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Yves Saint Laurent Parfums, S.A. v. Costco Wholesaler Corp.

June 24, 2010

YVES SAINT LAURENT PARFUMS, S.A. AND YSL BEAUTÉ INC., PLAINTIFFS,
v.
COSTCO WHOLESALER CORPORATION, QUALITY KING DISTRIBUTORS, INC. AND J & H COSMETICS, LTD., DEFENDANTS.
QUALITY KING FRAGRANCE, INC., THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF,
v.
J & H COSMETICS, LTD., THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Pitman, United States Magistrate Judge

OPINION AND ORDER

I. Introduction

By notice of motion dated July 28, 2008 (Docket Item 67), defendant/proposed third party-plaintiff Quality King Distributors, Inc. ("QKD") and third-party plaintiff Quality King Fragrance, Inc. ("QKF") move for an Order pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) permitting QKD and QKF to serve an amended third-party complaint and an Order pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 21 permitting QKD to add Gerald Schmeltzer as a third-party defendant. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

II. Facts

This is a trademark infringement action. As originally commenced, it was limited to claims against Costco Wholesale Corp. ("Costco") for the alleged resale of lipstick and mascara bearing trademarks belonging to plaintiffs. The complaint was subsequently amended to add claims against Costco, QKD and J&H Cosmetics, Ltd. ("J&H") for infringement with respect to the sale of OPIUM brand perfume (Second Amended Compl., Docket Item 41). The Second Amended Complaint alleged that J&H sold counterfeit OPIUM perfume to QKD, which QKD sold to Costco and which Costco sold to retail consumers (Second Amended Compl. ¶¶ 27, 29). In its cross claims against J&H, QKD denied that it had purchased the perfume in issue but admitted that QKF did purchase the OPIUM perfume in issue from J&H (Answer and Cross Claims of QKD, Docket Item 35, ¶¶ 9-10). QKD and QKF asserted cross claims against J&H for breach of contract, violation of the Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act, breach of implied warranty, equitable indemnity, equitable contribution, a declaratory judgment that J&H is liable for any costs QKD or QKF incurred defending against plaintiff's claims and common law unfair competition. On that same day, QKF filed a third-party complaint against J&H, asserting on its own behalf the same cross-claims that had been asserted in QKD's Answer and Crossclaims (QKF's Third-Party Complaint, Docket Item 42, ¶ 42).

Plaintiffs subsequently settled their claims against Costco, QKD and QKF; the only remaining claims are plaintiffs' claims and QKD and QKF's claims against J&H. QKD and QKF bring the present motion to assert claims against J&H and its principal, Gerald Schmeltzer. Specifically, the proposed amended third party complaint asserts the following claims on behalf of both QKD and QKF against both J&H and Schmeltzer: (1) breach of contract; (2) violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (3) federal false advertizing; (4) breach of implied warranty; (5) equitable indemnity; (6) equitable contribution; (7) a declaratory judgment that J&H and Schmeltzer are liable for any costs incurred by QKD and QKF in defending against plaintiffs' claims, and (8) contribution and indemnity with respect to the claims against QKD and QKF for common law unfair competition. J&H and Schmeltzer oppose the motion.

III. Analysis

A. Standard Applicable to a Motion to Amend

The standards applicable to a motion to amend a pleading are well settled and require only brief review. Leave to amend a pleading should be freely granted when justice so requires. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Dluhos v. The Floating & Abandoned Vessel, Known as "New York", 162 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 1998); Satchell v. Dilworth, 745 F.2d 781, 785 (2d Cir. 1984); Gumer v. Shearson, Hamill & Co., 516 F.2d 283, 287 (2d Cir. 1974). "Nonetheless, the Court may deny leave if the amendment (1) has been delayed unduly, (2) is sought for dilatory purposes or is made in bad faith, (3) [would prejudice] the opposing party . . . or (4) would be futile." Lee v. Regal Cruises, Ltd., 916 F. Supp. 300, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Kaplan, D.J.), aff'd, 116 F.3d 465 (2d Cir. 1997); accord Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Jacky Maeder (Hong Kong) Ltd., 969 F. Supp. 184, 187-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Kaplan, D.J.).

