The opinion of the court was delivered by: H. Kenneth Schroeder, Jr. United States Magistrate Judge
This case was referred to the undersigned by the Hon. William M. Skretny, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), for all pretrial matters and to hear and report upon dispositive motions. Dkt. #59.
The defendant, Robert Wesley (hereinafter, "defendant" or "Wesley"), along with nineteen others was charged in a twenty-four count Indictment with having violated Title 21, United States Code, Section 846, Title 21, United States Code, Section 963 and Title 21, United States Code, Section 843(b). Dkt. #1. The defendant was charged in three separate counts, Counts 1, 2 and 22. Id.
Presently pending before this Court is the defendant's omnibus motion for discovery, motion to dismiss Counts 1 and 2 of the Indictment, motion to suppress electronic eavesdropping evidence and a motion to sever. Dkt. ##165 and 228. The government has filed its response to defendant's omnibus motion for discovery, the motion to dismiss, the motion to suppress, the motion to sever, as well as a motion for reciprocal discovery. Dkt. #236. This Court's Decision and Order and/or Report, Recommendation and Order with respect to defendant's motion to dismiss, motion to suppress and to sever will be addressed and filed separately. What follows is this Court's Decision and Order with respect to the defendant's omnibus motion for discovery.
The defendant seeks the following information with respect to Counts 1 and 2 of the Indictment: the exact date when defendant Wesley is alleged to have joined the conspiracy; the identity of all known, but unnamed co-conspirators; each individual with which defendant Wesley is alleged to have had an agreement with respect to the "conspiratorial goal;" the nature of the alleged agreements; whether it is alleged that defendant Wesley's knowledge of the possession and distribution of the controlled substance is actual or constructive; how defendant Wesley knew of the "possession and/or distribution of a substance containing cocaine"; the specific locations within the Western District of New York which the conspiracy took place; the other unnamed locations in which the conspiracy took place; the precise conduct of Wesley alleged to establish the elements of combination and agreement; the quality of methamphetamine distributed and possessed by Wesley; the basis for attributing the entire amount of controlled substances in Counts 1 and 2 to defendant Wesley; any overt acts of the defendants; the exact date, time and place these offenses occurred; the exact amount of methamphetamine, 3,4 methylenedioxymethamphetamine, 1-benzylpiperazine and cocaine involved in the alleged distribution; identify the names of the alleged purchasers, any confidential informant and/or police officers or agents acting on behalf of the government; the location where the illegal drugs were possessed by defendant Wesley; and, the manner in which it is alleged defendant Wesley possessed illegal drugs with the intent to sell. Dkt. #165, pp.4-5
With respect to Count 22, defendant Wesley seeks the following information, the phone company and owner(s) of the phone used; the exact date, time and place the calls were alleged to be made; the name and owner of the phone; and the name of any individual present when the phone was used and whether the individual was a government employee, agent or informant. Dkt. #165, p.6.
As a threshold matter, in its response the government maintains that defendant Wesley has failed to offer any specific facts, reasons or legal authority, to justify a finding that further particularization is necessary. The government further states,
[t]he Indictment notifies defendants that they are alleged to be involved with more than fifty (50) grams of a mixture and substance containing methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance, a substance containing 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA0, a Schedule I controlled substance, and a substance containing 1-benzylpiperazine (BZP), a Schedule I controlled substance, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B) and 841(b)(1)(C). Drug weight is a typical evidentiary matter not subject to particularization on speculation that particulars will prevent a defendant from experiencing some unfair surprise or future jeopardy.... With the extensive disclosures and discovery produced by the government in this case, and the additional information that defendants will receive in advance of trial, there is no risk that they will be surprised or at risk of future jeopardy without bills of particulars as to more exact drug quantities.
Dkt. #236, pp.7-8 (internal citations omitted).
Specifically, with respect to defendant's request for a bill of particulars concerning the development of the conspiracies charged in Counts 1 and 2, the government maintains that it is not required to furnish details concerning the formation of a conspiracy, including when and how it was formed and when a particular defendant joined, because those details need not be proven at trial. Dkt. #236, p.10. With respect to defendant's request for detailed information relating to specific overt acts alleged in furtherance of the conspiracies charged in Counts 1 and 2, the government argues that details such as the exact time and place of the overt acts and names of persons present are not properly the subject of a bill of particulars. Id. at p.11. Moreover, the government states that, "[t]he information in the Indictment, coupled with the discovery materials, which includes transcripts of defendant['s] intercepted conversations and many narrative reports of the investigation, more than adequately inform defendant[ ] of the facts essential to the pending charges." Id. at p.12. Finally, in its conclusion concerning defendant's request for a bill of particulars, the government states, "[b]ecause defendant will be provided with full discovery, exculpatory and impeachment material, a witness list, and exhibit lists, including 3500 materials, well in advance of trial, [he] will not be surprised by the evidence against [him] or be subject to future jeopardy in a way that might otherwise justify ordering the particulars sought." Id. at p.13.
