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Hubbard v. Hanley

May 13, 2010

PETER HUBBARD, PLAINTIFF,
v.
JAMES HANLEY, COMMMISIONER OF NEW YORK CITY OFFICE OF LABOR RELATIONS; JOHN MATTINGLY, COMMISSIONER OF NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN'S SERVICES; AND THE CITY OF NEW YORK, DEFENDANTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Harold Baer, Jr., District Judge

OPINION & ORDER

Plaintiff Peter Hubbard ("Plaintiff" or "Hubbard") is an employee of the New York City Administration for Children's Services (the "ACS"), who received a 20-day suspension without pay for two incidents with other ACS employees. Hubbard claims that the disciplinary hearing process, where he received both pre- and post-discipline hearings, violated his Constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. He also claims that he was discriminated against in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, and in violation of his First Amendment right to free speech. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND*fn1

Plaintiff is employed as a Community Coordinator for the ACS, an agency of the City of New York. In late 2008, Hubbard was brought up on disciplinary charges for two instances of improper conduct. On September 10, 2008, Plaintiff received a formal notice of "Charges and Specifications," for a series of verbal altercations with an ACS Child Protective Specialist ("CPS") and an ACS attorney. See Compl., "Book of Exhibits," at 1-2 (Charges and Specifications, ACS File No. 66051-542-001) (hereafter "Charge #1"). On August 1, 2008, the CPS contacted Plaintiff to determine the status of a bed delivery to the home of a child's grandmother, which was court-ordered to be provided by August 4. According to the notice, Hubbard said that the bed would be delivered sometime that week, but would not confirm it would arrive by August 4 despite the court order; the bed ultimately did not arrive by that date. On August 6, 2008, an ACS attorney contacted Plaintiff about the bed delivery issue, whereupon Hubbard allegedly yelled at the attorney, called her names like "Missy," refused to provide a telephone number or refer the call to his supervisor and ultimately claimed that he was the supervisor. Hubbard was charged with violations of the ACS Code of Conduct, specifically (1) offensive or inappropriate language and a failure to be courteous and considerate; (2) failure to perform duties, tasks and standards of employment and imposed by law; (3) conduct prejudicial to good order; and (4) conduct detrimental to the ACS.

On December 11, 2008, Hubbard received a second notice for a different incident with his fellow ACS employees. See Compl., "Book of Exhibits," at 16-17 (Charges and Specifications, ACS File No. 66051-542-002) (hereafter "Charge #2"). According to the notice, on or about November 14, 2008, Hubbard got into a verbal altercation with another Child Protective Specialist, as well as a Specialist Supervisor, where he yelled at both individuals, asked whether the CPS was "stupid or just slow," and told the Supervisor that he "run[s] the show down here." Id. Plaintiff was charged with (1) offensive or inappropriate language and a failure to be courteous and considerate; (2) conduct prejudicial to good order; and, (3) conduct detrimental to the ACS.

Plaintiff engaged in a pre- and post-discipline hearing process for both sets of charges. On September 23, 2008, Hubbard participated in a pre-discipline informal hearing for Charge #1. On November 13, 2008, Plaintiff received the informal hearing decision, which sustained the charges and recommended a ten-day suspension without pay. He also received on that same day a waiver letter that gave Hubbard the option of either proceeding with a Disciplinary Hearing pursuant to Section 75 of the New York State Civil Service Law, or waiving the Section 75 hearing in favor of a union-based Grievance Procedure established by the Plaintiff's union collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). Hubbard signed the waiver and opted for the Grievance Procedure. On December 1, 2008, a "Step II" hearing was held pursuant to the Grievance Procedure to review the proposed discipline, and on January 21, 2009, the hearing officer sustained the suspension. On December 19, 2008, a pre-discipline informal hearing was held for Charge #2; Hubbard received notice on December 30 that these charges were sustained, and another ten-day suspension without pay was recommended. Again, Plaintiff opted to participate in the Grievance Procedure instead of a Section 75 hearing.*fn2 On January 12, 2009, a "Step II" hearing was held for Charge #2, and on January 22, the hearing officer sustained the proposed suspension. On January 29, 2009, the Commissioner for the ACS accepted the recommendation of the Step II hearing officers for both Charge #1 and #2, and suspended Hubbard for a combined twenty days without pay, beginning on February 9, 2009. On June 18, 2009, Plaintiff participated in a post-disciplinary "Step III" hearing for both sets of charges. Hubbard was notified on July 28, 2009 that there was no violation of the Grievance Procedure and the suspension was upheld. Hubbard could have further appealed to a "Step IV" arbitration proceeding, but it is unclear from the complaint and attached documents whether he ever opted to do so.

