its discretion, dismiss an action based upon the failure of a plaintiff to prosecute an action or comply with any order of the court. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962). "This power to dismiss an action may be exercised when necessary to achieve orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Freeman v. Lundrigan, 1996 WL 481534, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1996) (citing Rodriguez v. Walsh, 1194 WL 9688, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 1994)).
Moreover, a litigant has the duty to inform the court of any address changes. As then District Judge Pooler stated:
It is neither feasible nor legally required that the clerks of the district courts undertake independently to maintain current addresses on all parties to pending actions. It is incumbent upon litigants to inform the clerk of address changes, for it is manifest that communications between the clerk and the parties or their counsel will be conducted principally by mail. In addition to keeping the clerk informed of any change of address, parties are obliged to make timely status inquiries. Address changes normally would be reflected by those inquiries if made in writing.
Dansby v. Albany County Corr. Facility Staff, 1996 WL 172699, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1996) (quoting Perkins v. King, No. 84-3310, slip op. at 4 (5th Cir. May 19, 1985) (other citations omitted)); see generally N.D.N.Y.L.R. 41.2(b).
In light of the facts that more than six months have elapsed since Plaintiff communicated with the Court, he has failed to respond to Defendants' Motion, and has failed to maintain a current address with the Court, the Court finds that he has failed to prosecute this matter and presumably has abandoned his case. Smith's failure to prosecute this matter and provide a change of address warrants a recommendation of dismissal. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b) (allowing for dismissal of an action for failure to prosecute); see also N.D.N.Y.L.R. 41.2(a) (noting that a plaintiff's failure to take action for four months is "presumptive evidence of lack of prosecution); N.D.N.Y.L.R. 41.2(b) (authorizing dismissal for failure to provide a change of address). Indeed, courts in the Northern District of New York have dismissed lawsuits brought by pro se plaintiffs for failure to provide a current address. See Rivera v. Goord, 1999 WL 33117155 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1999); Fenza v. Conklin, 177 F.R.D. 126 (N.D.N.Y. 1988); Morgan v. Dardiz, 177 F.R.D. 125 (N.D.N.Y. 1998); Williams v. Faulkner, 1998 WL 278288 (N.D.N.Y. May 20, 1998); Dansby v. Albany County Corr. Facility Staff, 1996 WL 172699 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1996).
Nevertheless, while we recommend dismissal of this action due to Plaintiff's failure to prosecute, we will continue our analysis of the substance and merits of Plaintiff's claims.
II. DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate only where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The moving party bears the burden to demonstrate through "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with [ ] affidavits, if any," that there is no genuine issue of material fact. F.D.I.C. v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). "When a party has moved for summary judgment on the basis of asserted facts supported as required by [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)] and has, in accordance with local court rules, served a concise statement of the material facts as to which it ...