The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Glenn T. Suddaby, United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER
Currently before the Court in the above-captioned action are (1) Plaintiffs' motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's Decision and Order of June 18, 2010 ("June Order"), and (2) their renewed motion for attorney's fees and costs incurred thus far in collecting the amounts owed to Plaintiffs by Defendants in this action. (Dkt. Nos. 18.)*fn1 For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' motion for partial reconsideration is denied; and their renewed motion for attorney's fees and costs is granted in part and denied in part.
I. MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION
Motions for reconsideration in this Court are governed by Local Rule 7.1(g) of the Local Rules of Practice for this Court. As an initial matter, the Court notes that the June Order was entered on June 18, 2010, and Plaintiffs filed their motion for reconsideration on July 14, 2010. Plaintiffs' motion is therefore denied as untimely. See N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(g) ("Unless Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 otherwise governs, a party may file and serve a motion for reconsideration or reargument no later than FOURTEEN DAYS after the entry of the challenged judgment, order, or decree.").
In any event, even if the Court were to consider the merits of Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, the Court would deny that motion as without cause. "[A] motion to reconsider should not be granted where the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided." Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). A district court may, however, properly reconsider its previous ruling if (1) there is an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence not previously available comes to light, or (3) it becomes necessary to remedy a clear error of law or to prevent obvious injustice. Stewart Park & Res. Coalition, Inc. v. Slater, 374 F. Supp.2d 243, 253 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (Treece, M.J.).
Here, Plaintiffs have failed to establish the existence of any of the
above factors. Instead, in Plaintiffs' memorandum of law,*fn2
they merely attempt to relitigate certain points that this
Court previously decided in the June Order.*fn3 For
each of these two alternative reasons, Plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration is denied.
II. RENEWED MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
A. Number of Hours Reasonably Expended on this Action
In the June Order, the Court refused to award Plaintiffs' attorney's fees because the Court was unable to determine the amount of time that Plaintiffs' counsel spent thus far in collecting the amounts owed to Plaintiffs by Defendants in this action. Cent. New York Laborers, 2010 WL 2545151, at *4. As noted above, Plaintiffs' have since submitted documentation in an effort to address this issue.
However, upon review of Plaintiffs' counsel's billing statements, the Court finds that certain time entries recorded by both counsel and counsel's paralegals are vague, duplicative, and/or excessive. For example, the Court finds that the following entries reflect an excessive amount of time spent on the task indicated: Date Employee Hours Amount Description 11/18/2009 JAC 1.70 419.00 Worked on attorney affidavit, paralegal affidavit, Fund affidavit, Union affidavit, Memorandum of law, Narrative of legal services, and notice of motion for default judgment, worked on Exhibits 11/25/2009 JAC 1.0 247.00 Worked on attorney affidavit, paralegal affidavit, Memorandum of law, Order, 214 Pension Fund affidavit, Union affidavit, CNYLF affidavit and Narrative of legal services on motion for Judgment 12/03/2009 JAC 1.0 247.00 Worked on attorney affidavit, paralegal affidavit, Memorandum of law, CNY Laborers Fund affidavit, 214 Pension Fund affidavit, Order, Notice of Motion, Narrative of fees and memorandum of law on motion for judgment.
12/08/2009 JAC .60 148.20 Researched contractual right to attorney fees and costs under LMRA, recovery of fees costs under ERISA for services to collect delinquencies in violation of contract, lodestar rate for community and ERISA action, and case law supporting Funds' right to recoup costs of collection The Court finds that these billing entries reflect an excessive amount of time spent on the task indicated because, among other things, Plaintiffs' counsel was counsel for a group of plaintiffs in Eng'rs Joint Welfare, Pension, Supplemental Unemployment Benefit and Training Funds v. Catone Constr. Co., Inc., 08-CV-1048, 2009 WL 4730700, (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2009) (Scullin, J.), a different, but nearly identical, ERISA action. In both cases, Plaintiffs' counsel submitted affidavits, memorandum of law, and other documents that were almost identical. For instance, Point I, II, and III of Plaintiffs' memorandum of law in support of their motion for default judgment in this case is copied verbatim from the memorandum of law in support of the motion for default judgment in Eng'rs Joint Welfare, Pension, Supplemental Unemployment Benefit and Training Funds. To further illustrate, as indicated by the billing entry above, dated 12/08/2009, Plaintiffs' counsel billed for researching issues such as "lodestar rate for community and ERISA action," and "recovery of fees and costs under ERISA for services to collect and delinquencies in violation of contract." The Court, however, notes that Plaintiffs' counsel previously addressed these same issues in Eng'rs Joint Welfare, Pension, Supplemental Unemployment Benefit and Training Funds. Therefore, to compensate counsel twice for the same work would allow for a "double recovery," which would obviously be inappropriate.
Furthermore, the Court finds that some of Plaintiffs' time entries are so vague as to hinder the Court's ability to determine whether the amount of time spent on the particular task was reasonable. Time records should enable the court to determine the nature of the tasks performed and the amount of time reasonably required to perform those tasks. Mr. X. v. New York State Educ. Dept., 20 F. Supp.2d 561, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Vague or incomplete time entries justify a reduction in the amount of attorney's fees awarded.*fn4
Finally, the Court finds that the submitted billing records contain entries that are not sufficiently specific and do not adequately describe the nature of the work performed. For example, some of the entries are described as "worked on memorandum of law," "drafted affidavits," or "drafted letters to [various individuals]." (Dkt. No. 18, Attach. 2.) These time entries do not provide a detailed description of the services performed; rather, they contain a boilerplate explanation that was copied and pasted verbatim throughout the billing statements. (Id.) In addition, some of the entries are questionable because they appear to include tasks that are not relevant to the ERISA action.
The district court is embodied with broad discretion to independently review and assess the reasonableness of the hours worked by attorneys. Gatti v. Community Action Agency of Greene County, Inc., 263 F. Supp.2d 496, 518 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (Treece, M.J.). It is well-settled that case law disallows fee requests for hours that are "excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." Gatti, 263 F. Supp.2d at 518 (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Rather than sift through the submitted time sheets, the Court can 'exclude excessive and unreasonable hours from its fee computation by making an across-the-board reduction in the amount of hours.'" Id. (Luciano v. ...