A proposed amended complaint is futile when it fails to state a claim. Health-Chem Corp. v. Baker, 915 F.2d 805, 810 (2d Cir. 1990); Mina Inv. Holdings Ltd. v. Lefkowitz, 184 F.R.D. 245, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (Sweet, D.J.); Parker v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 19 F. Supp.2d 141, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (Kaplan, D.J.), aff'd in pertinent part, vacated in part on other grounds sub nom., Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326 (2d Cir. 2000); Yaba v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, 931 F. Supp. 271, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Koeltl, D.J.); Prudential Ins. Co. v. BMC Indus., Inc., 655 F. Supp. 710, 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (Sweet, D.J.); see generally Dluhos v. Floating & Abandoned Vessel, Known as "New York", supra, 162 F.3d at 69-70. The party opposing the amendment has the burden of demonstrating that leave to amend would be futile. Staskowski v. County of Nassau, 05-CV-5984 (SJF)(WDW), 2007 WL 4198341 at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2007)("The party opposing an amendment has the burden of establishing that leave to amend would be . . . futile."); Lugosch v. Congel, 00-CV-784, 2002 WL 1001003 at *1 (N.D.N.Y. May 14, 2002), citing Blaskiewicz v. County of Suffolk, 29 F. Supp. 2d 134, 137-38 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).

Leave to amend may be denied as futile "where the claim or defense proposed to be added has 'no colorable merit.'" Oliver v. Demarinis & Co., 90 Civ. 7950 (SS), 1993 WL 33421 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1993) (Lee, M.J.) (citation omitted); see also Ryder Energy Distrib. Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 783 (2d Cir. 1984). The 'colorable grounds' requirement mandates that a district court may not deny a motion for leave to amend a pleading when said pleading is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." Children First Found., Inc. v. Martinez, 04-CV-0927 (NPM), 2007 WL 4618524 at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2007), citing Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen, Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 244 (2d Cir. 2007); Estate of Ratcliffe v. Pradera Realty Co., 05 Civ. 10272 (JFK), 2007 WL 3084977 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2007) (Keenan, D.J.); Journal Publ'g Co. v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 771 F. Supp. 632, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (Leisure, D.J.); Prudential Ins. Co. v. BMC Indus., Inc., supra, 655 F. Supp. at 711 (Although leave to amend should be freely given, "it is inappropriate to grant leave when the amendment would not survive a motion to dismiss."). In assessing the claimed futility of a proposed amended pleading, the court must assume the truth of the factual allegations set forth in the proposed amended pleading. Edwards v. City of New York, 07-CV-5286 (CPS)(RML), 2009 WL 1910740 at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2009); Da Cruz v. Towmasters of N.J., Inc., 217 F.R.D. 126, 128 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); Binder v. Nat'l Life of Vt., 02 Civ. 6411 (GEL), 2003 WL 21180417 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2003) (Lynch, D.J.); Gabourel v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 901 F. Supp. 142, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (Chin, D.J.).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff's "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (overruling the language of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) that a motion to dismiss should not be granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief"); see also Oliver Sch., Inc. v. Foley, 930 F.2d 248, 252 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing the standard for denying an amendment as futile prior to Bell Atlantic); Blaskiewicz v. County of Suffolk, supra, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 138 (same).

The Court of Appeals has also repeatedly noted that the trial court has "broad" discretion in ruling on a motion to amend. Local 802, Associated Musicians v. Parker Meridien Hotel, 145 F.3d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1998); Krumme v. Westpoint Stevens Inc., 143 F.3d 71, 88 (2d Cir. 1998); see generally Grace v. Rosenstock, 228 F.3d 40, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2000).