Hubbard now brings suit against the City of New York, James Hanley, Commissioner for the Mayor's Office of Labor Relations for City of New York, and John Mattingly, Commissioner for the Administration for Children's Services (collectively "Defendants"). Plaintiff claims that the disciplinary process was flawed and in violation of his procedural due process rights under the Constitution because there were no live witnesses and he therefore could not confront his accusers. He also claims that he was suspended based on protected speech in violation of the First Amendment. Finally, Hubbard also claims that the process was a violation of his substantive due process rights as well as a violation of his right to equal protection. Defendants move to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff fails to adequately allege violations of due process, equal protection, or free speech; (2) the individual defendants are shielded by qualified immunity and lack personal involvement; and (3) the violations are not alleged to be a custom, policy, or practice of the City of New York.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A complaint will be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if there is a "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P.12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss on this ground, a plaintiff must "plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A facially plausible claim is one where "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Where the court finds well-pleaded factual allegations, it should assume their veracity and determine whether they "plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. at 1950. A court must accept as true all of the factual allegations in the plaintiff's complaint, see, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2009), and may consider "undisputed documents, such as a written contract attached to, or incorporated by reference in, the complaint," Chapman v. New York State Div. for Youth, 546 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that "some person has deprived him of a federal right" and "the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state law."*fn3 Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 2005). I need not consider whether Defendants acted under "color of state law" because Plaintiff fails to adequately allege any actionable deprivation of constitutional rights.

B. Procedural Due Process

The Fourteenth Amendment protects a person from deprivation of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). A court should examine a procedural due process claim in two steps: "the first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State . the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient." Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); see also Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 2002). There is little question at this stage that Plaintiff has a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment with the City of New York. "[A] public employee has a property interest in continued employment if the employee is guaranteed continued employment absent 'just cause' for discharge," Harhay 323 F.3d 206, 212 (2d Cir. 2003), and the suspension without pay of a tenured employee likewise implicates a protected property interest. See O'Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 197 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Narumanchi v. Bd. of Trustees of the Ct. State Univ., 850 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1988)). Unfortunately for Plaintiff, he fails to demonstrate how the procedures that led to his suspension violated due process under the Constitution.

"The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). In the context of a public employee, "procedural due process is satisfied if the government provides notice and a limited opportunity to be heard prior to termination, so long as a full adversarial hearing is provided afterwards."*fn4 LoCurto v. Safir, 264 F.3d 154, 171 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545-46 (1985)). In some instances, of course, the government may be unable to hold a pre-deprivation hearing. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540-41 (1981) ("the impracticability in some cases of providing any pre-seizure hearing under a state-authorized procedure"). Where a deprivation of property or liberty is due to a "random and unauthorized" act of government as opposed to an established state procedure, there is no procedural due process violation if the government provides a meaningful post-deprivation remedy. LoCurto, 264 F.3d at 172.

Plaintiff contends that his due process rights were violated because he was not provided the opportunity to confront live witnesses at any of his pre- or post-deprivation hearings. The requirements for a pre-deprivation hearing are limited and, based on the facts alleged, were satisfied in this case. The requisite hearing "is a minimal one" and "need not be elaborate." LoCurto, 264 F.3d at 173; Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that, prior to discipline, "[t]he tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story." Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546; see also O'Connor, 426 ...


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