With respect to defendant Wesley's request for a bill of particulars revealing the identity of any co-conspirators, the government states that defendant Wesley knows the identity of his charged co-conspirators and "will learn more identities as trial preparations continue, to include disclosure of impeachment and so-called 3500 material." Dkt. #236, p.10. The government adds, "[t]he criminal investigation is continuing, and that investigation could be compromised if we were required to identify persons who might be charged or even questioned. The government likely will not object to later requests for disclosure of the identities of unindicted co-conspirators as trial approaches, however." Id.
It has become axiomatic that the function of a bill of particulars is to apprise a defendant of the essential facts of the crime for which he has been charged. United States v. Salazar, 485 F.2d 1272, 1277-78 (2d Cir. 1973); cert. denied, 415 U.S. 985 (1974); Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77 (1927). The charges in the Indictment, along with the discovery materials provided by the government, clearly inform the defendant of the essential facts of the crimes charged. As a result, the defendant is not entitled to, nor is he in need of, the "particulars" being sought for that purpose. Accordingly, defendant's request for a bill of particulars is denied.
A bill of particulars should be required only where the charges of the indictment are so general that they do not advise the defendant of the specific acts of which he is accused." United States v. Feola, 651 F. Supp. 1068, 1132 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 875 F.2d 857 (2d Cir.) (mem.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 834, 110 S.Ct. 110, 107 L.Ed.2d 72 (1989); see also United States v. Leonelli, 428 F. Supp. 880, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). "Whether to grant a bill of particulars rests within the sound discretion of the district court." United States v. Panza, 750 F.2d 1141, 1148 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Burgin, 621 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015, 101 S.Ct. 574, 66 L.Ed.2d 474 (1980)); see also [United States v.] Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d  at 574 [(2d Cir. 1987)]. "Acquisition of evidentiary detail is not the function of the bill of particulars." Hemphill v. United States, 392 F.2d 45, 49 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 877, 89 S.Ct. 176, 21 L.Ed.2d 149 (1968).
United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 234 (2d Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Chen, 378 F.3d 151, 163 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 994 (2004); United States v. Porter, No. 06-1957, 2007 WL 4103679 (2d Cir. Nov. 19, 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 1690 (2008).
In two separate requests the defendant is seeking the disclosure of Brady and Giglio material. Dkt. #165, pp.6 and 8. In its response the government states,
[t]he government believes it is complying with its obligations to provide this potentially exculpatory information to defendants. Specifically, we are aware of no evidence that a defendant was operating under duress, as a result of coercion, or under imperfect duress of coercion.... As a practice, the government discloses directly exculpatory information as soon as we become aware of it, and are complying with the obligation to disclose exculpatory material to permit defendants to make effective use of the material before trial. To the extent that additional Brady and impeachment material becomes known to the government, we will endeavor to disclose it sufficiently in advance of the proof for the information to be effectively useful to defendants.
"[A]s a general rule, Brady and its progeny do not require immediate disclosure of all exculpatory and impeachment material upon request by a defendant." United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 146 (2d Cir. 2001). The prosecution is obligated to disclose and turn over Brady material to the defense "in time for its effective use." Id. at 144. With respect to impeachment material that does not rise to the level of being Brady material, such as Jencks statements, the prosecution is not required to disclose and turn over such statements until after the witness has completed his/her direct testimony. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500; Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2; In re United States, 834 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1987). However, if the government has adopted a policy of turning such materials over to the defendant prior to trial, the government shall comply with that policy; or in the alternative, produce such materials in accordance with the scheduling order to be issued by the trial judge.
Based on the representations made by counsel for the government as to its obligations under Brady and Giglio, the defendant's request is denied, but the government is hereby directed to comply with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' holding in United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2001) and United States v. Rodriguez, 496 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2007) by making timely disclosure of those materials to the defendant.
Early Disclosure of Jencks Act Material
By this request, the defendant seeks the early disclosure of witness statements pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3500. Dkt. #165, p.7. In its response, the government states,
[t]he United States opposes defendant['s] request for immediate disclosure of Jencks Act material, and will comply in this case with our practice and that of the trial court to disclose witness statements before trial. That practice should be followed because [the] defendant[ ] [has] failed to make any showing of good cause for the extraordinary, expedited relief sought.... Nonetheless, the government agrees to provide witness statements required by Title 18, United States Code, Section 3500, at the time set by the trial court according to its usual practice. However, the government reserves the right to withhold witness statements until a ...