MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff William Terry commenced this action against his former employer, Defendant County of Putnam, and his former supervisors Defendants Michael Rosenzweig and Harold Gary, claiming Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights in retaliation for his threat to report alleged safety violations within his department to an outside board. Specifically Plaintiff Terry alleges that his right to equal protection was violated by selective prosecution, and his First Amendment rights were violated via retaliatory conduct by the Defendants. Currently before this Court are Defendants' motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.*fn1 For the reasons set forth below Defendants' motion is granted.
Plaintiff was hired by Defendant Putnam County as an electrician in the County Highway Department on February 16, 1993. In approximately 1997, Defendant Rosenzweig was hired by the Highway and Facilities Department and became Plaintiff's supervisor. Defendant Harold Gary has been the Commissioner of Highways for Putnam County since approximately 1991 and was Defendant Rosenzweig's immediate supervisor.
Plaintiff alleges that in the years after Defendant Rosenzweig became his supervisor, unqualified and/or unlicensed workers did electrical work and corners were cut on electrical jobs, leading Plaintiff to repeatedly voice concerns to Defendant Rosenzweig about safety. Plaintiff was the sole electrical license holder in the department and was to oversee the work of unlicensed electricians.
Plaintiff states that in 2005 protocols were adopted by the County, in conjunction with the New York Board of Fire Underwriters ("Electrical Board"), to address liability concerns regarding unlicensed electricians performing work for the department while he was out sick for three months. In February of 2007 Plaintiff was again out of work sick for several months. Upon his return, he claims to have found that unlicensed workers were once again performing unsupervised electrical work, and not in compliance with the national electric code. Plaintiff alleges that throughout 2005 and into 2006 required paperwork was not filed for inspections of electrical work and there was insufficient oversight of unlicensed work. Plaintiff discussed these problems with Defendant Rosenzweig as well as with fellow co-workers.
Sometime in early March 2007 -- the exact date is contested -- Plaintiff and Defendant Rosenzweig had a heated discussion regarding these same issues. Plaintiff threatened to go out of the department to the Electrical Board to report what he saw as safety violations if action were not taken to rectify the deficient work. Defendant Rosenzweig verbally reported Plaintiffs safety complaints to Defendant Gary.
On March 8, 2007 Defendant Rosenzweig wrote a memo to Defendant Gary alleging that Plaintiff had made death threats against Rosenzweig and two other department employees in the presence of several staff members. In response, Defendant Gary suspended Plaintiff for thirty days without pay on March 12, 2007. Defendant Gary preferred three charges of misconduct against him on March 20, 2007 in accordance with Section 75 of the Civil Service Law of the State of New York. These charges alleged that Plaintiff made "derogatory, offensive and inappropriate comments to employees and co-workers," "used words and acts of intimidation and made threats of physical violence against co-workers" and "caused disruption and committed inappropriate workplace behavior through words and acts of intimidation, threats of violence, and derogatory and inappropriate comments to co-workers."
Plaintiff was allowed to go back to work in June, 2007, but in a different location and no longer under the supervision of Defendant Rosenzweig. However, on September 17th, 2007, Defendant Gary again suspended Plaintiff for thirty days without pay and preferred another set of disciplinary charges. Said charges alleged misconduct and insubordination for failure to properly fill out and return certain documents.
In his defense to the first set of charges, Plaintiff claims that whatever inappropriate language he may have used in the workplace -- and he specifically denies the death threats attributed to him -- it was no worse than language used on a regular basis by virtually all staff members in that department. Obscenity and threats of violence were common place in the department, according to Plaintiff, and not something taken seriously by supervisors. Plaintiff asserts that both sets of charges preferred against him were a pretext used by Defendants Gary and Rosenzweig to keep him from reporting unsafe practices to the Electrical Board. Defendants aver that the charges had nothing to do with Plaintiff's threat to go to the Electrical Board, and that Plaintiff's termination was solely in response to his threats of violence and other inappropriate conduct.
On October 30th, 2007 and January 22, 2008 hearings were convened before an arbitrator in accordance with a collective bargaining agreement between the Defendant County of Putnam and the Civil Service Employees Association. On May 27th, 2008 the arbitrator issued an Opinion and Award finding just cause to terminate Plaintiff's employment based on the first set of charges but not the second. On June 6th, 2008 Defendant Gary adopted the findings of the arbitrator and terminated Plaintiff's employment with the County. Plaintiff thereafter brought an Article 78 action against Defendants Gary and Putnam County in New York State Supreme Court to vacate, set aside and nullify the disciplinary hearing and determination, which was denied on August 19, 2008.
Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Bryant v. Mafucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir. 1991). A fact is material when its resolution would "affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law" and a dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must draw all permissible inferences in favor of that party from the submitted affidavits, exhibits, interrogatory answers, and depositions. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Vann v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1040, 1048-49 (2d Cir. 1995). "Assessments of credibility and choices between conflicting versions of the events are matters for the jury, not for the court on summary judgment." Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 2005). However, "[t]he mere existence of some ...