Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

X Bank of v. Commack Properties

December 10, 2010

X BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO LASALLE BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE REGISTERED HOLDERS OF J.P. MORGAN CHASE COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES TRUST 2007-LDP 11, COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE PASSTHROUGH CERTIFICATES SERIES 2007-LDP 11,
PLAINTIFF
v.
COMMACK PROPERTIES, LLC, AND JAY R. VIDERS, DEFENDANTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Denis. R. Hurley Senior District Judge

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Senior District Judge:

This is a commercial foreclosure action commenced by Plaintiff Bank of America, as Trustee, ("Lender") against defendant Commack Properties, LLC ("Commack") and Jay R. Viders ("Viders") (collectively "Defendants"). Presently before the Court is Lender's motion for summary judgment against Commack on its foreclosure cause of action*fn1 and Defendants' cross motion to compel arbitration. For the reasons set forth below, Lender's motion is granted and Defendants' cross-motion is denied.

Factual Background

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.*fn2

On or about March 26, 2007, Commack borrowed from AIG Mortgage Capital LLC (the "Original Lender") the principal amount of $5,000,000 (the "Loan"), for financing related to certain property owned by Commack and located at 366-368 Veterans Memorial Highway, Commack, New York (the "Property"). To evidence the Loan, Commack executed a Promissory Note dated March 26, 2007. As security for the Loan, Commack executed and delivered to the Original Lender a Mortgage, Assignment of Leases and Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture filing (the "Mortgage"), dated March 26, 2007, and recorded in the real estate records of Suffolk County on April 27, 2007.

The Mortgage and Note, among other documents, were thereafter assigned to other entities. It is undisputed that Lender is the present holder of the Note and the Mortgage, among other documents.

Under the terms of the Loan, Commack is required to pay per month $29,900.00 in principal and interest and approximately $13,500 to cover insurance and taxes. Commack is presently in default under the terms of the Loan by, among other things, failing to make timely payments. Commack failed to make monthly payments in July, August, and September 2009. In October 2009, Commack remitted approximately $43,500 and thereafter remitted approximately $13,600 each month form November 2009 to February 2010. The defaults have not been cured and the Lender has accelerated all sums due under the Loan. Despite demand for payment, Commack has failed to pay all sums due under the Loan. The principal balance outstanding and due immediately under the Loan is at least $4,985,769.25 as of November 2009.

Discussion

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is only appropriate where admissible evidence in the form of affidavits, deposition transcripts, or other documentation demonstrates both the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and one party's entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 309 (2d Cir. 2008); Viola v. Philips Med. Sys. of N. Am., 42 F.3d 712, 716 (2d Cir. 1994). The relevant governing law in each case determines which facts are material; "only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see SCR Joint Venture L.P. v. Warshawsky, 559 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2009); Coppola v. Bear Stearns & Co., 499 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2007). No genuinely triable factual issue exists when the moving party demonstrates, on the basis of the pleadings and submitted evidence, and after drawing all inferences and resolving all ambiguities in favor of the non-movant, that no rational jury could find in the non-movant's favor. See SCR Joint Venture, 559 F.3d at 137; Chertkova v. Conn. Gen'l Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).

To defeat a summary judgment motion properly supported by affidavits, depositions, or other documentation, the non-movant must offer similar materials setting forth specific facts that show that there is a genuine issue of material fact to be tried. See Rule v. Brine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1002, 1011 (2d Cir. 1996). The non-movant must present more than a "scintilla of evidence," Del. & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Cons. Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174, 178 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252), or "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Aslanidis v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1067, 1072 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)), and cannot rely on the allegations in his or her pleadings, conclusory statements, or on "mere assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not credible." Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted). Affidavits submitted in opposition to summary judgment must be based on personal knowledge, must "set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence," and must show that the affiant is "competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 219 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). "Rule 56(e)'s requirement the affiant have personal knowledge and be competent to testify to the matters asserted in the affidavit also means that an affidavit's hearsay assertions that would not be admissible at trial if testified to by the affiant is insufficient to create a genuine issue for trial." Patterson, 375 F.3d at 219 (citing Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc.,183 F.3d 155, 160 (2d Cir. 1999)).

When determining whether a genuinely disputed factual issue exists, "a trial judge must bear in mind the actual quantum and quality of proof necessary to support liability," or "the substantive evidentiary standards that apply to the case." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254-55.

A district court considering a summary judgment motion must also be "mindful of the underlying standards and burdens of proof," Pickett v. RTS Helicopter, 128 F.3d 925, 928 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252), because the evidentiary burdens that the respective parties will bear at trial guide the district court in its determination of a summary judgment motion. See Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 211 (2d Cir. 1988). Where the non-moving party will bear the ultimate burden of proof on an issue at trial, the moving party's burden under Rule 56 will be satisfied if he can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the non-movant's claim. See id. at 210-11. Where a movant without the underlying burden of proof offers evidence that the non-movant has failed to establish her claim, the burden shifts to the non-movant to offer "persuasive evidence that [her] claim is not 'implausible.'" Brady, 863 F.2d at 211 (citing Matsushita, 475 ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.