The opinion of the court was delivered by: Gary L. Sharpe District Court Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Donna Clark commenced this action against various employees of the Office of the State Comptroller (OSC), Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA) members, and John Wapner, alleging violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the New York Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), and her First Amendment and Due Process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) Pending are motions to dismiss filed by all defendants. (Dkt. Nos. 26, 30, 36.) For the reasons that follow, the motions are granted in part and denied in part.
The standard of review under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (1) and (6) is well established and will not be repeated here. For a full discussion of the standards, the court refers the parties to its decision in Hunt v. United States, No. 1:07-CV-0112, 2007 WL 2406912, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2007),and Ellis v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP,701 F. Supp. 2d 215, 217-18 (N.D.N.Y. 2010.) As relevant to this motion, review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion "is generally limited to the facts and allegations that are contained in the complaint and in any documents that are either incorporated into the complaint by reference or attached to the complaint as exhibits." Blue Tree Hotels Inv., Ltd. v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 369 F.3d 212, 217 (2d Cir.2004) (citations omitted).
Donna Clark was a Calculation Clerk for OSC from June 30, 2005, to March 1, 2007. (See Compl. ¶ 26, Dkt. No. 1.) Clark suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder, chronic pain, amnestic disorder, post-concussive syndrome, cognitive deficits, photophobia, hip and lumbar injuries, headaches, word retrieval problems, and tangential speech patterns. (See Id. at ¶ 23.) Clark requested and was granted medical leave from October 26, 2006, to December 3, 2006. (See Id. at ¶ 34.) On March 1, 2007, OSC placed Clark on involuntary administrative leave from her job. (See Id. at ¶ 136.) Thereafter, Clark underwent a medical examination and participated in a proceeding where it was determined that she was unfit to perform her job. (See Id. at ¶¶ 136, 142.)
A. Sufficiency of the Complaint
Defendants contend that several claims set forth in the complaint must be dismissed because Clark has not exhausted her administrative remedies with respect to those claims. Specifically, they argue that some claims were neither included in the complaint filed with the EEOC nor reasonably related to those claims, and that various defendants were not specifically named in the EEOC complaint.
While defendants concede that Clark has alleged causes of action under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA, they specifically dispute factual allegations pertaining to each cause of action in relation to exhaustion. The aspect contesting factual allegations surrounding the causes of action is premature. ...