The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Harold Baer, Jr., District Judge:*fn1
Petitioner's case originates from an incident that took place on November 10, 1989, in which he had an altercation with Gilberto Torres that resulted in Torres' death from multiple gunshot wounds. The Petitioner, the witnesses, and the forensic evidence in this case all suggest different stories as to the intent involved in the killing, and each version is detailed in the R&R. On October 4, 1990, the jury found Petitioner guilty of murder in the second degree pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25. The trial judge sentenced Petitioner to the maximum sentence of 25 years to life imprisonment and recommended against parole.
Petitioner appealed his conviction directly. The Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously affirmed the conviction. Peoplev. Pizarro, 585 N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y. App. Div., 1st Dep't 1992), appeal denied,80 N.Y.2d 908 (1992). It found that: (1) the trial court did not err in disallowing evidence of Torres' prior acts of violence because Pizarro did not offer proof that he was aware of that reputation at the time of the altercation; (2) Petitioner's challenge to the prosecutor's statement in summation, implying that Petitioner had the burden of proof, was not preserved because Petitioner did not object at the time the alleged statements were made; (3) Petitioner's contention that he was deprived of a fair trial when the court extensively questioned testimony of his witness was also not preserved because he failed to object at trial, and he did not specify any conduct evincing bias. Id.
On March 20, 2007, Petitioner moved to vacate his conviction pursuant to section 440.10 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law. He claimed, among other things, that new evidence from three first-hand witnesses demonstrated his actual innocence. On August 8, 2007, the New York Supreme Court found that the witnesses' affidavits were not credible and denied Petitioner's motion. On October 18, 2007, the Appellate Division denied Petitioner's appeal.
Petitioner commenced this action on October 1, 2008, arguing that he had secured three additional witnesses whose testimony would prove actual innocence of second degree murder. On January 7, 2009, the Court directed Petitioner to submit an affidavit within 60 days, showing why the statute of limitations imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-13, 110 Stat. 1214, 28 U.S.C. § 2244, should not bar his petition. Petitioner responded that evidence of actual innocence should overcome any time-bar to his claims under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321-22 (1995). Respondent answered and Petitioner submitted supplemental arguments.
B. Magistrate Judge Freeman's Report & Recommendation
After carefully evaluating the submissions, Magistrate Judge Freeman recommended that Petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied. The R&R opines that the claims are time barred under AEDPA, which requires that a petitioner file within one year of the latest of four dates, in this case "the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The judgment became final in November, 1992, 90 days after Petitioner's final appeal was denied, see Pizarro, 80 N.Y.2d 908, and Petitioner was also allowed an additional one-year grace period from AEDPA's effective date of April 24, 1996. The R&R denies and refutes the arguments that Petitioner made as to why this limitation should not apply. First, the statute of limitations did not begin to run anew with the finalization of his section 440.10 motion on October 18, 2007. Section 2244(d)(2) provides that an application for State collateral review tolls, but does not restart, the applicable statute of limitations. Second, to the extent that a showing of actual innocence may overcome the statute of limitations,*fn2 Petitioner's purportedly new evidence is not credible or different enough from the evidence presented at trial to establish a probability that no reasonable juror would have found Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The R&R based its finding on two grounds: the presumption that a state court's prior review of the evidence is correct without clear and convincing evidence to rebut that finding and a lack of credibility in the witness testimony itself.
Petitioner objects to the R&R on the grounds that: (1) he should have been granted an evidentiary hearing to assess the credibility of his new witnesses, the denial of which he claims violates his habeas right as well as his First, Sixth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; and (2) the R&R was incorrect in finding that he failed to show that the doctrine of "equitable tolling" should overcome the statute of limitations. In a supplemental letter to the Court dated December 3, 2010 Petitioner withdrew certain references to the Fifth Amendment within his supplemental memorandum of law.
This Court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations" of a magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); New York Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Perimeter Interiors, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 410, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). This Court reviews de novo those parts of the R&R to which objections are made, and reviews the remainder for clear error. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Perimeter Interiors, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 414. "When a party makes only generalized or conclusory objections, or simply reiterates his original arguments, the Court reviews a magistrate judge's report and recommendation for clear error." Perimeter Interiors, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 414. However, motions by pro se litigants "must be construed liberally and ...