The opinion of the court was delivered by: Gary L. Sharpe District Court Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Radcliffe Meeks, a Clinton Correctional Facility inmate, commenced this action against defendants Kartan and Sidicky, two physicians employed at the Central New York Psychiatric Center (CNYPC), alleging a civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 7.) On March 9, 2009, Kartan and Sidicky moved for a partial dismissal of Meeks's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. No. 13.) In a Report and Recommendation Order (R&R) filed January 4, 2010, Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles recommended that defendants' motion be granted and that Meeks be given an opportunity to replead. (Dkt. No. 16.) Pending are Meeks's objections to the R&R. (Dkt. No. 18.) For the reasons that follow, the R&R is adopted in its entirety.
In his amended complaint, Meeks alleges that while housed at CNYPC, staff members medicated him and drew blood against his will, despite his protestation that these medical procedures were against his religious beliefs as a Rastafarian Nazarite. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8-12, Dkt. No. 7.) Afterward, Meeks allegedly felt ill for five days-suffering chronic headaches, weakness in his joints, an inability to stand, and an inability to keep his eyes open and focused-and received no medical attention. (Id. at ¶¶ 13-14.) Further, Meeks alleges that following the disruptive behavior of another inmate, staff members once again medicated him and drew blood against his will. (Id. at ¶ 15.) According to Meeks, staff members then confined him in a room where he injured two fingers and received no medical attention.(Id. at ¶ 16.) Meeks claims that Kartan and Sidicky violated the Eighth Amendment by their deliberate indifference to his medical needs and exercise of excessive force. (See id. at ¶¶ 17-25.) Additionally, Meeks claims that they violated his First Amendment right to practice his religion. (See id. at ¶¶ 26-27.) Based on these violations, Meeks seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (See id. at 5.)
In Kartan and Sidicky's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, they argued that: (1) they were not personally involved in the alleged wrongdoings and cannot be found liable under the theory of respondeat superior; (2) the de minimis force used by staff members against Meeks did not constitute excessive force; (3) Meeks failed to allege that Kartan and Sidicky were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need; and (4) New York State's sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment extends to state officers in their official capacities, and therefore the court must dismiss Meeks's claims against Kartan and Sidicky in their official capacities. (See Defs. Mem. of Law at 3-7, Dkt. No. 13.)
Judge Peebles recommended that the court dismiss Meeks's excessive force claims, deliberate indifference claims, and claims for damages against Kartan and Sidicky in their official capacities, and grant Meeks the opportunity to replead. (See R&R, Dkt. No. 16.) Specifically, Judge Peebles found that: (1) Kartan and Sidicky could be held liable despite their claim that they were not personally involved in the alleged wrongdoings; (2) although de minimis force might suffice for an excessive force claim, Meeks's allegations did not evince sadistic or malicious application of force and were insufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim; (3) Meeks's allegations did not include a medical need that was sufficiently serious to support a claim of deliberate medical indifference under the Eighth Amendment; and (4) the Eleventh Amendment provided absolute immunity to Kartan and Sidicky, as state officials, in their official capacities. (See R&R at 19, Dkt. No. 16.) In response, Meeks submitted objections to the R&R, claiming that Kartan and Sidicky's use of force against him was excessive and that Kartan and Sidicky were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical condition. (Dkt. No. 18.)
Before entering final judgment, this court routinely reviews all report-recommendations in cases referred to a magistrate judge. If a party has objected to specific elements of the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations, this court reviews those findings and recommendations de novo. See Almonte v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, No. 04-cv-484, 2006 WL 149049, at *6-7 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2006). In those cases where no party has filed an objection, or only a vague or general objection has been filed, this court reviews the findings and recommendations of a magistrate judge for clear error. See id.
In his objections to the R&R, Meeks specifically objects to Judge Peebles's findings regarding excessive force and deliberate indifference. (See Objections at 2-3, Dkt. No 18.) In addition, Meeks specifically objects to the issue of Kartan and Sidicky's personal involvement. (See id. at 5.) However, since Judge Peebles decided the issue of personal involvement in Meeks's favor, the court accepts the R&R's recommendation to hold Kartan and Sidicky liable for their involvement in the alleged wrongdoings on the basis of their supervisory role.*fn1
A. Deliberate Indifference
As to his allegations of deliberate indifference, Meeks argues that his two injured fingers constituted a serious medical condition and that the staff deliberately refused to provide medical attention. (See id. at 3-4.) The standard for an Eighth Amendment claim on the basis of deliberate indifference includes both an objective and subjective prong. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). To satisfy the objective prong, an alleged deprivation must be "sufficiently serious." See id. This means a condition of urgency that may lead to death, degeneration, or extreme pain. See Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994). Factors to consider include: (1) whether the condition significantly impairs a plaintiff's daily activities; (2) whether the condition has caused a plaintiff severe or chronic pain; (3) worsening of the condition due to lack of treatment; and (4) whether a reasonable doctor or patient would find the injury important and worthy of comment or treatment. See Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 701-02 (2d Cir. 1998).
The subjective prong requires more than negligence by a defendant. See Hathaway, 37 F.3d at 66.Rather, a defendant must "know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For example, a prison official's conscious delay or failure to treat an inmate's serious medical ...