To the extent that a proposed amendment would add new parties, the motion is technically governed by Rule 21, which provides that "the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party," rather than Rule 15(a). Fed.R.Civ.P. 21; FTD Corp. v. Banker's Trust Co., 954 F. Supp. 106, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Stein, D.J.). However, "'the same standard of liberality' applies under either Rule." FTD Corp. v. Banker's Trust Co., supra, 954 F. Supp. at 109, citing Fair Hous. Dev. Fund Corp. v. Burke, 55 F.R.D. 414, 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) and Expoconsul Int'l, Inc. v. A/E Sys., Inc., 145 F.R.D. 336, 337 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Preska, D.J.); see also Sly Magazine, LLC v. Weider Publ'ns L.L.C., 241 F.R.D. 527, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (Casey, D.J.); Chowdhury v. Haveli Rest., Inc., 04 Civ. 8627 (RMB)(JCF), 2005 WL 1037416 *1-*2 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2005) (Francis, M.J.).

J&H and Schmeltzer oppose the motion on the ground that the proposed amended third-party complaint is futile, that the application was unduly delayed and that the application is made in bad faith.

A. Futility*fn1

1. First and Fourth Claims - Breach of Contract and Warranty as to Schmeltzer

J&H and Schmeltzer argue that the first claim, which alleges breach of contract, should be dismissed as to Schmeltzer because QKD and QKF do not allege any contractual relationship with Schmeltzer and the proposed amended third-party complaint does not contain factual allegations sufficient to justify holding Schmeltzer personally liable for the acts of J&H.

The proposed amended complaint does not allege any contractual relationship between QKD/QKF and Schmeltzer. Thus, the contractual claims against Schmeltzer are colorable only if the proposed amended third-party complaint adequately alleges facts to pierce J&H's "corporate veil."

The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil permits the owner of a corporation, under certain limited circumstances, to be held liable for the corporation's obligations, such as the contract at issue. See, e.g., Morris v. N.Y.S. Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 82 N.Y.2d 135, 140-41, 623 N.E.2d 1157, 1160, 603 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810 (1993); accord Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1991) ("The doctrine . . .is invoked 'to prevent fraud or to achieve equity.'"), quoting Int'l Aircraft Trading Co. v. Mfrs. Trust Co., 297 N.Y. 285, 292, 79 N.E.2d 249, 252 (1948); see also JSC Foreign Econ. Ass'n Technostroyexport v. Int'l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc., 306 F. Supp. 2d 482, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Koeltl, D.J.) ("New York courts will pierce the corporate veil 'whenever necessary to prevent fraud or achieve equity.'"), quoting Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 417, 223 N.E.2d 6, 7, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585, 587 (1966). In order to pierce the corporate veil, there must be a showing that "(1) the owners exercised complete domination of the corporation in respect to the transaction attacked; and (2) that such domination was used to commit a fraud or wrong against the plaintiff which resulted in the plaintiff's injury." JSC Foreign Econ. Ass'n Technostroyexport v. Int'l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc., supra, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 485; see also, e.g., Freeman v. Complex Computing Co., Inc., 119 F.3d 1044, 1052 (2d Cir. 1997); Thrift Drug, Inc. v. Universal Prescription Adm'rs, 131 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 1997); Am. Fuel Corp. v. Utah Energy Dev. Co., Inc., 122 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 1997); Am. Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo, 844 F.2d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 1988); TNS Holdings, Inc. v. MKI Sec. Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 335, 339, 703 N.E.2d 749, 751, 680 N.Y.S.2d 891, 893 (1998); Morris v. N.Y.S. Dep't of Taxation & Fin., supra, 82 N.Y.2d at 141, 623 N.E.2d at 1160-61, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 810-11; Lowendahl v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 247 A.D. 144, 157, 287 N.Y.S. 62, 75-76 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 272 N.Y. 360, 6 N.E.2d 56 (1936).

The determination of whether the corporate veil should be pierced requires a fact-specific inquiry; there are no bright-line rules. See MAG Portfolio Consultant, GMBH v. Merlin Biomed Group LLC, 268 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 2001); Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., supra, 933 F.2d at 139 ("Applying [the relevant] factors to the infinite variety of situations that might warrant disregarding the corporate form is not an easy task because disregarding corporate separateness ...


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