REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
In June 2006, Plaintiff Tammy Harper filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under the Social Security Act ("the Act"). Plaintiff alleges she has been unable to work since September 1, 2005, due to back, neck, and hip impairments, as well as emphysema, arthritis, anxiety, depression, and fibromyalgia. The Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denied Plaintiff's application.
Plaintiff, through her attorney, Peter A. Gorton, commenced this action on February 19, 2009, by filing a Complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. (Docket No. 1). Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) and 1383 (c)(3).
On May 20, 2010, the Honorable Norman A. Mordue, Chief United States District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). (Docket No. 16).
The relevant procedural history may be summarized as follows: Plaintiff initially applied for DIB on June 16, 2006, alleging disability beginning on September 1, 2005 (R. at 107).*fn1 Plaintiff alleged disability due to back, neck, and hip impairments, as well as emphysema, arthritis, anxiety, depression, and fibromyalgia. The application was denied (R. at 41-44). Plaintiff timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") (R. at 38). A hearing was held in Binghamton, New York, on July 9, 2008, before ALJ Elizabeth W. Koennecke (R. at 515-46). Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified (R. at 518-35). The following witnesses also testified: Ms. Margaret Fairbanks, Plaintiff's co-worker (R. at 535-38); Mr. Michael Wines, Plaintiff's boyfriend (R. at 539-41); and Ms. Kelly Miller, Plaintiff's friend (R. at 542-44). On September 29, 2008, ALJ Koennecke issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled (R. at 15-24). Plaintiff filed a request for review of that decision (R. at 10). The ALJ's decision became the Commissioner's final decision on February 6, 2009, when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review (R. at 6-9).
Plaintiff, through counsel, timely commenced this action on February 19, 2009. (Docket No. 1). The Commissioner interposed an Answer on June 8, 2009. (Docket No. 9). Plaintiff filed a supporting Brief on September 1, 2009. (Docket No. 13). The Commissioner filed a Brief in opposition on October 15, 2009. (Docket No. 14).
Pursuant to General Order No. 18, issued by the Chief District Judge of the Northern District of New York on September 12, 2003, this Court will proceed as if both parties had accompanied their briefs with a motion for judgment on the pleadings.*fn2
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Commissioner's motion be denied, Plaintiff's motion be granted, and that this case be remanded for further proceedings.
A. Legal Standard and Scope of Review
A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo whether an individual is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383 (c)(3); Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the Commissioner's determination will only be reversed if the correct legal standards were not applied, or it was not supported by substantial evidence. Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Where there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of the right to have her disability determination made according to the correct legal principles."); see Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983); Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979). "Substantial evidence" is evidence that amounts to "more than a mere scintilla," and it has been defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Where evidence is deemed susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner's conclusion must be upheld. See Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
"To determine on appeal whether the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining evidence from both sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts from its weight." Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988). If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's finding must be sustained "even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff's position and despite that the court's independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner's]." Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In other words, this Court must afford the Commissioner's determination considerable deference, and may not substitute "its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner], even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon a de novo review." Valente v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984).
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process*fn3 to determine whether an individual is disabled as defined under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920, 404.1520. The United States Supreme Court recognized the validity of this analysis in Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-142, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987), and it remains the proper approach for analyzing whether a claimant is disabled.
While the claimant has the burden of proof as to the first four steps, the Commissioner has the burden of proof on the fifth and final step. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n. 5; Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582 (2d Cir.1984).
The final step of the inquiry is, in turn, divided into two parts. First, the Commissioner must assess the claimant's job qualifications by considering his or her physical ability, age, education, and work experience. Second, the Commissioner must determine whether jobs exist in the national economy that a person having the claimant's qualifications could perform. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(g); 404.1520(g); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460, 103 S.Ct. 1952, 76 L.Ed.2d 66 (1983).
1. The Commissioner's Decision
The ALJ made the following findings with regard to factual information as well as the five-step process set forth above: Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2012 (R. at 17). Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date of September 1, 2005. Id. At step two, Plaintiff's "degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine and lumbar spine, bilateral trochanteric*fn4 bursitis,*fn5 and emphysema with nicotine abuse" were found to be severe impairments. Id. Plaintiff's depression was found to be a non-severe impairment (R. at 18-19). At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff "d[id] not have an impairment or combination of impairments that m[et] or medically equal[ed] one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1" (R. at 19). The ALJ found that Plaintiff "ha[d] the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a). She c[ould] lift 10 [pounds] occasionally and less than 10 [pounds] frequently. She c[ould] sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour day and stand for 2 hours. She could perform no frequent climbing" (R. at 19). Plaintiff's "statements as to the intensity, frequency and limiting nature of her impairments [were found] to be only partially credible" (R. at 21). The ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any of her past relevant work (R. at 22). At the time of her alleged onset date, Plaintiff was a ...