The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Harold Baer, Jr., District Judge
Robert Morales brings this action against The Long Island Rail Road Company ("the LIRR"), in which he claims that he was discriminated against through disparate treatment because of his race and color and subjected to a hostile work environment. Morales's claims arise under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII").Defendant LIRR moves to dismiss Morales's Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The LIRR asserts that (1) Morales has failed to allege an adverse employment action with regard to his disparate treatment claim; (2) Morales has failed to allege any causal connection between discriminatory conduct toward him and his hostile work environment claim; and (3) Morales has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to his hostile work environment claims. For the reasons discussed below, the LIRR's motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Morales, a non-white Hispanic male who is currently forty-one years of age, began working for the LIRR on June 24, 1996 as a Machinist in the LIRR's Maintenance of Equipment Department. According to Morales, he was at work on May 21, 2007, when he "took a moment to reflect and pray" with his eyes closed. When he opened his eyes, he discovered that he was being watched by Brian Donlan, a supervisor. Morales told Donlan that he was praying, but was charged with "sleeping or assuming the position of sleep," which is a violation of the Maintenance of Equipment Department Code of Conduct. He was also charged with theft of wages, and was told to appear for a trial at an LIRR office on June 7, 2007.
Morales appealed the charges, and on March 14, 2008 was offered a "trial waiver," pursuant to which he agreed to waive his right to a trial through the LIRR disciplinary system. In exchange, Morales pleaded guilty to the charges, and agreed to a five-day suspension from work. The suspension, but not the plea, was to be held in abeyance until May 21, 2008, a procedure akin to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal used frequently in New York state criminal courts. Morales was never suspended, because he met the conditions of the plea, i.e., he was not charged with any other work-related offense during the period ending May 21, 2008; nonetheless, his guilty plea was recorded on his permanent record. Morales alleges that Donlan and other supervisors and employees of the LIRR acted in a discriminatory manner and created a hostile work environment when they falsely charged Morales with violating the Code of Conduct. He claims that other employees have been found "actually sleeping [on the job] and not received any punishment," and believes that the charge leveled against him was a result of discrimination because of his race and color. Morales Aff., Nov. 20, 2008.*fn1 Finally, Morales alleges that discrimination against him continued after the date of the incident, May 21, 2007, which led him to experience a hostile work environment at the hands of Dolan and other supervisors and employees of the LIRR. Cplt. ¶ 14. Unfortunately, there is not a single incident to support this allegation -- causing one to inquire, "where's the beef?"
On December 30, 2008, Morales filed a Charge of Discrimination with the United States Equal Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). On July 14, 2009, the EEOC mailed Morales a Notice of Right to Sue, instructing Morales that he had 90 days to commence his action in federal court. Morales filed his Complaint on October 13, 2009, 91 days after the Notice was sent by the EEOC, but presumably within 90 days of his receipt of the Notice, which must have taken at least one day to reach him by mail.*fn2 Thus, this action was timely filed.
According to the Supreme Court's most recent decisions, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The requirement that the court accept all factual allegations as true does not apply to "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements." Id. The court's determination of whether a complaint states a "plausible claim for relief" is a "context-specific inquiry" that requires application of "judicial experience and common sense." Id.
With respect to employment discrimination cases, in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), which preceded Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court rejected a heightened pleading requirement for Title VII cases. The Court held that an employment discrimination complaint need not allege specific facts that establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
Id. at 514. Rather, an employment discrimination complaint "must include only a short and plain statement of the claim... [that] give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Id. at 512 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2007). In Twombly, the Supreme Court explicitly affirmed the Swierkiewicz pleading standard for employment discrimination claims. See 550 U.S. at 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ("This analysis does not run counter to Swierkiewicz.... Here, the Court is not requiring heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.") (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1953 ("Our decision in Twombly expounded upon the pleading standard for all civil actions, and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike.") (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Accordingly, to overcome a motion to dismiss, a complaint in a Title VII case need not establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, but the complaint must be facially plausible and must give fair notice to the defendants of the basis for the claim. Barbosa v. Continuum Health Partners, Inc., 2010 WL 768888 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. March 8, 2010) (SAS); see also Fowler v. Scores Holding Co., Inc., 677 F.Supp.2d 673, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (VM).
A. Disparate Treatment under Title VII
"To prevail on a Title VII disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff must ultimately prove that "'(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he is competent to perform the job or is performing his duties satisfactorily; (3) he suffered an adverse employment decision or action; and (4) the decision or action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination based on his membership in the protected class.'" La Grande v. Descrescente Distrib. Co., Inc., 2010 WL 1049320 at *4 (2d Cir. March 23, 2010) (quoting Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir. 2005). At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need not satisfy the required elements of disparate treatment, but must plead sufficient facts to "give the defendant ...