The opinion of the court was delivered by: Smith, J.
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the New York Reports.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has asked us three questions about the interpretation of CPLR 214-c (4), which extends the statute of limitations for certain tort victims who do not, for some time, know the cause of their injuries. We answer the questions by holding that:
(1) the provisions of CPLR 214-c (4) are limited to actions for injuries caused by the latent effects of exposure to a substance;
(2) an injury that occurs within hours of exposure to a substance can be considered "latent" for these purposes; and
(3) "technical, scientific or medical knowledge and information sufficient to ascertain the cause of [the plaintiff's] injury" is "discovered, identified or determined" within the meaning of the statute when the existence of the causal relationship is generally accepted within the relevant technical, scientific or medical community.
Plaintiff suffered a series of strokes in March of 1999. The strokes were caused, we assume for present purposes, by ephedra, a substance contained in a dietary supplement that plaintiff had been using for about two years. Ephedra causes in some users a short-term elevation in blood pressure, heart rate or both, and a temporary constriction of certain blood vessels. This effect, which increases the risk of stroke, typically occurs within a few hours after ephedra is consumed.
Neither plaintiff nor the doctors who treated him for his strokes knew at the time that ephedra was to blame. When they could, or reasonably should, have known of the causal connection is disputed. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York has found that studies published as early as 1996 suggested a link between ephedra and stroke, but that as late as 2005 scientific evidence did not establish the link "with any degree of medical or scientific 'certainty'" (In re Ephedra Prods. Liab. Litig., 598 F Supp 2d 535, 536 [SD NY 2009]).
Plaintiff claims that he became aware of a possible link between ephedra and stroke in February 2003, when news reports suggested that the sudden death of a major league baseball player might have been caused by ephedra. On July 28, 2003 -- about four years, four months after his strokes --plaintiff sued the distributor of the product he had taken in New York State Supreme Court. The case was removed to federal court, the manufacturer of the product was added as a defendant, and the case was consolidated with other ephedra-related litigation in the Southern District of New York.
Defendants moved to dismiss the case as barred by the statute of limitations, relying on CPLR 214 (5), which imposes a three-year limitation period, with certain exceptions, on "an action to recover damages for a personal injury." It is undisputed that the claim is barred by CPLR 214 (5) unless it is saved by the exception in CPLR 214-c (4), which we quote in the next section of this opinion.
Defendants' statute of limitations motion generated a series of opinions in the District Court and the Second Circuit.
Initially, the District Court granted the motion to dismiss (In re Ephedra Prods., 2006 WL 944705, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 18691 [SD NY 2006]). Plaintiff appealed to the Second Circuit, which remanded the case for determination of an issue the District Court had not reached (Giordano v Market America, Inc., 289 Fed Appx 467 [2d Cir 2008]). Following the District Court's ruling on that issue (In re Ephedra Prods. Liab. Litig., 598 F Supp 2d 535 [SD NY 2009]), the Second Circuit certified to us the three questions that we now address (Giordano v Market America, Inc., 599 F3d 87 [2d Cir 2010]).
Directly in issue here is subdivision four of CPLR 214-c, which refers to subdivisions two and three of the same section. The text of the three relevant subdivisions is:
"2. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 214, the three year period within which an action to recover damages for personal injury or injury to property caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance or combination of substances, in any form, upon or within the body or upon or within property must be commenced shall be computed from the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or from the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence such injury should have been discovered by the plaintiff, whichever is earlier.
"3. For the purposes of sections fifty-e and fifty-i of the general municipal law, section thirty-eight hundred thirteen of the education law and the provisions of any general, special or local law or charter requiring as a condition precedent to commencement of an action or special proceeding that a notice of claim be filed or presented within a specified period of time after the claim or action accrued, a claim or action for personal injury or injury to property caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance or combination of substances, in any form, upon or within the body or upon or within property shall be deemed to have accrued on the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or on the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence the injury should have been discovered, whichever is earlier.
"4. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivisions two and three of this section, where the discovery of the cause of the injury is alleged to have occurred less than five years after discovery of the injury or when with reasonable diligence such injury should have been discovered, whichever is earlier, an action may be commenced or a claim filed within one year of such discovery of the cause of the injury; provided, however, if any such action is commenced or claim filed after the period in which it would otherwise have been authorized pursuant to subdivision two or three of this section the plaintiff or claimant shall be required to allege and prove that technical, scientific or medical knowledge and information sufficient to ascertain the cause of his injury had not been discovered, identified or determined prior to the expiration of the period within which the action or claim would have been authorized and that he has otherwise satisfied the requirements of subdivisions two and three of this section."
The three questions that the Second Circuit has asked us are:
"1. Are the provisions of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-c (4) providing for an extension of the statute of limitations in certain circumstances limited to actions for injuries caused by the latent effects of exposure to a substance?
"2. Can an injury that occurs within 24 to 48 hours of exposure to a substance be considered ...