In February of 2007, Plaintiff Cassandra Kelly applied for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI" ) benefits under the Social Security Act. Plaintiff alleges that she has been unable to work since January 1, 2007, due to physical and mental impairments. The Commissioner of Social Security denied Plaintiff's application. Plaintiff, through her attorneys, Olinsky & Shurtliff, Jaya A. Shurtliff, Esq., of counsel, commenced this action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) and 1383 (c)(3).
On December 22, 2010, the Honorable Norman A. Mordue, Chief United States District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). (Docket No. 19).
The relevant procedural history may be summarized as follows:
Plaintiff applied for benefits on February 2, 2007, alleging
disability beginning January 1, 2007. (T at 64-66).*fn1
The applications were denied initially and Plaintiff timely
requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). A
hearing was held on August 6, 2009, before ALJ Thomas P. Tielens.
Plaintiff appeared with her attorney and testified. (T at 18-33).
On September 3, 2009, ALJ Tielens issued a decision denying Plaintiff's application. (T at 10-16). The ALJ's decision became the Commissioner's final decision on November 5, 2009, when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (T at 1-3).
Plaintiff, through counsel, commenced this action on December 4, 2009, by filing a Complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. (Docket No. 1). The Commissioner interposed an Answer on April 22, 2010. (Docket No. 7). Plaintiff filed a supporting Brief on September 9, 2010. (Docket No. 13). The Commissioner filed a Brief in opposition on December 15, 2010. (Docket No. 17).
Pursuant to General Order No. 18, issued by the Chief District Judge of the Northern District of New York on September 12, 2003, this Court will proceed as if both parties had accompanied their briefs with a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Commissioner's motion be denied, Plaintiff's motion be granted, and that this case be remanded for further proceedings.
A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo whether an individual is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir.1990). Rather, the Commissioner's determination will only be reversed if the correct legal standards were not applied, or it was not supported by substantial evidence. Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir.1987) ("Where there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of the right to have her disability determination made according to the correct legal principles."); see Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir.1983); Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir.1979).
"Substantial evidence" is evidence that amounts to "more than a mere scintilla," and it has been defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). Where evidence is deemed susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner's conclusion must be upheld. See Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir.1982).
If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's finding must be sustained "even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff's position and despite that the court's independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner's]." Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F.Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y.1992). In other words, this Court must afford the Commissioner's determination considerable deference, and may not substitute "its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner], even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon a de novo review." Valente v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir.1984).
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether an individual is disabled as defined under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920, 404.1520. The United States Supreme Court recognized the validity of this analysis in Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-142, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987), and it remains the proper approach for analyzing whether a claimant is disabled.*fn2
While the claimant has the burden of proof as to the first four steps, the Commissioner has the burden of proof on the fifth and final step. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n. 5; Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582 (2d Cir.1984).
The final step of the inquiry is, in turn, divided into two parts. First, the Commissioner must assess the claimant's job qualifications by considering his or her physical ability, age, education, and work experience. Second, the Commissioner must determine whether jobs exist in the national economy that a person having the claimant's qualifications could perform. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(g); 404.1520(g); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460, 103 S.Ct. 1952, 76 L.Ed.2d 66 (1983).
1. Commissioner's Decision
The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since the date her benefits application was filed.*fn3
The ALJ further determined that Plaintiff had the following
medically determinable impairment considered "severe" under the Social
Security Act: status post left shoulder surgeries for dislocation. (T
However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the impairments found in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the "Listings"). (T at 13).
The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform sedentary work, as defined in 20 CFR § 416.967 (a), except that she was limited to only occasional climbing of ladders, ropes and scaffolds; was required to avoid cold and hazards; and was limited work that is simple and repetitive. (T at 13).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. (T at 15). The ALJ considered Plaintiff's age (20 years old on the application date), education (high school), work experience, and RFC (sedentary work, limited as set forth above), and concluded that there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. (T at 15-16). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined under the Act, from the application date through the date of the ALJ's decision. (T at 16). As noted above, the ALJ's decision became the Commissioner's final decision on November 5, 2009, when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (T at 1-3).
Plaintiff contends that the Commissioner's decision should be reversed. She offers four (4) principal arguments in support of her position. First, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly concluded that several of her impairments were not severe. Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's RFC determination was flawed. Third, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ did not properly assess her credibility. Fourth, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to consult a vocational expert. This Court will address each argument in turn.
a. Severity of Impairments
At step two of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits his or her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). The following are examples of "basic work activities": "walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling ... seeing, hearing, and speaking ... [u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions ... [u]se of judgment ... [r]esponding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations." Gibbs v. Astrue, No. 07-Civ-10563, 2008 WL 2627714, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2008); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b)(l)-(5).
The claimant bears the burden of presenting evidence establishing the severity of his or her impairments. Miller v. Comm'r of Social Sec., No. 05-CV-1371, 2008 WL 2783418, at *6-7 (N.D.N.Y. July 16, 2008); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). The "mere presence of a disease or impairment, or establishing that a person has been diagnosed or treated for a disease or impairment" is not, by itself, sufficient to render a condition "severe." Coleman v. Shalala, 895 F.Supp. 50, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1995). Indeed, a "finding of 'not severe' should be made if the medical evidence establishes only a 'slight abnormality' which would have 'no more than a minimal effect on an individual's ability to work.'" Rosario v. Apfel, No. 97-CV-5759, 1999 WL 294727 at *5 (E.D.N.Y. March 19,1999) (quoting Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 154 n. 12 (1987)).
In this case, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's depression, anxiety, and other mental impairments did not cause more than a minimal impairment in her ability to perform basic work activities and, thus, were not severe impairments. (T at 12).
When evaluating the severity of mental impairments, the regulations require the ALJ to apply a "special technique" at the second and third steps of the review, in addition to the customary sequential analysis. Kohler v. Astrue, 546 F.3d 260, 265-66 (2d Cir.2008) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a). The technique first requires a determination of whether the claimant has a medically determinable mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(b)(1). Then, the ALJ must rate the degree of the claimant's functional limitation resulting from the impairment in four areas: (1) activities of daily living; (2) social functioning; (3) concentration, persistence, or pace; and (4) episodes of decompensation. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3).
These areas are rated on a scale of "none, mild, moderate, marked, and extreme." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c)(4); 416 .920a(c)(4). A mental impairment is generally found not severe if the degree of limitation in the first three areas is mild or better and there are no episodes of decompensation. § 404.1520a(d)(1). The ALJ must document "a specific finding as to the degree of limitation in each of the functional areas." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(e)(2).
The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff possessed only mild restrictions in terms of her activities of daily living, mild difficulties in maintaining social functioning, mild difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; and had never experienced any repeated episodes of decompensation. (T at 12). The ALJ based his decision upon the assessment of a non-examining State Agency review consultant and portions of a report prepared by a consultative examiner. (T at 12).
The State Agency review consultant opined that Plaintiff was not significantly limited with regard to understanding and memory. (T at 335). The consultant found Plaintiff "moderately limited" with regard to carrying out detailed instructions and working in coordination with or proximity to others without being distracted by them. (T at 335). Otherwise, consultant concluded that Plaintiff's concentration and persistence were not significantly limited. (T at 335-36). The consultant opined that Plaintiff was moderately limited in terms of accepting instructions and responding appropriately to criticism from supervisors, but had no other significant limitation with regard to social interaction. (T at 336). The consultant found moderate limitation with ...